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


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
1817

ARTES SCIENTIA VERITAS











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POSTHUMOUS WORKS

OF

FREDERIC II.

KING OF PRUSSIA.

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V O L. IV.

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M E M O



FROM THE  
PEACE OF HUBERTSBURG,  
TO THE  
PARTITION OF POLAND,  
AND OF THE  
BAVARIAN WAR.

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TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH  
BY  
THOMAS HOLCROFT.

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O F

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## P R E F A C E.

**I** HAD reason to suppose that the last political and military work I should bequeath to posterity would be the history of what had passed in Europe, from the year 1756 to the year 1763, when the peace of Hubertsburg was concluded. After so many laborious campaigns, by which my constitution had been destroyed, my advanced age began to make me sensible of those infirmities which were the necessary result, gave me a glimpse of the goal of life which I was approaching, and induced me to forebode that the only services I could hereafter render the state would be to efface, by a sage and active administration, the infinite evils which war had inflicted on all the provinces of the Prussian monarchy. There  
was

## ii P R E F A C E.

was reason to hope, after the violent shocks which had been felt by Europe during the last war, that calm serenity would succeed to storms so numerous. The preponderating powers were wearied, by the prodigious efforts they had been obliged to make. The exhausted state of their finances inspired sentiments of moderation, which banished that animosity to the indulgence of which they had yielded with but too much unreserve. Weary at length of so many useless labours, they were only desirous of confirming the public tranquillity.

This tranquillity was still more necessary to Prussia than to the rest of Europe, for she had borne almost the whole burthen of the war. It is impossible to picture the state of this kingdom, except by the image of a man whose body is pierced by a thousand swords, weakened by the loss of blood, and ready to sink under the weight of his sufferings; for whom regimen was necessary to his convalescence, restoratives to give him vigour, and balms to heal his wounds. Under such circumstances, government could only follow the example of a wise physician, who,  
aided

aided by time and gentle remedies, recovers the powers of an extenuated body.

These considerations were so forcible that the domestic government of the state absorbed my whole attention. The nobility were exhausted, the people ruined; numerous villages had been burned; many towns had been destroyed, as well by sieges as by incendiaries suborned by the enemy. One universal anarchy had overthrown all order; the police and the government of finances were in the utmost confusion; in a word, desolation was become general. Add, to these numerous embarrassments, that of the death of the old counsellors and ministers of finance, during the course of the war; so that, singly as I may say and unsupported, I was obliged to select new agents, and at the same time to form them to the exercise of those offices to which they were destined.

Nor was the army in a better situation than the rest of the country. Seventeen battles had cut off the flower of the officers and the soldiers; the regiments were half destroyed, and composed in part of deserters, or of prisoners taken from the enemy.

Order

#### iv P R E F A C E.

Order had almost disappeared, and discipline was so much relaxed that our old corps of infantry were not superior to new raised militia. It was therefore necessary to think of recruiting the regiments, and of re-establishing order and discipline; particularly of inspiring the young officers with the love of glory, that this degraded body of men might recover its ancient energy.

The picture which politics presented was not more flattering than that we have exposed to view. The conduct of England, toward the close of the last war, had broken off our alliance with that power. The separate peace she had concluded with France, the negotiations she had attempted in Russia, to embroil me with the emperor Peter III. the advances she had made at the court of Vienna, to sacrifice my interests to that court, all these instances of ill faith having dissolved the connections which had united me to Great Britain, I was left after the general peace single, and destitute of allies in Europe.

This critical situation was not however of long duration; for, toward the end of

## P R E F A C E.      v

the year 1763, affairs assumed a more favourable aspect. The court of Russia had been stunned, as it were, by the sudden revolution which had happened there, and time was necessary to recover recollection. Scarcely had the new empress secured her domestic government before she extended her views, and made approaches to Prussia. At first, these were nothing more than explanations; but the mutual necessity of union was soon seen not to be problematic. At the time that this negotiation began to strengthen, Augustus III. king of Poland died; and this unexpected event was sufficient to accelerate the conclusion of a defensive alliance, between Russia and Prussia. The empress wished to dispose of the vacant throne at her pleasure; and Prussia was the ally that best might conduce to effect this purpose. Stanislaus Poniatowsky was accordingly, soon after, elected king of Poland.

Nor would this election have been attended with any disagreeable consequences, had the empress stopped there; but she further required the republic should grant very considerable

## iv P R E F A C E.

siderable privileges to the dissidents. These new pretensions excited a universal insurrection, in Poland. The grandees of the kingdom implored the succour of the Turk; war soon after was kindled, and the Russian armies had only to appear in order to vanquish the Muscovites in all their encounters.

This war changed the whole political system of Europe. A new career being opened, he must have been without address, or buried in stupid torpor, who should have neglected to profit by so advantageous an opportunity. I had read the beautiful allegory of Boyardo. I therefore took time by the forelock, and, by dint of negotiation, I effected an indemnification in favour of our monarchy for all its past losses, by incorporating Polish Prussia with my former provinces. This was one of the most important acquisitions we could possibly make; because it joined Pomerania and Eastern Prussia, and, by rendering us masters of the Vistula, we gained the double advantage of being able to defend this kingdom, and of levying very considerable tolls on the Vistula ;

tula; the whole trade of Poland being carried on upon that river.

The attainment of Pomerellia, which will stand as an epocha in the annals of Prussia, has appeared to me a circumstance sufficiently remarkable to be transmitted at length to posterity; especially as I myself was a witness of and an actor in the scene. The original pieces of the negotiations which I shall expose, in the course of the work, are all to be found among the archives of Prussian foreign affairs. I have divided these memoirs into three chapters. The first treats of negotiations and political affairs, from the peace of Hubertsburg to the pacification of Poland. The second embraces affairs of finance; the new branches of commerce that have been established; the lands that have been cleared, in various provinces; the products of Western Prussia, and the improvements of which it still is susceptible. The third contains all those objects that have any relation to the army, its establishment, its augmentation; the number of new corps levied, after the acquisition of Pomerellia: the state of the troops, which was  
fixed



viii      P R E F A C E.

fixed in time of peace at a hundred and eighty-six thousand men; the artillery, and all the arrangements necessary to give motion to the mass.

I ought at the same time to inform the reader that, having felt some repugnance to speak continually of myself throughout a long narration, I have preferred speaking of facts in the third person to an egotism so disgusting. I shall therefore simply confine myself to the office of a historian, who is desirous of describing, with truth and precision, the events which happened in his time, without either exaggerating or falsifying the smallest circumstances. I never during my life deceived any one, still less would I deceive posterity.

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M E M O I R S  
FROM THE  
PEACE OF HUBERTSBURG  
TO THE  
PARTITION OF POLAND.

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C H A P. I.

*Of the State of Politics, from the Year 1763 to  
the Year 1775.*

I N order to obtain a just idea of the political situation of Europe, after the peace of Hubertsburg, it is requisite we should recollect that all its kingdoms were nearly in a like proportion exhausted. France had made peace with England, because she wanted sufficient funds for the campaign of the year 1763. Nor would the empress queen have concluded the peace of Hubertsburg, if her peculiar resources had not

totally failed. The king of Prussia only was still in possession of ready money, because he had always had the prudence to keep the supplies for the year in advance in his treasury. The want of specie influenced political views, and each power was desirous of maintaining the public tranquillity, that it might gain time to recover its strength.

Probably this was one of the causes which most contributed to the continuance of the treaty that had been concluded at Versailles, between the emperor, France, and Spain. Austria no doubt was most benefited by this treaty; because that, being sure of France, she had nothing to fear either in Flanders or in Italy; and thus it was in her power to employ all her forces against Prussia, if it should become needful. France, on the other part, in safety from the formidable house of Austria, beheld her frontiers in no danger of insult; and, as she could foresee no possibility of a continental war, she was enabled to confine her whole attention to the increase of her navy; which, added to that of Spain, might hereafter inspire the English fleets with awe.

These provident views were well founded. The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle had been too precipitately concluded: many points which ought to have been clearly explained were but slightly

highly mentioned; as that of the right of fishing, granted to the French on the banks of Newfoundland; the Manilla ransom, which England demanded from Spain; and other matters which, in reality, were of small importance, but which were sufficient to supply those restless men with pretences who should wish to excite disturbances.

Neither were reasons of reciprocal convenience the only ones which united the two houses of Bourbon to the renovated house of Hapsburg; the character and mode of thinking of the ministers who governed at Vienna and Versailles did not less contribute. Prince Kaunitz, of a haughty and imperious mind, regarded the treaty of Versailles as his *chef-d'œuvre* in politics. He applauded himself for having disarmed the ancient enemies of the house of Austria; and for having forestalled their services, in behalf of the emperor, against the king of Prussia. The duke de Choiseul was born in Lorraine; his father, the count de Stainville, had been sent ambassador from the court of Vienna, to France; so that the duke, still imagining himself a vassal of the emperor, was in his heart more attached to Austria than to France. It therefore was not wonderful that the propensities of these two prime ministers should support the

the alliance they had formed; or that this alliance should continue, so long as the promoters of it should preserve their influence over the minds of their masters.

Turning our eyes hence toward Prussia, we there shall perceive that kingdom standing alone, and without all alliance.—Here follow the reasons.

When Mr. Pitt quitted the helm his place was bestowed upon lord Bute, a Scotch earl. This English minister broke off all the connections which subsisted between the two courts. England, as we have before said, having concluded peace with France, had sacrificed to her the interests of Prussia; and had offered the conquest of Silesia to the house of Austria; that, by favour of this service, the ancient ties between the Imperial court and that of Great Britain might be renewed. As if these proceedings had still been insufficient, lord Bute had set every engine at work, at Petersburg, to embroil the king with the emperor Peter III., in which attempts however he was unsuccessful. Ill faith so repeated had interrupted all the friendship which had before existed between Prussia and England; and, to that alliance which reciprocal wants had produced, malignity the most potent, and hatred the most violent, succeeded. Thus it happened that

that the king remained singly on the field of battle; where indeed no one came to attack him, but neither did any person present himself for his defence; a situation only supportable by being short, and which could not long endure; for which reason it presently underwent a change.

Toward the close of the year 1763, negotiations were begun in Russia for the conclusion of a defensive alliance with that power. The only person well inclined toward Prussia, at that time at Petersburg, was count Panin. The ancient enemy of the king, chancellor Bestuchef, that promoter of all the misunderstandings that had happened between the two courts, clandestinely opposed the negotiation, and was supported in the private ear of the empress by count Orlov. The courts of Vienna and Dresden secretly caballed, as much as they were able, that they might traverse count Solms. The Austrians represented to the empress of Russia that theirs was the only power the alliance of which could be advantageous to the Muscovites; because that the court of Vienna only could assist them against the Turks, their common enemy. The Saxons had other reasons for endeavouring to counteract the negotiations of count Solms. They solicited the support and protection of the empress, that they

might thereby clear the road to the succession of the throne of Poland, whenever Augustus III. should die. The Saxons, governed by count Bruhl, the constant foe of the Prussians, were beside disposed to join their intrigues to those of any other power, to impede or diminish whatever might give influence to the king, in the affairs of Europe.

Some peculiar event was necessary to terminate this crisis, and it came in good time. Augustus III. king of Poland died at Dresden, on the 4th of October, of the same year, 1763. His son, the elector of Saxony, soon followed his father to the grave. The grandson of Augustus, who then became elector, was at that time in his minority. These two so sudden deaths, added to a young prince in his minority, quickly changed the face of affairs; and the intrigues and cabals of the French, the Saxons, and the Austrians, were afterward all ineffectual at Petersburg. Count Panin gained his cause, and became prime minister; and, in consequence of the ascendancy he possessed over the mind of the empress, he persuaded her to place a *plafte* \* on the throne of Poland. That she might proceed with greater certainty, Cathe-

\* A noble Pole, of a family supposed to be descended from the ancient kings of Poland, T.

rine communicated her projects to the king of Prussia, who promised them his support; and, without waiting till the treaty which then was negotiating at Petersburg was signed, his ambassador at Warsaw was instructed to aid the Russian ambassador, who was then in that capital, and to make the most powerful and nervous insinuations, relative to the future election, as well to the primate as to the grandees of Poland. This well-imagined proceeding at length brought the irresolution of the court of Petersburg to a decision; the Russian ministers indicated to their sovereign how much their negotiations had been facilitated by the assistance given by the king of Prussia; and this finally determined Catherine to conclude the alliance which the monarch had proposed. In the month of January, 1764, the counter plan was sent from Berlin to count Solms; and, after some difficulties had been surmounted, relative to the concurrence and assistance which the empress required from the king, the important treaty was signed, some time in the month of March.

To avoid being tedious, I shall content myself with relating, in a few words, the substance of the treaty.—It was limited, and was to continue in force only eight years. The mutual



guarantee of the possession of the two contracting powers was stipulated; nor was truce, or peace, to be made without the consent of both. A reciprocal aid was promised of a body of ten thousand foot, and two thousand horse; and, by a secret article, it was agreed that, should the king be attacked on the banks of the Rhine, or the empress toward the Crimea, this succour should be rated at the annual sum of four hundred thousand rubles, or four hundred and eighty thousand Prussian crowns. With respect to Poland, the parties engaged to oppose the government of this kingdom becoming hereditary, and not to suffer the enterprises of any to succeed who should endeavour to change the form of government, and to introduce monarchical power in Poland. It was further promised to protect the dissidents against the oppression of the national church; and, finally, by a secret convention, which was signed on the same day, it was agreed that the election should alight on a piasse, and this piasse was Stanislaus Poniatowsky, Stolnic of Lithuania, long known to the empress of Russia, and whose person she had found agreeable.

Ten thousand Russians soon approached Warsaw, while the Prussians, on the frontiers of Poland, gave demonstrations which might convince

vince these republicans, as well as foreign powers, that those who should wish to oppose the election, contrary to the will of Russia and Prussia, would find with whom they had to contend; and that might induce them, more than once, to think seriously on the subject. The time drew nigh when the diet of election was to assemble, and the dignity of the two courts was enough concerned to send thither a titled ambassador of the first order. The king appointed the prince of Carolath-Schönaich to this embassy, who immediately repaired to Warsaw.

The form of the diet was changed: it was assembled (May) under the title of a confederation, thereby to annul the *Liberum veto*, or the *Nie Pos vallum* of the contrary party, and that the plurality of votes might be sufficient to sanction the resolutions which the deputies of the Palatinates were to be obliged to take. To this diet another succeeded, in the month of August, which in like manner assumed the form of a confederation; and it was the latter which on the 7th of September, by the forcible recommendations and support of the Russian and Prussian ambassadors, unanimously elected Stanislaus Poniatowsky king of Poland. His title, as

such, was acknowledged by all the powers of Europe.

A third diet was necessary for the coronation. The Czartorinskies, uncles of the new king, prevailed on the confederation, which still subsisted, to entirely abolish the *Liberum veto*, by which they would have been rendered the absolute masters of the deliberations of the republic. The king of Prussia, fearing these efforts might be attended with disagreeable consequences, by introducing a very considerable change in the government of a republic, the provinces of which lay so near his own, informed the court of Petersburg of their proceedings, which entered into his views. They still however suffered the form of the confederation to remain, till the ensuing diet.

1765. What followed were but fruitless negotiations for the abolition of a general tax, which the diet of convocation had substituted to a tax on the nobility. This new regulation being contrary to the antecedent treaty of Welau, the king was authorised in making reprisals upon the republic. The sieur Goltz was sent to Warsaw, to accommodate the difference. The empress of Russia was appointed arbitratrix, and the newly instituted taxes were abolished by both parties.

The

The court of Petersburg, dissatisfied with the conduct of the king of Poland, and still more by that of his uncles, the Czartorinskies, by whom he was governed, sent the sieur Saldern to Warsaw, to observe them, and to make proper remonstrances, that they might employ greater moderation and wisdom in their procedure.

From Warsaw this negotiator made a journey to Berlin, being charged with vast projects, which had been formed by count Panin, whose inclination led him to the ostentatious and the splendid. Saldern, who neither possessed the forms of breeding nor ductility of mind, spoke in the tone of a Roman dictator, that he might enforce the king to give his consent for the accession of England, Sweden, Denmark, and Saxony, to the treaty of Petersburg. An enterprise like this being totally contrary to the interests of Prussia, it was impossible the king should comply. How in effect could it be supposed the king would enter into arrangements with England, after the treatment he had received from that power? The aid which could be obtained from Sweden, Denmark, and Saxony, was a nullity; for these powers could only be enabled to act by paying them heavy subsidies; and still more, being in friendship with Russia, they might

too much participate that influence which the king himself there hoped to obtain. It was therefore better timely to keep them at a distance; and especially because competitors ought not to be multiplied without necessity.

All these reasons concurred to make the king decline the propositions of the sieur Saldern. The ambassador took fire, imagining himself to be the prætor Popilius, and supposing his majesty to be Antiochus, king of Syria. He wished to prescribe laws to a monarch: but the king, not in the least believing himself to be the sovereign of the Syrians, dismissed the minister with all possible coolness, assuring him that he should ever be the friend of the Russians, but never their slave. Dissatisfied with having found a prince so little submissive to his commands, Saldern repaired from Berlin to Copenhagen; where, wholly at his ease, displaying his despotism and his unlimited pretensions, he so entirely subjugated the mind of the king of Denmark that he dismissed the ministers and generals who displeased him, and substituted his creatures in their stead; after which he concluded an eventual treaty of exchange, between the dutchy of Holstein Gottorp, which was to revert to Denmark, and the counties

ties of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst, which the princes of Holstein were to receive in lieu of the dutchy they were to lose.

Toward the end of the year, another diet was assembled in Poland. The empress of Russia declared herself the protectress of the dissidents, a certain number of whom were of the Greek church. She required that the free exercise of their religion should be granted them, and that they might be capable of acting in any post of government, as well as their rival countrymen. This proposition was the cause of all the troubles and the wars which followed. The Prussian envoy presented a memorial to the diet, to insinuate to them that his master could not behold the abolition of the *Liberum veto*, the levying of new taxes, and the augmentation of the troops of the crown, with an indifferent eye; and the republic paid respect to this remonstrance.

It had not the same complaisance for the privileges which had been demanded in favour of the dissidents. Far from paying deference, the diet, in a kind of fanatic enthusiasm, confirmed the laws of which the dissidents had most cause to complain. The most favourable thing the court of Russia was able to obtain was to dissolve  
the

the diet, and the confederation by which it had been formed.

1766. Stung to the quick at the unmannered insolence of the Poles toward her, the empress came to a resolution to support the cause of the dissidents by open force. She immediately invited the king to co-operate in the measures which she intended to take; and this he had already engaged himself to perform, in virtue of his treaty of alliance.

During all these agitations of Poland, the marriage of the prince of Prussia with the princess Elizabeth, the fourth daughter of the duke of Brunswick, was concluded. Four persons were concerned in the succession. The prince of Prussia; prince Henry, who was soon after carried off by the small-pox; prince Henry, brother of the king; and prince Ferdinand, who at that time had no male heir.

1767. But let us return to Poland, from which we have wandered. The despotism with which the court of Petersburg acted in that republic was revolting to the Sarmatians, and induced a part of Europe to oppose Russia. It was with difficulty that the court of Vienna could conceal its jealousy and discontent. France, which still preserved the remains of that spirit of grandeur that had so highly manifested itself

in the time of Louis XIV. could ill brook any great change should be effected in Europe, in which she should take no part. The duke de Choiseul, who enjoyed the royal puissance without the title of royalty, was the most restless and the least forbearing man to whom France ever gave birth. He beheld the election of a king of Poland, without the concurrence of his master, as an insult on the kingdom. To revenge this ideal affront, he would immediately have engaged France in a new war, had he not been restrained by the poverty of the state, and by the dislike of Louis XV. for any such projects. He found some compensation for his inability to act by opposing the Russians whenever he found an opportunity. Thus, that he might refuse the empress the title of Imperial majesty, he had recourse to the French academy, which was obliged to decide that the expression was not good French. This is pitiful vengeance, unworthy of enlarged minds; nor should I report such wretched artifices, did they not depict the characters of men.

The emperor Francis I. had died, at Inspruck, in the year 1765. His son Joseph II. who had been crowned king of the Romans, succeeded him without opposition. This young prince made a tour into Bohemia and Saxony,  
that



that he might examine the ground which had been the theatre of the last war. As he was to pass through Torgau, the king proposed an interview between them, which was refused, by the empress's mother and prince Kaunitz. The emperor felt some chagrin at this refusal, and caused the king of Prussia to be informed that he would find means to make reparation for the rudeness which his pedagogues had obliged him to commit.

The discontent of the Poles was become however almost general. The whole nation exclaimed aloud. Might they have been believed, the Russians were attempting the destruction of the Catholic religion; and every prince, born in the bosom of the Apostolic and Roman church, was in conscience obliged to come to their assistance. These clamours often repeated began to make some impression on the court of Vienna. The ill humour of the empress occasioned some motions of the troops in the Austrian provinces; military arrangements were begun, not such as are necessary for immediately taking the field, but of the nature of those which are the preludes of any grand meditated design. The rumour of these warlike preparations, which every where began to be spread, gave some alarm to the court of Petersburg; and

And the fears with which they inspired the empress of Russia were the cause that a secret convention was entered into, between Muscovy and Prussia, which was promptly concluded. (April 23d.)

The substance of this was that the empress should march a body of troops into Poland, to the support of the dissidents; and, in order to avoid giving new umbrage to the court of Vienna, the aid which the king should afford to the enterprizes of the Russians should be confined to vigorous declarations, such as might intimidate the dissatisfied; but it was agreed that, if the court of Vienna should march troops into Poland to commence hostilities against the Russians, his majesty then should declare himself, act openly against the Austrians, and even make a powerful diversion into their provinces.

It was further agreed that, in consideration of this war which the king would have to sustain, solely to promote the interests of Russia, the empress should assist him with a body of her forces, and should procure him some proper recompense whenever peace should be concluded. The connections which daily became more intimate between the king and Russia overawed the court of Vienna; and, as the

perils to which she would be exposed were more considerable than the advantages she could procure herself, she thought proper to remain a tranquil spectator of these proceedings.

During the present year, 1767, the marriage of the princess Wilhelmina, the king's niece, was celebrated with the prince of Orange. This marriage could have no political influence. It went no further than to procure a proper establishment for a princess of the blood.

Let us again return to the affairs of Poland. The dissidents, following the instigations of Russia, formed a confederation, and were protected by the Muscovite troops, which had lately entered the kingdom. The Prussian resident, at Warsaw, at the same time declared that the king must support the dissidents in consequence of a clause in the treaty of Oliva; and of his alliance with the empress of Russia; and that he intreated the republic to take their grievances into consideration. The king of Poland granted the deputies of these dissidents an audience, which was productive of a *senatus-consultum* (October 5th) that convoked an extraordinary diet.

The diet assembled under the protection of the Russian troops that surrounded Warsaw. Prince Repnin, ambassador from Catharine, employed none

none but violent methods to subjugate the diet. He carried off the bishop of Cracovia, the bishop of Kiow, and the second crown general Rezewusky, all of them declared enemies of the dissidents, who were sent into banishment beyond Moscow, toward Siberia. The other nuncios were obliged to limit the duration of the diet to the first of February, 1768\*; and commissaries were nominated with powers to conclude affairs definitively, in the name of the republic.

1768. The Russian ambassador, the Prussian, and those of the protestant courts, as well as the marshals of the dissidents, were present at the sittings of these commissioners, by whom an act was signed, in virtue of which the dissidents were re-established in all their rights. They soon after proceeded to sign the cardinal laws of the kingdom, by which the power of the first offices of the republic was limited, particularly that of the first crown general. The diet was forced to confirm these new laws; after which it broke up.

So many sovereign acts, exercised in this republic by a foreign power, at length incited universal heat; nor was it in any manner allayed by the pride of prince Repnin. Those who

\* The French erroneously reads 1767. T.

were in possession of the first offices, with hearts rankled at the diminution of their power, could not forget changes that were as prejudicial to their authority as they were debasing. The bishops, the half of whose dioceses was composed of dissidents, and who had flattered themselves they should increase their tythes by their conversion, beheld their hopes annihilated at the promulgation of these new laws. They made it a common cause; and, foreseeing that the people would not take fire to revenge the wrongs of which they individually complained, they determined to employ fanaticism, that they might excite the souls of the stupid to the defence of their pontiffs.

United by the same discontents, the bishops and the magnats (grandeess) caused it to be rumoured that Russia, in conjunction with the king of Poland, wished to abolish the catholic-apostolic Roman religion; that destruction would ensue if they did not take up arms; and that, if there still were any zealous and fervent catholics to be found, they ought all to fly to the defence and salvation of their altars. The people, who had been oppressed in the various countries through which the Russian troops were distributed, had already begun to feel impatience, and had on several occasions testified their discontent.

content. The foolish herd, formed to be led by those who will but take the trouble to deceive, suffered itself to be easily seduced by the priesthood. The cause of religion was the signal, and the word, at which to rally; the spirit of bigotry seized on all minds, and the grandees profited by the enthusiasm of their serfs, to shake off a yoke which they already found to be insupportable. Sparks began to be emitted from what were yet but smothered embers, and which perhaps would have been stifled by the preponderance of the allied courts, had not France, which from motives of jealousy endeavoured to divide and trouble the north, blown up those flames that produced the general conflagration which ensued.

The duke de Choiseul was devoured by ambition, and wished to impart splendour to his administration. Too much prejudiced in favour of the pretended testament of the cardinal de Richelieu, the promise of the cardinal to Louis XIII. that he would make his monarchy respected by all Europe was ever present to his mind, and it was his intent to make Louis XV. thus respectable. But times and circumstances were in all respects dissimilar; for, in the first place, France was not, under the cardinal, overwhelmed by debt; and, in the second,

Europe had undergone a total change since the seventeenth century. Russia, which we now behold acting so conspicuous a part, was then unknown. Prussia and Brandenburg were destitute of energy; the glory of Sweden was dazzling, which at present is eclipsed. Beside, what projects may a minister form, when the means of executing them are wanting; and who, from the dread of a general bankruptcy, is incapable of any thing except cabal, and is obliged to renounce all those bold enterprizes that might enable him to emerge from his state of inactivity?

These obstacles, which could not be removed, instead of calming the inquietude of the duke de Choiseul, did but compress his genius; and, unable to set the great engines of politics in action, he gave employment to his restlessness by intrigue. Exclusive of the jealousy with which the election of a king of Poland inspired France, she having no part in that election, the empress of Russia could not be pardoned, at Versailles, for having abandoned the grand alliance, and made a separate peace with the king of Prussia. To revenge this, the duke de Choiseul excited the Poles and Turks against Catharine. He wished at the same time the Swedes should make a diversion in Finland,  
and

and Estonia; and by these different efforts he hoped to kindle a war against Russia, from which it would be difficult for her to extricate herself with advantage. French emissaries accordingly were dispatched into all parts. Some encouraged the Poles to defend their freedom; others hastened to Constantinople, to excite the Porte not to behold with eyes of indifference the despotism which a neighbouring power was exercising in Poland; and a third posse repaired to Stockholm, to cabal in the diet, change the form of government, and render the king absolute, that he might make a diversion against the Russians, in favour of the Turks and Poles.

Not satisfied with so many artifices, the duke de Choiseul endeavoured to detach the king of Prussia from a power which he hoped thus the more easily to crush; but in this he was unsuccessful. He failed in like manner in Sweden, where the Russian party in the diet was victorious over that of France. But it was otherwise in Poland, and in Turkey. A confederation was formed against Russia, during the month of March, in the town of Bar, in Poland, of which count Kraszinsky was elected marshal. This confederation produced several others; and the confederates signalized their insurrection by annulling all the



new laws that had been enacted. Far from remaining quiet after this first essay of their power, intoxicated by hope, and in the delirium of passion, they aspired at nothing less than dethroning the king; to execute which design they only waited some fit opportunity. The sovereign was informed of their intention. Alarmed at the threatening danger, he assembled a *senatus-consultum*, in which it was agreed that the aid of Russia should be demanded, to protect Poniatowski, whom she had placed upon the throne.

This was the signal of hostilities. The Russians, although they had not ten thousand men in the kingdom, vanquished all the confederates by whom they were opposed; but, as they were not sufficiently numerous to extirpate them, this swarm of wasps, being dispersed in one part, collected and buzzed in another. In one of the encounters between them in Podolia, the Russians, without knowing it, pursued the confederates upon the Turkish territories. The small town of Balta, where the Poles had taken refuge, was burned. This violation of territory was the pretext which the Turks alleged, in order to declare war against Russia. (October).

The Turks immediately seized and imprisoned the sieur Obreskow, the Imperial ambassador

sador from Russia to Constantinople, in the Seven Towers. These people neither know how to make peace nor war. They were very unseasonably precipitate in their declaration; it was rather sending information to the Russians to make preparations, during the winter, to resist the Ottoman forces, by which they were to be attacked in the ensuing spring. Had the declaration been retarded till the following year (1769) the bolt would have descended at the very instant when the thunder was heard; and the Russians would have been taken unprovided; since full six months were necessary for them to prepare for war, and assemble an army sufficiently formidable, that should be provided with whatever was necessary, vigorously to oppose the attacks of the enemy.

The troubles which then began to be manifest occasioned great embarrassment at the court of Berlin. Scarcely was the king relieved from a war that had been as durable as it was ruinous. His provinces might recover under the protection of continued peace, but time was necessary to heal their former wounds. The army was recruited, and was begun to be disciplined; but it had not yet attained that state of maturity which might inspire total confidence in its operations. The war that was declared  
between

between the Porte and Russia laid the king under the obligation of fulfilling his engagements, with the empress. The subsidies stipulated by alliance, which as we have said annually amounted to four hundred and eighty thousand crowns, must be paid.

While negotiations were carried on at Berlin, the Russians and the Turks were come to blows. The Russian armies, under the command of prince Gallitzin, had beaten the Ottomans near Choczim, and the capture of that town was followed by the conquest of Moldavia. The generals of Catharine were ignorant of the art of encampment, and of tactics. Those of the sultan had still less knowledge ; so that, in order to conceive a just idea of this war, we must suppose men with one eye, who having beaten the blind had gained a complete ascendancy over them.

A progress so rapid was equally as alarming to the allies of Russia as it was to the other powers of Europe. Prussia had to fear that her ally, become too puissant, would in time impose laws upon her, as she had done upon Poland. The prospect was alike dangerous and terrific. The court of Vienna too well understood its own interests not to entertain nearly similar apprehensions. The common danger for a time made  
past

past animosities forgotten. Although the astonishing success of the Russians gave umbrage to all Europe, the impressions it made were far the strongest on the powers that were most in its vicinity. The peril therefore approached the courts of Vienna and Berlin; step was succeeded by step. The emperor, chagrined as we have said that the interview which had been proposed in 1766 did not take place, made the first advance toward paying a visit to the king in Silesia. Prince Kaunitz did not oppose his will. The empress queen in like manner consented. The affair was put into immediate negotiation (August the 25th) and it was agreed that the meeting should take place at Neiss.

The emperor wished to be wholly incognito. He assumed the name of count Falkenstein; and the king imagined he could not do him greater honour than by complying in all things with his will. The young prince affected a frankness which seemed natural; his amiable character indicated gaiety, added to great vivacity; but, with the desire of information, he wanted the patience necessary to gain instruction. This did not prevent connections of friendship and esteem being formed between the two monarchs. The king declared to the emperor that he regarded that day as the most conspicuous

cuous in his whole life, since it was to serve as the epocha of union between two houses that had too long been inimical to each other, and whose reciprocal interest it was to afford each other aid, rather than to destroy. The emperor replied, Austria no longer had any Silesia; after which he adroitly suffered it to be understood that, during his mother's life, he dared not flatter himself with having sufficient ascendancy over her mind to execute all he wished; but he did not in the least dissemble that, the present situation of affairs in Europe considered, neither he nor his mother would suffer the Russians to remain in possession of Moldavia and Wallachia. He afterward proposed that measures should be taken to maintain an exact neutrality in Germany, if any war should break out between England and France. The supposition then appeared possible and probable, because that a French ship, which had been taken by the English near Newfoundland, had occasioned some very warm altercations between the two courts.

To prove the desire he had to preserve a good intelligence between Prussia and Austria, the king accepted the offers of the emperor; and the two princes entered into a mutual written engagement to maintain the proposed neutrality, which

which thus became an act as inviolable as any formal treaty, dignified with the sign manual of ministers. The emperor promised in the name of the empress and himself; and the king engaged his word of honour that, if war should happen between France and England, he would faithfully adhere to the fortunate peace thus re-established between Prussia and Austria; and that should any other troubles arise, the causes of which it might be impossible to foresee, they would each observe the most exact neutrality with regard to their respective possessions. This engagement, the secret of which was scrupulously observed, was signed at Neiss, August the 28th, to the common satisfaction of the two sovereigns.

It must be allowed that, in politics, it would have been an unpardonable fault blindly to have confided in the good faith of the Austrians; but under the present circumstances, when the preponderancy of Russia became too great, and when it was impossible to predict where her conquests might end, it was exceedingly convenient to be on terms of the greatest friendship with the court of Vienna. Prussia still felt the wounds Russia had inflicted during the last war, and it was not the interest of the king personally to labour for the increase of a power as formidable

dable as it was dangerous. There were two paths to pursue: either that of stopping her in the career of her immense conquests; or, which was more prudent, adroitly attempting to profit by these conquests.

The king had neglected nothing which might contribute to effect this purpose. He had sent a political project to Petersburg, which he attributed to that same count Lynar who had become known, during the last war, by having negotiated the convention of Closter Seven, between the Hanoverians, commanded by the duke of Cumberland and encamped at Stade, and the French, under the duke de Richelieu. But the great success of the Russians, as well in Moldavia and Wallachia as in the Archipelago, where their fleets were victorious, had so far intoxicated the court with prosperity that it paid no attention to the supposed memorial of count Lynar.

This attempt having failed, the king thought proper to have recourse to other measures. It was not for the interest of Prussia to see the Ottoman empire entirely overwhelmed; because, in time of need, that empire might be usefully employed in making diversions, whether it were into Hungary or into Russia, according to the power with which he should be at war.

The king therefore judged that, by making the court of Vienna a party, and adding his own mediation, peace might be re-established between the belligerent powers, on conditions that should be acceptable to both parties.

1770. Overtures were begun, both at the court of Petersburg and at that of Constantinople, by representing that the two powers must alike be desirous of putting an end to the war; and the more so because it was to be feared the conflagration would else in time become universal. A wish was added of finding such temperate propositions as might be agreeable to them both, in order to bring their disputes to an amicable conclusion.

To this count Panin, after having rehearsed a panegyric on the moderation and disinterestedness of the empress, replied that her majesty was entirely disposed to listen to any propositions that might be made. This reserve concealed, under a shew of gentleness, pretensions that were very potent. Before any attention would be paid to the demands of the Turks, it was required the ambassador Obreskow should be restored to his freedom; but it was added that the empress would with pleasure behold the king employing his good offices at the Porte, to inspire the Divan with pacific sentiments; and that,



that, when such should be entertained, the czarina desired nothing more earnestly than, by the mediation of the king of Prussia, to accomplish the re-establishment of the public tranquillity.

The Turks, on the other part, began to desire a conclusion to a war the success of which had by no means equalled their expectations. The king, who had with much energy advised them not to infringe the peace, had by this advice acquired their confidence. The Turks therefore accepted the Prussian mediation; but they felt some repugnance to that of the court of Vienna. Means however were found to vanquish this repugnance, by a reiteration of the same remonstrances, founded on the very decisive influence which a power so great as that of the house of Austria might give, to promote the success of the negotiation.

The Russians, on whom pacific insinuations had hitherto made but little impression, continued in the mean time to gain the greatest advantages over the Ottoman armies. Their fleet, after having beaten that of the Turks (July the 10th) nearly effected its total destruction, in so much that most of the ships were burned or sunken. A stroke so unforeseen obliged the Porte to divide its attention. It knew not whether

ther it were necessary to employ its powers to the defence of the straits of Sestos and Abydos, or whether it were still more necessary to protect Moldavia. This state of incertitude, mingled with terror, favoured the operations of marshal Romanzow, and certainly contributed to gain him the victory at Kiab, over the army of the grand visir. Thus, in one campaign, he added the conquest of Wallachia to that of Moldavia. Count Panin, the brother of the minister, who in the mean time laid siege to Bender, carried the place, after a vigorous defence on the part of the foe.

Success so rapid and so repeated dazzled the court of Petersburg, and rendered it exceedingly pertinacious. But while nothing was there thought of except how to crush the Ottoman puissance, chagrin and jealousy were augmented at Vienna, in proportion to the advantages gained by the Russians. The Austrians compared the last unfortunate war which they had waged against the Turks with the prodigious success of the Russians; nor could they conceal the humiliation which their self-love suffered; beside which they dreaded a power so great should become their neighbour, as it must should the conquest of Moldavia and Wallachia be preserved. To guard against these apprehensions,

or rather openly to oppose Russia, the Austrians lately had strengthened the forces they had in Hungary, where they formed magazines, and made every preparation to act according as circumstances should require. Far from keeping their intentions secret, they told all who chose to listen that, if not speedily ended, the emperor's queen must be obliged to make herself a party in the war.

The second interview between the king and the emperor (September the 3d) took place at the camp of Neustadt, in Moravia. Not an Austrian was heard who did not suffer some trait of animosity against the Muscovites to escape. The emperor appeared to the king the same man he had supposed him to be the first time they met at Neiss. Prince Kaunitz, who also came to Neustadt, had long conferences with his Prussian majesty; in which, emphatically displaying the system of his court, he represented this system as the master-piece of politics, and himself as its author. He afterward insisted on the necessity of opposing the ambitious views of Russia, and declared the empress queen never would suffer Russian armies to pass the Danube, nor the court of Petersburg to make acquisitions which should bring it into the neighbourhood of Hungary. He added that

that the union of Prussia and Austria was the only barrier that might be opposed to this overflowing torrent, which menaced all Europe with inundation.

When he had ended speaking, the king replied he should always endeavour to cultivate the friendship of their Imperial majesties, which he held in infinite esteem; but he also requested prince Kaunitz would take into consideration the duty which the alliance he had contracted with Russia, and which he might not in any manner infringe, imposed upon him; and to recollect that these engagements were shackles which prevented him from entering into the measures that were proposed by prince Kaunitz. The king added that his sole desire was to prevent the war between the Russians and the Turks from becoming general; that, to this effect, he very willingly offered to endeavour at reconciling the two Imperial courts; and that it was time to think of such reconciliation, lest the present reciprocal discontents might at length degenerate into open broils.

The king however, that he might continue the court of Vienna in its favourable dispositions, thought proper to reiterate the assurances he had given the emperor, when this monarch came to Neiss. He further promised to termi-

nate, in a friendly manner, the petty disputes which often take place between custom-house officers on the frontiers. The king was further very willing to consent to what the emperor requested ; that is to say, frankly to communicate to the court of Vienna whatever overtures might be made by France, at the court of Berlin. As however all this had passed between the king and prince Kaunitz only, the king thought decency required the emperor should be acquainted with whatever was done and said ; and it seemed that the monarch, who had been little accustomed to be thus respected, remembered the attention paid him by the king on this occasion.

The day after the conference, a courier arrived at Neustadt, from Constantinople, with letters from the Caimacan, dated the 12th of August, in which the grand seignor invited the courts of Vienna and Berlin to accept of the office of mediation, and to accommodate the differences that still subsisted between the Porte and Russia. In this dispatch it was expressly declared that the Turks would not consent to any peace, except by the intervention of the two courts.

The emperor acknowledged that he was wholly indebted for his part in the mediation  
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to the active good offices of the king of Prussia at Constantinople; for which he testified his gratitude to the monarch. The king had a conversation, on the same day, with prince Kaunitz; whom he did not fail to congratulate on the fortunate event, which might in some sort afford him tranquillity, and even diminish that jealousy to which the success of the Russians had given birth in his mind. The monarch added that this proceeding of the Porte rendered the court of Vienna the arbitrix of the conditions of peace which she should wish to stipulate between the two powers. The minister received this compliment with affected indifference; saying he approved of the step which the Turks had taken. Never however was mediation, in reality, accepted with greater eagerness.

While these endeavours were made for the pacification of the north, new disputes, and other quarrels, predicted approaching ruptures toward the south of Europe. Of these troubles the duke de Choiseul, whose restless spirit took pleasure in scattering the seeds of dissension through all courts, was the sole author. He was wholly intent upon humbling the English; and, as he durst not act openly, fearing to shock Louis XV. he made the Spaniards his harbin-

gers, who seized on Falkland's islands, in which the English had begun to form establishments. Some of the merchant ships of the English were taken by the Spaniards, and the dock-yard at Portsmouth was at the same time set on fire. So many vexatious accidents, happening one after another, made a greater impression upon the court of London because the naval minister had paid so little attention to the duties of his administration that England scarcely was able, at that time, to fit out twenty ships of the line.

The English however took fire, and war would have been the consequence, had the duke de Choiseul remained at the head of affairs; but he was displaced by his enemies. The grand chancellor of France, Meaupoux, flattered himself that, by the dismissal of this minister, he should succeed to all the employments the duke de Choiseul had held; and that, joining them to the seals which he then possessed, he would in reality be prime minister, as formerly were Richelieu and Mazarin. To strengthen his party, he associated himself with the duke d'Aiguillon, and the duke de Richelieu. The latter captivated the monarch by bringing him acquainted with a female, whose reputation was far from equivocal; her charms  
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were so successful that she presently became all puissant : the old Louis XV. adored her. The duke de Choiseul, too haughty to bend in the presence of a person for whom he had the most sovereign contempt, refused her those distinctions which men in office usually grant to their master's favourites. The discontent which the new mistress felt at this was quickly communicated to her lover ; and faction immediately profited by the contest. The opposing party embittered the mind of the king, already ill disposed toward the duke de Choiseul, by depicting the minister as a prodigal, who had very improperly and foolishly expended the revenues of the state ; and who, in order to render himself necessary, had so much embroiled the affairs of France and England that the quarrels which must be the consequence could not but lead France into a war, that would not be less ruinous than the preceding war had been.

This last argument was the one which made the strongest impression. Louis XV. immediately disgraced his minister, and with him fell all the vast projects he had formed. The king of France personally negotiated between England and Spain, that he might terminate their differences. Falkland's islands were restored to the English. But, offended that France had



not on this occasion supported his interest, the king of Spain entertained a secret resentment.

1771. No court more regretted the loss of the duke de Choiseul than that of Vienna. She had placed all her confidence in this minister, who was known to be devoted to her : whereas the duke d'Aiguillon, whom the king had made minister of foreign affairs, was said not to be so much attached to the Imperial house. The chancellor was alike deceived in his projects and his hopes. We must therefore date the changes which happened in France from the downfall of the duke de Choiseul. So naturally are incidents connected with each other, and so difficult is it to foresee the important consequences that often result from trifles !

We however are less interested in what was passing in that part of Europe than in the affairs of the east, and the north. The propositions, which the Porte had made to the courts of Berlin and Vienna, were communicated to that of Petersburg. The king, at the same time, insinuated to the Muscovites that, should the empress refuse the mediation of Austria and Prussia, it were to be feared that the grand seignor would address himself to France, to implore its aid. This was the sole reflection that might determine the court of Petersburg not to refuse

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refuse the mediation of Austria, for the aversion she had for the court of Vienna by no means equalled that in which she held the court of Versailles.

The Russians at first replied they could not accept the mediation that was offered by these two powers, under the pretence that they had refused the mediation of England. However, from motives of politeness, and in consequence of the good offices of the two courts, fearing to suffer constraint, by the intervention of other powers, in the projects which they had formed concerning peace, they did what nearly amounted to the same thing; they began an immediate negotiation with the Turks, through the channel of marshal Romanzow, who could directly treat with the grand vizir. This attempt not proving successful, they consented to the proposals that had been previously made them by the courts of Berlin and Vienna.

It so happened that prince Henry, the king's brother, at this time was paying a visit to the queen of Sweden, his sister, at Stockholm. The empress of Russia, who, in her youth, had been acquainted with the prince at Berlin, requested he might have permission to come to Petersburg; which request could not with propriety be refused. The prince therefore continued his journey

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ney from Sweden to Russia, and his understanding soon gained an ascendancy over that of the empress, and persuaded her to communicate her thoughts freely to the king his brother. The letter of the empress was accompanied by a long memorial, which contained the conditions of peace, that were to serve as the basis of the negotiation which was desired to be begun. After a preamble in which the utmost moderation was announced, the empress demanded from the Turks the cession of the two Cabardies \*, or Cabardinia; Asof and its territory; the independence of the kham of the Crimea; the sequestration of Wallachia and Moldavia for five and twenty years, to indemnify her for the expences of the war; the free navigation of the Black Sea; an island in the Archipelago, which might serve as the storehouse of commerce for the two nations; a general amnesty in behalf of the Greeks who had taken part with the Russians; and, previous to all these, the freedom of the ambassador Obreskow, who was imprisoned in the Seven Towers.

Conditions so enormous would have completely exasperated the court of Vienna; per-

\* Provinces of Circassia, which separate the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian empires, and which lie at the foot of mount Caucasus. T.

haps, had they been communicated, would have induced her to take the most violent resolutions; and this was the reason which prevented the king from sending any information of what had passed to that court. He rather preferred more gentle means, more certain, and such as would give no person offence. He explained himself in a friendly manner to the empress of Russia, yet avoided contradiction; but, that she might herself be convinced of the difficulty there would be in bringing the grand seignor to consent to the independence of the Tartars, he represented to her the almost invincible obstacles which the court of Vienna would throw in the way of her possessing Wallachia and Moldavia, by which Russia would become the neighbour of Austria; and added that the island in the Archipelago would inspire all the maritime powers with jealousy and envy. He further advised the empress to limit her pretensions to the two Cabardies, to the town of Asof and its territory, and to the free navigation of the Euxine. He added that it was no sensation of jealousy on his part at the aggrandisement of the empress, which occasioned him thus to explain himself, but entirely with a desire that, by abatements, the part which other powers else might take in this war, so as to render it general,

might be avoided; that the Turks also had already acceded to two of the articles; they had agreed to grant an amnesty to the Greeks, and to release the ambassador Obreskow.

These remonstrances, though very moderate, appeared to give the empress some pain. She let it be understood that she did not expect to meet with opposition on the part of her best ally; and, as she continued to insist on her plan, some few restrictions excepted, the king saw himself obliged to impart this plan to the court of Vienna. His majesty communicated the memorial with every softening of which it was susceptible; and, that he might not enrage prince Kaunitz, it was insinuated to him that this was not the definitive resolution of Russia; for that, no doubt, this court was disposed to relax, respecting such articles as should meet with the most difficulty. (1771.)

The precautions which the king took were the more highly necessary because the Imperial court no longer concealed its projects; and because all the motions which were seen in Hungary announced an approaching rupture with Russia. The court of Vienna was determined not to suffer the countries beyond the Danube to be made the theatre of war. She even hoped that, under the favour of an armed mediation, she

the might oblige the Russians to restore Moldavia and Wallachia to the Turks; and further to make them desist from the independence which they demanded in behalf of the Tartars. To this effect, troops from Italy, Flanders, and Austria, had marched into Hungary. The envoy of the emperor had even explained himself, with sufficient positiveness, on this head, to the king: He went so far as to demand that, should the Russians be attacked in any part except Poland, he should remain neuter; which demand was peremptorily refused. Prince Kaunitz flattered himself that, by the pursuit of this plan, he should aggrandise the house of Austria, without having the trouble of making conquests. He supposed the Porte would pay for the assistance that should be given, by ceding to the empress queen those provinces which Austria had lost, at the peace of Belgrade.

While Vienna abounded in projects, and Hungary in armed men, an Austrian corps entered Poland, and seized on the lordship of *Zips*, on which the court had pretended claims. A step so daring astonished the court of Petersburg; and it was this which most promoted the partition treaty, which afterward was concluded between the three powers. The principal reason was that of avoiding a general war, which  
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was on the eve of bursting forth ; beside which it was necessary to maintain a balance of power between three such near neighbours ; and, as the court of Vienna sufficiently gave it to be understood that she meant to profit by the present troubles, to effect her own aggrandisement, the king was under the necessity of following her example.

Irritated that any troops except her own should dare to give law to Poland, the empress of Russia informed prince Henry that, if it were the purpose of the court of Vienna to dismember Poland, the other neighbours of that kingdom had a right to do the same. The overture was made *a-propos* ; for, all circumstances examined, this was the only remaining mode of avoiding new troubles, and giving every one satisfaction. Russia might indemnify herself, for the expences of her war with the Turks ; and, instead of Wallachia and Moldavia, which she could only hope to possess after having been as victorious over the Austrians as she had been over the Ottomans, she had only to choose a province of Poland, such as might please her, and in which choice she would encounter no new perils. To the empress queen a province in the vicinage of Hungary might be assigned ; and to the king, that part of Polish Prussia  
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which separated the states of Prussia-royal; while, by this equilibrium of the political balance, the three powers would remain in a nearly equivalent state of strength.

To be more certain however of the intentions of Russia, count Solms was sent to examine whether the words which had escaped the empress had any stable meaning; or whether they had been uttered in a moment of dissatisfaction, and transient anger. Count Solms found divided opinions on the subject. Count Panin, who, at the commencement of the troubles of Poland, had declared that Russia would maintain that kingdom whole and entire, felt a repugnance for the dismemberment; he nevertheless promised he would make no opposition, should it be determined on in council: but the empress was pleased with the idea that she might, without danger, extend the limits of her domains. Her favourites and some ministers perceived this, and thought proper to be of her opinion; so that the partition project was carried by a plurality of votes. The king of Prussia was informed of the resolution that had lately been taken, as of an expedient which had been imagined to repay him the subsidies which he had sent to Russia.

Count Panin, when he communicated the  
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substance of what we have repeated to count Solms, exacted as a preliminary that the king should endeavour to learn what were the sentiments of the court of Vienna, on the subject of the partition of Poland. The king therefore opened the affair to baron van Swieten, by assuring him that Russia testified not the least dissatisfaction at the act of the Austrians, in taking possession of Zips; and that the king, in order to prove his friendship to their Imperial majesties, advised them to extend their acquisitions, in that part of Poland, according to their good pleasure; which they might with the less danger perform, since their example would be imitated by the other neighbouring powers in that kingdom.

Cordial as this overture was, it was not welcomed by the court of Vienna in the manner the king had hoped. Prince Kaunitz was too much preoccupied with a plan which he was preparing to put in execution. He imagined greater advantages might be derived from an alliance with the Turks than from an alliance with Russia. He therefore coldly replied that, though his court had seized on some districts of Poland which were on the confines of Hungary, it was not intended to keep them; but only to obtain justice respecting some debts which the  
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house of Austria claimed from the republic; and that he never had imagined an object so trifling could have given birth to the supposition of a plan of dismemberment, the execution of which was surrounded by insurmountable difficulties; because that it was equal to impossible to agree on any perfect equality, between the different portions of the three powers: that in fine any such project could only serve to render the situation of Europe more critical than it was at present; he therefore advised his Prussian majesty not to enter into any such measures; and added, with an air of indifference, that his court was ready to evacuate the districts the Austrian troops then occupied, if other powers were willing to do the same.

These last words were a kind of tacit reproach to the Russians, who had an army in Poland; and they in like manner glanced at the king, who had drawn a line with his troops from the country of Crossen and on the opposite shore of the Vistula, that he might preserve his states from the plague, which at that time made great ravages in Poland.

In an affair of such a nature it was no time to be discouraged by trifles. It was easy to divine that the court of Vienna would change its sentiments, whenever Russia and Prussia should

be perfectly agreed ; because that Austria would prefer such a partition to the dangers of a war, against a party so strongly formed. Add to this, the empress queen, having no ally except France, could not depend on any succour at that time. That he might profit by such favourable circumstances, the king determined to promote the affair of the dismemberment. He kept silence with respect to the court of Vienna, that he might give time for reflection ; and, in the interim, count Solms was ordered to inform the court of Russia that overtures for a treaty of partition had been made at Vienna ; and that, although prince Kaunitz had hitherto avoided being explicit on the subject, it might nevertheless be foreseen that he would willingly accede, as soon as the two other powers should have come to an agreement, concerning their reciprocal interests. He made this a motive to accelerate the conclusion of the business, because there was not a moment to lose.

The tardiness and habitual indolence of the Russians would still perhaps have delayed the affair, had not the court of Vienna unintentionally aided the king. She daily by her mediation started new difficulties relative to the peace ; she often disputed on the enormous pretensions of the Russians, with bitterness ; and explained herself

herself in a despotic tone on those articles which she rejected, favouring the Turks in whatever depended upon her. The motions which were made by the army in Hungary completely rendered the Austrians suspected at the court of Petersburg. A rumour at the same time was current that the Austrians were negotiating a subsidiary treaty at Constantinople. This last information gave the alarm to the council of Petersburg; and the king, who communicated all the intelligence to the Russians which might lead to a discovery of the intrigues of the Austrians, at length effectually roused the court of Petersburg from the lethargy into which it had been plunged. The empress of Russia felt how much she needed the aid of his majesty, and judged that, in order to secure this prince, it was requisite to procure him advantages; for which reason count Panin declared to count Solms that he only waited for the arrival of the plan of partition, to begin conferences with him on the subject.

June 14th. The plan was presently expedited to Petersburg; a *carte blanche* was given to the empress, who was empowered to choose any one of the provinces of Poland of which she should think it most proper to take possession. The king demanded for himself Pomerellia, the dis-

trict of Great Poland which lies on this side the Netze, the bishoprick of Warmia, and the palatinates of Marienburg and Culm, leaving the Austrians the power of acceding to the treaty, if so they should think proper.

The arrangements which were made at Berlin and at Petersburg did not prevent prince Kautitz from continuing his pursuits; in consequence of the Austrian mediation, he threw a thousand impediments in the road of the negotiation for peace with the Turks; he particularly rejected the article that ceded Wallachia and Moldavia from the Porte to the Russians. Proud of the offers which were made him by the sultan, and imagining the number of troops assembled in Hungary might equally awe the Prussians and the Russians, he declared to the king that the conditions of peace, as proposed by Russia, were diametrically opposite to the interests of the Austrian monarchy; that they tended to overturn the equilibrium of the east; and that, should not the court of Petersburg think proper to moderate them, their Imperial majesties would be obliged to take part in the war; flattering themselves that, should this happen, the king would observe a perfect neutrality, especially as his engagements with Russia

were

were confined to Poland, the territories of which should be respected by Austria.

It was perceived that the court of Vienna was determined Russia should not become her neighbour. On one part she feared that the number of persons of the Greek church in Hungary might be attached to that power from motives of religion; and, on the other, she rather wished the vicinity of the enfeebled empire of the Turks than the formidable one of the Russians. The situation in which the king found himself between these courts was embarrassing. If he consulted his interest this could not lead him to wish an increase to the power of Russia, which already was but too formidable, nor to employ his forces to such effect. These reasons were counterbalanced by solemn engagements, which obliged this prince to assist the empress his ally, whenever she should be attacked by the empress queen. Either such engagements must be fulfilled or the promised fruit they were to produce must be renounced. To remain neuter was more dangerous to Prussia than even to support her ally. The Austrians and Russians would make war on each other, and would afterward make peace at the expence of the king; his majesty would have lost all political consideration; no one would have confided in

his good faith ; and when war should have been ended he must have stood aloof ; such must indubitably have been the consequences, had the king pursued a plan so defective.

The king did not hesitate. He determined faithfully to fulfil his treaty with Russia ; and, that he might at the same time soften the court of Vienna, he held out the flattering hope that it was not impossible but that the empress of Russia might be induced to change her intentions, relative to Wallachia and Moldavia ; but it was added that, should an actual rupture happen between the two empresses, his majesty could not desist from aiding Russia, with which power he was in alliance.

To add the greater weight to the declaration, the cavalry was augmented and remounted ; and the orders that were given for that purpose were quickly and universally rumoured. These vigorous measures, taken so a-propos, made an impression on the court of Petersburg, the present satisfaction of which was turned to advantage, to induce it to sacrifice a part of the pretensions made on Wallachia to the common good, and the promotion of peace.

To treat with the Russians was difficult. The counterproject of the plan of partition, from the court of Petersburg, arrived at that time at

Berlin. It was singularly conceived. Every advantage was in favour of Russia; the risk of peril was all thrown on Prussia. The greatest part of the lands in Poland which the king had demanded were granted, it is true; but the acquisition of the Russians was at least of twice the extent; and still more there was a very burthensome article on his majesty inserted in this treaty. It was demanded that Prussia should assist the Muscovites with all her powers, should they be attacked by the Austrians; but, if the empress queen were to declare war on the king of Prussia, the monarch had no succour to hope from Russia, till peace should first be concluded with the Turks.

Conditions so ill proportioned not being acceptable gave rise to some explanations. A retrospect was taken of all the engagements that had been made between Prussia and Russia, the result of which shewed that every thing had been to the advantage of the empress, and nothing in favour of the king. His majesty however added that he had determined to give every reasonable satisfaction to which any possible pretence could be made, and that he confided on the equity as well as on the moderation of the empress of Russia, who well might sacrifice some part of her conquests to prevent the progress of



a war which, it was to be feared, would become general; especially as Moldavia and Wallachia served as a pretext to the Austrians more to embroil affairs; and that, under circumstances so critical as the present, it became the dignity of a monarchy so vast as that of Russia to pay less respect to its particular interest than to the public good. It was at the same time proposed that, to indemnify Prussia for the various dangers which she might expect from a new war, the consequences of which were impossible to be foreseen, Russia should add the city of Dantzic, situated in the middle of Pomerellia, to that part of the dismemberment of Poland of which the king was to put himself in possession.

These remonstrances, as it usually happens, did not produce all the effect that might have been expected. Reflecting however on the force of the reasons which had been so clearly urged, the empress of Russia was willing to restrict the propositions of peace which were incompatible with the interests of other powers; in consequence of which she engaged to restore to the Turks, after the peace, the countries she had conquered between the Dniester and the Danube. The court of Berlin communicated this happy intelligence with promptitude to that of Vienna; and, for the first time, the countenance of prince Kaunitz

Kaunitz assumed serenity. Calm succeeded to inquietude; and jealousy, with which the great success of the Russians had inspired the Imperial court, disappeared at the moment she had no longer to fear beholding that power in the vicinity of her own provinces.

The Porte was immediately informed of the present amicable dispositions of the court of Petersburg. The Turks, to whom misfortune had given a disgust for war, were highly inclined to peace. The last campaign of the Russians was one continued triumph. They had conquered the Crimea; and a decisive victory, gained by marshal Romanzow, toward the close of the year, had completed the prosperity of their arms. Under circumstances so desponding, the information arrived at Constantinople that the greatest impediments to peace were removed. The Turks therefore, on their part, that they might facilitate the general pacification, determined to set the ambassador Obreskow at liberty, who till then had been detained in the Seven Towers; for this was a preliminary exacted by the empress, and without which she would listen to no negotiation.

1772. Though every court was active, the dilatoriness and irresolution of the Russians retarded the conclusion of the treaty of dismemberment.

berment. The negotiation chiefly stopped at the possession of the city of Dantzic. The Russians pretended that they had guarantied the freedom of this petty republic; but in reality it was the English who, jealous of the Prussians, protected the liberties of that maritime town; and who encouraged the empress of Russia in refusing her consent to the demands of his Prussian majesty. It was nevertheless necessary for the king to determine; and, as it was evident that the possession of the Vistula, and the port of Dantzic, would in time also subject the city, it was thought proper not to delay a negotiation so important, for an advantage which, in reality, was but deferred; for which reason his majesty desisted from his demand.

After much lingering, the *ultimatum* of the court of Petersburg was received. (January the 12th.) The Russians continued to insist on the considerable succours which they demanded from the Prussians, should the Austrians declare war. However offensive such inequalities were, however disproportionate to the aid which allies in reality mutually owe each other, as the empress queen was known at that time to be in a more favourable and pacific temper than she had been, these considerations ceased to continue of importance, when a treaty so advantageous was

to be concluded; and the Russians were promised succours which, after such a treaty, never could be called in question.

(February 17th.) Obstacles so numerous being removed, the secret convention was at length signed at Petersburg. The Prussian acquisitions were such as we have stated them; the cities of Dantzic and Thorn, and their territories, excepted. By this partition, the court of Petersburg acquired a very considerable district in Poland, extending along its ancient frontiers, from the Dwina as far as the Dniester. The time fixed on for taking possession was the month of June; and it was agreed to invite the empress queen to join the two contracting powers, and to make herself a party in the dismemberment. Russia and Prussia guaranteed their respective acquisitions, and promised to act in concert at the diet of Warsaw, that they might obtain the consent of the republic to all these concessions. The king further engaged, by a secret article, to send twenty thousand men into Poland, who were to join the Russians, should the war become general. His majesty further pledged himself openly to declare against the house of Austria, if this aid should not be found sufficient. It was also stipulated that the Prussian subsidy should cease to be paid, as soon

as

as the auxiliary corps should have joined the Russian army. In another article it was added that his majesty should be authorised in withdrawing his auxiliary troops, if, because of such succour, he should be attacked by the Austrians, in his proper states; and in this case Russia promised to send him a corps of six thousand foot, and four thousand Cossacks. The number was further to be doubled whenever circumstances would permit. Russia also agreed to maintain an army of fifty thousand men in Poland, in order to assist the king with all her powers, after the war with the Ottomans should be terminated; and in fine to continue this aid till such time as, by a general pacification, a suitable compensation could be procured for Prussia. A separate convention was added to all these articles, to regulate the reciprocal maintenance of the auxiliary troops.

— This work, which was to serve as a basis to the projects that were to ensue, being terminated, it now remained to persuade the court of Vienna to join the two contracting powers. There were three parties formed in that court, and which were of three different opinions. The emperor was desirous of regaining in Hungary those provinces which his ancestors had lost by the peace of Belgrade. The empress,  
his

his mother, no longer possessed of that energy and fortitude of which she had given so many proofs in her youth, and who began to addict herself to mystical devotion, reproached herself with the blood which her past wars had shed. She detested war, and wished to purchase peace, be the price what it might. Prince Kaunitz, endowed with an accurate judgment, who wished to unite the interests of the monarchy with the inclination of his mistress, consequently found himself obliged to choose between war or the dismemberment of Poland; and had further to dread that, should he determine on the latter, the union between the houses of Bourbon and Austria, which he regarded as his masterpiece would have an end. On one side, the Prussian cavalry, remounted with such promptitude, gave him to understand that the king was decisive in his measures; on the other, he saw his majesty was desirous of a general pacification, to effect which he ardently laboured.

In fine the king told the Austrian envoy, during a conference between them, that his majesty congratulated the empress queen for having, at that moment, the destiny of Europe in her power; because that, in reality, peace or war, under the present circumstances, depended

was immediately communicated to the empress queen. The court of Vienna, in her counterproject, took care not to forget herself. Her avidity extended over numerous palatinates, including the whole space that lay between the principality of Teschen and the very confines of Wallachia; and in one direction advanced as far as Belcz, within a small distance of Warsaw. The country which that line of demarcation comprehended, and which constituted nearly the third of Poland, was too evidently in contradiction to the convention which this court had but just signed with the other powers.

The portion which the Austrians wished to appropriate to themselves was held to be as enormous, at Petersburg, as it had been thought exorbitant, at Berlin. Shocked at proceedings so indecent, count Panin remitted a memorial to prince Lobkowitz, who resided at Petersburg in quality of Austrian ambassador, in which he estimated with precision the partition of the three courts, and concluded that, in order to establish a perfect equality, it was necessary that Vienna should think proper to renounce the possession of Leopol, and the important salt-pits of Wiliczka, that no one might imagine themselves wronged.

The court of Vienna continued to insist on the

the town of Leopold and the salt-pits of Wiliczka, which she was determined to possess; but at the same time, in order to facilitate the convention, she gave up the palatinates of Lublin, Chelm, and Belcz. Such being the state of the negotiation, it was necessary to hasten the conclusion of it, or the dismemberment must be renounced. On such an occasion, too great exactitude in estimating the different portions would have given birth to never-ending disputes; other powers would infallibly have profited by the misunderstanding, and all the previous trouble that had been taken would have been rendered ineffectual.

Persuaded of this, the king advised the empress of Russia to accept the conditions which the court of Vienna announced as her *ultimatum*. Catharine well understood how precious the moments were: and, there being no longer any impediment, the triple convention of the contracting courts was signed (August the 5th) by their ministers at Petersburg.

The Prussian and Russian acquisitions in this treaty were such as they have before been described. The portion which was allotted to the Austrians extended from the principality of Teschen, beyond Sendomir, to the confluence of the Sau, drawing a right line to the Bug, and



from that river to the Dniester, on the frontiers of Podolia and Moldavia. The three courts guarantied their respective possessions, and promised to act in concert, to induce the republic of Poland to grant its consent to the cessions that should be demanded.

The court of Vienna, rendered gracious by so many acquisitions, promised to employ her good offices, conjointly with the king of Prussia, in order to dispose the Porte to accept the conditions of peace, such as they were stipulated by Russia.

The three courts fixed the 1st of September for the day of taking possession. They agreed to send a declaration, which should be concerted between the three powers, to the king of Poland, about the same period, that the republic might be informed of the arrangements which had been made, and exhorted to convoke an extraordinary diet, effectually to accomplish the entire pacification of the kingdom. At this diet, Russia, Austria, and Prussia individually proposed to present a deduction, which should contain the pretensions of each power, with the claims they imagined themselves to have on the provinces of which they had taken possession.

The king founded his demands on Pomerellia, and a part of Great Poland, situated on  
this

this side the Netze, upon the plea that these provinces, formerly annexed to Pomerania and Brandenburg, had been dismembered by the Poles. He claimed the town of Elbing, in virtue of a pretended debt, and of a loan which his ancestors had advanced the republic on that town. The bishoprick of Warmia, and the palatinates of Marienburg and Culm, were stated to be an equivalent to Dantzick, the capital of Pomerellia, which was to remain free.

We will not here dwell on the rights of the three powers; a singular junction of circumstances was necessary to produce this dismemberment, and that union of interests which was requisite. They were the sole means of avoiding a general war.

Such was the conclusion of so many negotiations, which required patience, fortitude, and address. Europe was at this time preserved from a general war, which was ready to burst forth. It was difficult to conciliate interests so opposite as those of the Austrians and the Russians. To compensate the Russians for the conquests which Austria demanded should be restored to the Porte, there was no other medium than that of assigning them possessions in Poland. The empress queen set the example, by causing her troops to occupy the lordship of Zips; and, if

an equilibrium between the monarchies of the north was in any manner to be maintained, it was requisite the king should take part in the dismemberment. This is the first example which history furnishes of a partition so regulated, and peaceably terminated, between three sovereigns. But for the circumstances under which Europe at that time was, the most able politicians must have failed in such an attempt. All depends on opportunity, and seizing the moment when opportunity presents itself.

The care of the three powers was not wholly absorbed by their respective interests in the dismemberment. They were not the less active in pressing the Turks to a congress. The Austrian internuncio, who resided at Constantinople, spoke no more of the subsidies, which he had so warmly solicited, nor of the diversions his court meant to make in favour of the Porte. Far from encouraging the Turks to continue the war, he joined the Prussian ambassador, to induce the Divan to make choice of the persons whom the grand Seignor should send to the congress of pacification. The plenipotentiaries were appointed, on the part of the two belligerent powers. The Prussian and Austrian ambassadors joined them at Foxsiani, in the beginning

ning of August, at which place the conferences were held.

Here count Orlov, the favourite of the empress, presided on the part of Russia; and Osman Effendi, in behalf of the Mussulmen. The two ministers appeared to agree on the essential articles of the treaty, and even relative to the independence of the Tartars. But, when the plan was examined article by article, Osman Effendi presented another, by which the right of confirming the kham of the Tartars elect, and of administering justice in the Crimea, was reserved to the grand Seignor. This proposition was rejected; and Osman presented one more moderate, which was as little admissible as the former; on which he declared that, after having used every means in which he was indulged by his instructions, after having modified and softened the articles which gave most offence to Russia, still perceiving that, regardless of the moderation of the grand Seignor, his propositions were all rejected, he had only to demand horses that he might return to Constantinople. Count Orlov took him at his word: the personal interests of the count recalled him to Petersburg, where his enemies, profiting by his absence, had found means to supplant him; and thus the congress, which had been assembled

with so much trouble, did not fit to the end of the month in which it began.

The more the affairs of the north and east were advantageous to Russia, the greater were the attempts of France, little satisfied as she was with her own want of importance, to find a recompense by her intrigues for the ascendancy which she had lost. This she flattered herself she might regain by making Sweden a party. The prince royal of Sweden, on his travels at that time in France, happened to be at Paris when he was informed of the death of the king his father. The ministers of Louis XV. that they might profit by the occasion, entered into secret engagements with the young prince. They promised to pay up the arrears of the last war, which France was indebted to Sweden. The sum total amounted to one million three hundred thousand crowns, a part of which was remitted to him at Paris; and they led him to hope for the rest, if he would employ it to change the form of government in Sweden, and render it absolute.

The youthful prince, ardent, ambitious, but with an alloy of levity, from that time applied himself, without reserve, to the execution of this project; a favourable opportunity to accomplish which would be furnished by the diet  
that

that was to be assembled for his coronation. On his return to Stockholm, emissaries provided with money were sent into all the provinces of the kingdom, to corrupt the deputies, and a part of the troops. His brother, prince Charles, put himself at the head of one of these corps, to conduct it to the capital, for the support of the king; but the young monarch did not wait his arrival. He had gained over the regiment of guards, and that of the artillery. By this means he seized on the arsenal, pointed cannon to sweep the squares and streets, assembled the senators who were intimidated by preparations so novel, and (August the 18th) caused himself to be declared sovereign by this body, which represented the whole nation.

An event so unexpected occasioned some inquietude at the court of Berlin. The king, in his treaty with Russia, had engaged to maintain the form of government established in Sweden in the year 1720. He was not ignorant how strong an impression so sudden a revolution would make on the empress of Russia. The congress of Foxfiani had indeed been interrupted, but the Russians and Turks were again parleying, preparatory to the assembling another at Bucharest. Should peace be concluded between these two powers, it might be expected

that Russia would instantly labour to restore the Swedish government to its ancient form. The young king of Sweden, who depended on the support of France, would never voluntarily resign the power he had so lately acquired. Here was a new subject for war, in which the king would have been obliged to combat against his own nephew; and nature, which pleads in the hearts of kings as powerfully as in those of private persons, revolted at the act.

On the other part, politics required the faith of treaties should be respected. In this dilemma, the king availed himself of the court of Vienna, in order that, by her remonstrances at Petersburg, the first effervescence of Russia might be calmed. Emotions of anger and revenge however would have been most powerful in the mind of the empress of Russia, had not the Turks, with much fortitude, resisted the rigorous and vexatious conditions which the Muscovites endeavoured to oblige them to accept. In the interim, the king of Sweden being aware of the danger with which he was menaced, on the part of Russia, it became a matter of moment with him first to prevent all interference from Denmark, that he might only have one enemy at a time to combat.

This obliges us to go back that we may with  
precision

precision expose the reasons which the king of Sweden had to act thus. The king of Denmark had ascended the throne too young, and before he had been formed for government by experience. He was surrounded by ministers who were grown old in the intrigues of the court, and who, being rather interested persons than good citizens, had no other ambition than that of governing their master. As these rivals struggled mutually to supplant each other, their contests did but occasion frequent disgraces: each day produced new ministers and new projects of government. The sieur Saldern, who was at that time ambassador from Russia at Copenhagen, had, as we have before said, trafficked for the exchange of the dutchy of Gottorp, in lieu of those of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst. This foreign ambassador, having too much power at Copenhagen, persuaded the king to make a tour through foreign countries, wishing by that to prevent his visiting the kingdom of Norway, as he had intended to do, and in which it was feared some changes would have been introduced, prejudicial to the interests of Russia.

Soon after his marriage with the princess Matilda, sister to the king of England, he departed from Copenhagen, and travelled to London, and from thence to Paris. His courtiers,  
and



and the persons who attended him, strengthened his inclination to voluptuousness and debauchery. On his return from his travels, he brought home a disease for the cure of which he had taken no care. The queen, his consort, under the pretence of recovering his health, gained a dominion over his mind, and proposed a physician to him, named Struensee, as the man most capable of effecting his cure. The free access which this physician had to the court gave him an opportunity of imperceptibly gaining an ascendancy over the queen, which was unbecoming a man of his inferior birth.

This connection, which daily increased in intimacy, obliged the queen to take the utmost precautions lest the king should perceive the present proceedings. It is pretended that, for the greater certainty, the queen and the physician, under the pretext of administering remedies to the king, caused him to take opium. The too frequent use of that soporific produced a considerable effect on the understanding of the young monarch: he was subject to such long and continued fits of forgetfulness that the queen, and the physician, seized on the reins of government. Struensee was created prime minister, and, during some months, was in reality king of Denmark. The Danish nation was enraged.

enraged. It was at length discovered that the project of the minister was to cause the king to be declared incapable of reigning, and, under this pretext, to raise himself to the protectorship of the kingdom; which step completed the disgust that the minds of men had conceived. To expose the kingdom to fall under a denomination like this was to cover it with opprobrium. The marine guards, whom it had been intended to break, because that the faction suspected their fidelity, gave the first shock to the revolution. The two generals Eickstædt and Coeller, both Pomeranians by birth, and the minister of state, Osten, secretly repaired to the queen, Julia, the mother-in-law of the king, and in the most lively colours painted those perils by which she, personally, as well as her son-in-law, and the whole kingdom, were menaced. They conjured her, at a moment so critical, to take a decisive part; and prevailed on her to repair, after a ball, which was to continue a great part of the night, by a secret stair-case, into the apartment of the king, to inform him of the imminent danger which threatened him, and to oblige him instantaneously to sign an order by which the generals should be authorized, the one to arrest the queen Matilda, and the other to secure the physician, prime minister.

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The plan was executed as it had been projected. The queen was imprisoned in a fortress, and the physician and his adherents were brought to trial. The fear of tortures made them confess all the crimes of which they were accused. The marriage of the queen Matilda was annulled. By the intervention of the king of England she was permitted to leave Denmark, and to retire into the electorate of Hanover. She fixed her abode at Zelle, where she was treated with distinction by her brother.

The physician and baron Brandt, after their trial, were beheaded. The queen Julia, mother-in-law of the king, assumed the management of affairs. Every thing was feebly conducted at the commencement of such an administration, which, in reality, was nothing more than a regency. The debility of the mind of the king was equivalent to a minority. The Norwegians, who had been loaded with taxes for the support of the bank, which was on the point of bankruptcy, began, on various occasions, to manifest their discontents. The sudden revolution, that at the same time happened in the Swedish government, gave very powerful alarms at the court of Copenhagen, which dreaded the enterprises of a youthful neighbouring prince, by birth the enemy of the Danes. The queen Julia sent  
general

general Huth, with some troops, into Norway; in order to guard that kingdom against any foreign invader.

The dissatisfaction of the Norwegians, and the little favourable propensities they had toward the court, were the subjects on which the king of Sweden founded his hopes. Some deputies from the peasants of that kingdom, who came to him in the small town of Eckholmsfund, assured him that he had only to shew himself with a few troops, on their frontiers, to animate the Norwegian peasants, and to occasion an insurrection in his favour. Without examining whether it was the nation, that spoke by the mouth of these deputies, or whether they were merely the organs of some obscure malecontents, the king suddenly departed, under the pretence of making what is called, in Sweden, the *Eric Gatta*. He made the tour of the southern provinces in Scania, and toward the frontiers of Norway. He thence sent a memorial to the court of Denmark (November the 9th) conceived in terms of menace, wherein he demanded the reason of the extraordinary armaments which that court was making in Norway. He at the same time prepared to undertake war himself. Swedish troops, provided with artillery, approached Norway. His numerous emissaries  
were

were dispersed through the kingdom, to excite the people to sedition. Ineffectual attempts were made to burn the dock-yard of Copenhagen: in fine every thing tended to a rupture between the two kingdoms; which perhaps must have ensued, had not the court of Berlin, by the most energetic remonstrances, induced the two powers to come to a mutual eclairsissement, relative to their suspicions, and to an accommodation. The effect these remonstrances produced occasioned the king of Sweden to return to his capital, and freed the Danes from their fears.

The change of government in Sweden had given displeasure to the empress of Russia, and these motions of the monarch, on the frontiers of Norway, offended her still further. She feared lest a prince, so restless and enterprizing as the king of Sweden, should with equal levity make an attack on the frontiers of Estonia and Finland. These two provinces were, at that time, unprovided with troops; the Russian armies were in Bessarabia, and in the Crimea, and Poland was over-run with more than fifty thousand of the Muscovite troops. The empress judged that, under such circumstances, while she was making conquests in the east, and subjugating the Sarmatians, she ought not to neglect the security of her former possessions.

With this intent, she recalled twenty thousand of her soldiers, who were in Poland, to send them into Livonia, for the defence of that and other provinces, which she believed were exposed to insult from the Swedes. She also shewed herself more inclined to a new congress, for the conclusion of peace with the Turks.

October 26th. The congress opened at Bucharest. The reis Effendi was the plenipotentiary from the Porte, and the sieur Obreskow from Petersburg. The two plenipotentiary ministers of Prussia and Austria did not attend, because the Russians had been dissatisfied with the sieur Thugut, who had been present at the first congress, as minister from the empress queen. The Russians began by renewing their exorbitant pretensions. They afterward receded on several articles; but the cession of the fortresses of Kersch and Jenikala, in the Crimea, situated on the strait of Zabach, the possession of which would open a passage to the Russians into the Euxine, was an invincible impediment to the conclusion of peace. The corps of the Ulemas, or men of the law, declared to the grand Seignor it never would consent that Russia should, by this cession, be empowered to send out a fleet which might threaten Constantinople itself with the most imminent danger;

ger; and Russia, on her part, announced the possession of these two places as a condition from which she would never recede. Hereupon each of the two courts sent an *ultimatum* to their plenipotentiaries. The Russians offered to give up the money that they had demanded, on condition that the Turks would consent to the remainder; and the Turks proposed to grant twenty-one millions of rubles to the Russians, if they would restore every thing to the state in which it was before the commencement of the war. After the conditions had been mutually rejected, toward the end of the month of March 1773, this second congress broke up like the first.

Two reasons contributed to render the congress ineffectual. The first was the burthensome, humiliating, and rigorous conditions, to which Catharine wished to subject Mustapha. The other originated in the intrigues of France, which, not satisfied with employing bribes to gain the principal visirs and grandees of the Porte, inspired them with courage by the hope that the king of Sweden would carry the war into Finland, and there make a diversion in their favour; adding that France was actually arming a numerous squadron at Toulon, which she would send to the Levant, and that it should there remain, to cruise in the Archipelago.

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## MEMOIRS AFTER THE PEACE.

The court of Versailles did more than raise these petty cabals. She disapproved the conduct of the empress queen, who, being her ally, had united with Prussia and Russia, and had taken part with these powers, which France regarded as her foes. To avenge herself of the Austrians, a quadruple alliance was projected at Versailles, between that court and those of Madrid, Turin, and London. This was begun by setting every engine in motion to inspire England with dissatisfaction against Prussia and Russia. Numerous pamphlets were dispersed by the French emissaries, in some of which they demonstrated to the English the very considerable injuries their trade would endure, now the king of Prussia was in possession of the port of Dantzic; in others they exaggerated the losses which the commercial interests of the English must suffer, should the Russians obtain the free navigation of the Euxine. These writings at length made some impression; the impetuosity of the English was quickly excited, and, without knowing why, the nation vented loud exclamations, protesting that the port of Dantzic was about to ruin the trade of Great Britain.

It is unnecessary here to report all the disagreeable circumstances to which these clamours gave birth; but we are indispensably obliged



to relate that the English addressed themselves to the Russians, and that they required the ambassador of the empress, in conjunction with the English ambassador, to give law to the king of Prussia, in his own domains, which belonged to him as legally as the provinces which the two other powers had invaded did to them, that he might sacrifice his interest to their caprices.

The Russians did not entirely enter into these extravagant ideas of the English. The war with the Turks still continued. The king granted subsidies; it was therefore necessary they should pay him some attention. Some vague negotiations took place with the court of Petersburg, concerning the duties and tolls of the Vistula, and relative to the port of Dantzic. After explanations between the parties, and when good reasons had been adduced to convince the czarina that each sovereign was master of his own territories, and that therefore he ought not to be disturbed in the administration of his finances, the Russians found these proofs were valid, and affairs remained in their former state.

The project of the French and English was still more artful than as above represented. Their view was to embroil Prussia and Russia, on the subject of the port of Dantzic; and, though

though the conclusion did not correspond with the attempt, the English did not cease to testify, at the court of Petersburg, how jealous and envious they were of the commerce of the Euxine, which it was the intention of the Russians to exercise. But the breaking up of the congress of Bucharest delivered them, for the moment, from their apprehensions.

The intestine troubles of the court of Petersburg, and the different factions which were endeavouring to effect the destruction of their opponents, influenced the public affairs, and occasioned new disputes; sometimes respecting the port of Dantzic; at others, concerning the tolls; and, on a third occasion, relative to the limits of the new acquisitions. Ill-humour was carried so far that they disputed a district with the king situated beyond the Netze, which he had inserted in his line of demarcation. Other difficulties were raised concerning the territory of Thorn, which it was pretended he had incroached upon; although the partition had been regulated by the most authentic geographical maps that were to be procured.

The Russians had similar quarrels with the Austrians, concerning a district which they had appropriated to themselves, lying beyond the San, and which was of considerable extent.

The king promised he would comply with the empress of Russia, and, in a certain degree, accommodate himself to her desires, on condition that the Austrians would act in like manner; but the court of Vienna, displaying its haughtiness and its whole dignity, declared it would not yield an inch of its possessions. This proud and determined declaration of the Austrians compelled the Russians to keep silence, and from that time affairs remained in the state in which they then were.

All these petty arts derived their origin from the hatred in which count Orlov, now made a prince, held count Panin. He accused him of having too advantageously regulated the partition in behalf of the Russian allies; and the minister, who saw his influence tottering, had not the courage firmly to maintain the points on which the empress of Russia and the king of Prussia had been mutually agreed, when the convention was signed. About this time, the nuptials of the grand duke were celebrated at Petersburg. (July.) Count Panin, who had been his governor, then gave up his charge, and the empress not only graciously rewarded him but, undeceived relative to the calumnies with which his enemies had endeavoured to

blacken his character, she restored him to her confidence.

It was the king who, by his efforts, occasioned the choice which the empress made of a daughter-in-law to alight on the princess of Darmstadt, own sister to the princess of Prussia. If influence was to be preserved in Russia, it was necessary persons should reside there who were connected with Prussia. When the prince of Prussia should ascend the throne, it was to be hoped he might hence derive great advantages. M. von Affeburg, a subject of the king, and who had passed into the service of the empress, was commissioned to make a tour through the courts of Germany, in which there were marriageable princesses, and to give in his report. He chose the princess of Darmstadt, who was designed for the consort of the grand duke.

While the marriage festivals were celebrating in the city of Petersburg, the diet of Poland assembled at Warsaw. The three courts there published a manifesto, with a deduction of their claims. They demanded that the king and the republic should—

1. Sign the treaty of cession, in favour of the three courts.
2. The pacification of Poland.

3. Set apart a fixed sum for the support of their king.

4. Should establish a permanent council. And

5. Appoint a stable fund by which the republic might maintain thirty thousand men.

At the same time each power sent a corps of ten thousand men into Poland. Each, in like manner, sent a general to Warsaw. The name of the Austrian general was Richecourt; of the Russian Bibikow; and of the Prussian Lentulus. They had orders to act in concert, and to chastise the grandees who should attempt to cabal, or be any let to the innovations which were intended to be made on their country.

At the beginning the Poles were froward; they treated whatever was proposed with repugnance, and the nuncios from the palatinates did not arrive at Warsaw. Fatigued by these delays, and this obstinacy, the court of Vienna proposed to fix a day for the assembling of the diet, with a menace that, if the nuncios should fail to be present, the three courts, without further loss of time, would dismember the whole kingdom. But it was likewise added that, out of regard to them, if they should give indications of their docility, as soon as the act of cession should be signed, the three powers

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would

would withdraw their troops from the territories of the republic.

Scarcely was this declaration published before all acted as if there had been no constraint. The diet assembled on the 19th of April; the treaty of cession was approved and signed, first with the Austrians, afterward with the Russians, and that of Prussia on the 18th of September. It was agreed that commissaries should be sent to regulate the frontiers. The republic in favour of his majesty renounced its right to the reversion of the kingdom of Prussia, and of the fiefs of Lauenburg, Butow, and Draheim. Several articles of the treaty of Welau were abolished, and all the remaining provinces were guarantied to Poland. The king further promised to preserve the catholic religion, in his portion of the dismemberment, in the state in which he found it; and the articles which related to trade were referred to separate acts. This treaty, and those of the other courts, were at first only signed by the two marshals of the confederation, the president of the delegation, and the ambassadors of the three powers. These ambassadors began afterward to treat with the members of the delegation. The creation of a permanent council was agreed on, but the discussions concerning it, which must necessarily

be long and circumstantial, were remitted to the succeeding assemblies.

The Poles, whom we cannot but consider as the most frivolous and inconsiderate people in Europe, flattered themselves without the least foundation that they should soon annihilate the labours of the three neighbouring powers. Thus do those reason who are little used to reflect. "The campaign of the Russians has not been fortunate this year, and they will be ruined in the next; and," added the zealous lovers of the anarchy of the ancient government of Poland, with still more wild bombast, "the grand Seigneur, at the head of his brave janissaries, will soon penetrate into Russia, will burn Moscow and Petersburg, will dethrone the empress, and will then divide between himself and the Poles the remains of that vast empire."

That we may judge how far their ill wishes falsely over-rated the bad success of the Russians, it will be necessary to relate what passed between the armies, during this campaign; and even to go somewhat back. After the breaking up of the congress of Bucharest, the empress of Russia, accustomed to have inconceivable exploits performed by her troops, imagined that by the aid of a new victory she might render  
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the sultan less stubborn in his purpose, and induce him to consent to those conditions of peace, from which she was not willing to recede. She therefore sent the marshal orders to pass the Danube with his army, and to attack, wherever he should find, the foe. Romanzow felt some repugnance to hazard his fame in an enterprise so perilous. He remonstrated concerning the difficulties; said the Danube was a mile wide, in these parts; spoke of the impossibility of constructing bridges; the danger of disembarking on the opposite shore, under the fire of the enemy; and added that no firm footing could be obtained in Romelia; and that there was reason to fear the army would be exposed to circumstances similar to those which threatened Peter I. on the banks of the Pruth.

These remonstrances were made in vain; reasons of war ceded to the impatience of the empress, and Romanzow was obliged to pass the Danube (June 13th) with his army, thirty-five thousand strong. He repulsed and defeated a corps of observation, which the Turks had sent on the banks of the river. He afterward marched for Silistria, which it was his intention to take. This town is situated in a defile: it has no works for its defence, but the hills that surround it on both sides were well fortified. Thirty thousand Turks were here encamped,  
and



and the army of the grand vizir, posted on mount Hemus, was ready to send succour. Marshal Romanzow, approaching Silistria, was determined to take the town by assault. He divided his army into different corps, some of which were to support the batteries that fired on the camp of the enemy, others to attack the town, by that opening between the hills which was the widest. The remainder was to form a reserve, which was meant either to support the assaults to be made, or to protect the retreat of the troops.

The Turks attacked this reserve and the corps which covered the batteries, with their spahis, at the same time that they came on the rear of the detachments; which, it is true, had entered Silistria, but which were afterward obliged to retire with very considerable loss. Informed of what had passed, the grand vizir quickly sent a heavy body of troops on the back of the Russian army, to garnish a defile through which it must retreat, in order to regain the banks of the Danube. Had the grand vizir known how to profit by the opportunity, he would without loss of time have assaulted the rear-guard, and the army of Romanzow, then retiring; according to every probability, he would then have destroyed this Russian army, that had passed the Danube.

Danube. But fate had decreed that so the affair should not terminate. The grand vizir remained quiet in his camp, and marshal Romanzow, having been informed that a corps of Turks was posted in his rear, sent general Weissman, at the head of a detachment, to dislodge the enemy from their ambuscade. The brave general, after incredible efforts of valour, was successful ; but his success cost him his life.

This important advantage empowered the Russian army to regain the Danube. Here there were not boats sufficient to transport the troops, all at one time ; three days were necessary to effect the passage, during which it never entered the thoughts of the Turks to attack the divisions of the army, that were waiting the return of the boats, or to throw the least impediment in the way of their embarkation.

The empress of Russia was exceedingly dissatisfied with the expedition. Troops were obliged to be drawn from Ingria, Estonia, and Poland, in order to reinforce the army of Wallachia. Government however was not discouraged ; new projects were formed at Petersburg, which it was determined should be put in execution, the same year, toward the end of autumn. It must be observed that it is customary among the Turks for the Asiatic troops to return home,  
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at the approach of winter. The Russians, being informed of this, were desirous of profiting by the weakened state of the army of the grand vizir, after the departure of so vast a multitude of combatants. Romanzow, by order of the empress, sent different detachments of his troops beyond the Danube; and the marshal, with the main army, consisting of about twenty thousand men, remained behind the rivers, to cover the conquered provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia.

General Ungern, prince Dolgorouki, and general Soltikow, were detached each at the head of three thousand men. Ungern and Dolgorouki fell upon a corps of Turks, which they put to flight. The serasquier who commanded them, and some cannon, were taken. Their orders were to march from thence to Warná; to seize on this important post, and on the port by which the army of the vizir obtained subsistence from the Black Sea. As misfortune would have it, the two generals quarrelled. Ungern singly advanced to Warná. He found the town well fortified, surrounded by a deep moat, full of water, defended by a strong garrison, and the port full of Turkish frigates, the artillery of which, scouring the whole shore, greatly incommoded the Russian troops.

Ungern

Ungern perceived it would be impossible for him to force the town; and, having abandoned his project, was exceedingly haraffed by the Turks on his retreat. He lost his artillery, not to mention a very considerable number of his men. Still however he regained the Danube; while the Turks, on their part, seized on the magazine which the Russians had collected for the expedition; by which the latter were all obliged to repass the Danube, and again to join their army, their numbers greatly reduced, and in a very distressed and famished state.

It now seemed that Fortune, in one of her caprices, weary of having so long favoured the Russians, meant to pass over to the opposite party. Two successive expeditions into Rometia already had failed; and, as if this were not sufficient, the Cossacks of the Don, and those who inhabit the banks of the Jayck, in the vicinage of Orenburg, revolted. Their principal complaint was that the court had violated their privileges; by forming them into regiments, like regular troops; by having drafted twenty thousand of their countrymen to send them against the Turks; and by having exhausted their province, in obliging it to send more men and horses than it was able to furnish,

A vagrant Cossack headed the insurgents, and persuaded

persuaded them that he brought with him the emperor Peter III. who wished to dethrone his wife, the empress, that he might place his son, the grand duke, upon the throne. Some of the neighbouring provinces joined the rebels. Their numbers, which daily increased, obliged the empress to recall as many of her troops as she could from Estonia, Ingria, and Poland, to oppose these Cossacks. General Bibikow was sent to head the corps that had thus been hastily assembled; but, in despite of all his diligence, he was unable to arrive in the kingdom of Casan sooner than the month of March, in the year 1774.

So great a reverse of prosperity, which astonished a court that had been so little accustomed to misfortunes, inspired the empress with more pacific sentiments. She feared, and with good reason, the great number of recruits that were exacted from the provinces, which exaction had already occasioned murmurs, would induce the Russians to proceed from discontent to open revolt. Add to this consideration that the success which it may be said had dazzled the eyes of Europe, at the commencement of the war, had lost much of its splendor, during the course of the last campaign. As the court had a very sincere desire to re-establish peace, count  
Panin

Panin requested count Solms to send advice to the sieur von Zegelin, ambassador from the king to the Porte, that he was intreated, in his own name, to lay the following propositions before the cadileker, who transacted the official business of the grand vizir, during his absence.

1. That the Porte should desist from the possession of Kersch and Jenikala.

2. That the Crimea should be governed by its own Kham, without any interference of either Turks or Russians.

3. That the free navigation of the Euxine should be confined to merchant ships, not any of which should carry more than four or five guns; and that all Russian ships of war should be forbidden to enter any of the ports which were under the dominion of the grand Seigneur.

4. That Oczakow, instead of Kinburn, should appertain to the Russians, that they might at least possess one fortified town, with a port on the Euxine; and that, in consideration of this grant, the Russians should restore Bender to the Turks, and with that all their other conquests.

That the delicacy of the empress Catharine might not be wounded, who had a repugnance to make the first proposals for peace to her enemies,

mies, the king willingly undertook to present them in his own name, at Constantinople, and the more so because it was his personal interest to put an end to the war, which by its continuation might be productive of disagreeable and vexatious events.

The new endeavour at pacification was not more successful than the preceding efforts had been. Both powers were too elevated, too haughty, to bring them to terms of accommodation. But, while these things passed, the grand Seignor, Mustapha, who had reigned during the course of this war, expired at Constantinople. His brother Achmet succeeded to the sceptre; a prince who was unacquainted with every thing, except the seraglio, which had been his prison, and in which he had been educated. Ignorant, and equally confined and feeble in understanding, he committed the cares of government to his sister, and his grand vizir; nor was there any apparent change produced by his reign.

In despite of the pride which both the courts affected, they both felt how requisite it was to re-establish peace; and, being alike disgusted that so many congresses had been assembled to no purpose, they attempted another mode of reconciliation. They renewed a direct negotia-

negotiation between the grand vizir and marshal Romanzow. This however was retarded by the recurring disputes concerning the independence of the Crimea, and the cession of the places which Russia demanded; and thus the affair languished till the month of June, when the campaign opened.

To avoid a general engagement, the grand vizir had chosen his camp on the mountains of Bulgaria, and only sent heavy detachments against marshal Romanzow. The latter, desiring to recover that fame which had been injured by the unfortunate operations of his last campaign, after having passed the Danube with his army, found means to turn that of the grand vizir by detachments, which beat all the troops by whom they were encountered. Romanzow then fortified these detachments, one of which had the good fortune to defeat and carry off a considerable convoy, that had been destined for the grand army of the Turks. Dearth soon began to make its appearance in the camp of the vizir: general Kamenfski cut off his communication with Adrianople. Had the Turk possessed audacity, he would have opened himself a passage, sword in hand; especially since the greatest part of his troops, wanting subsistence, deserted; after having pillaged



their own camp. His reverse of fortune threw the wretched grand vizir into despair, and he imagined himself obliged to sign all the propositions for peace which marshal Romanzow thought proper to dictate.

The peace produced the independence of the Crimea, and gained the Russians the cession of the towns of Asow, Kinburn, and Jenikala. The Turks further granted them the free navigation of the Hellespont, the Propontis, and the Archipelago, with the sum of four million and a half of rubles, as an indemnification for the expences of the war. These preliminaries, which were so glorious to the empress Catharine, were signed, on the 10th of July 1774, in the camp of marshal Romanzow. The grand vizir, without loss of time, led back the few troops that remained with him to Adrianople, where he died with grief.

The prosperity which the empire of Russia enjoyed, in consequence of the advantages it had acquired over the Turks, was counterbalanced by the apprehensions which the revolt of the Cossacks had occasioned. Pugatschef, who was at the head of the rebels, had the address to draw over the tribes that inhabit from the banks of the Jayck to those that are found in the vicinity of Moscow to his party; even the nobility

bility began to be seduced, and nothing was wanting to this chief of a faction, except the aid of good fortune, to complete the revolution which he intended to effect in the empire. But the peace which had so lately been concluded with the Turks rendered all his plans abortive. The troops that the empress marched from Romelia were employed against the rebel. They surrounded him on all sides, dispersed his party, and cut off retreat. He was at length betrayed by one of his adherents, who delivered him up to the Russians, by whom he was condemned to the death he had merited.

During all this interval the diet of Poland and the delegation were labouring at what they called a reform of the government. Whatever concerned the permanent council was regulated; funds were set apart for the maintenance of the king, which was fixed at the sum of one million two hundred thousand crowns. Other funds were destined for the support of the army. The article which regarded the dissidents was supposed to be the most delicate, because of the fermentation which it might occasion in the minds of men, and was therefore reserved for the close of the diet.

A new rumour, at this time, was spread

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throughout Poland. The nation loudly complained because the Austrians and Prussians, as they affirmed, no longer set any bounds to the extension of their limits. These complaints were not entirely void of foundation; for the Austrians, by the abuse of an incorrect map of Poland, as all the maps were, having confounded the names of two rivers, the Sbruze and the Podhorze, had, under this pretence, extended their limits far beyond what had been assigned them by the treaty of partition. It had been stipulated that the dismemberment should be made with perfect equality, and that the portions which should fall to the lot of the three powers should not be more extensive in the one than in the other instance. Therefore, as the Austrians had infringed the condition, the king thought himself authorized to do the same. He consequently extended his limits, and included the old and new Netze, in that part of Pomerellia which he already possessed.

The court of Petersburg interfered in the affair, and the king engaged to contract the limits of his frontiers, on condition that the court of Vienna would set the example. The Poles, informed of the altercations which passed between the three courts, thought this was the moment,

moment, by the aid of their cabals, to sow discord, bitterness, and envy, between the powers.

With this intent count Branicky, grand general of Poland, was sent to Petersburg, under the pretence of pleading the cause of the republic, but rather to incite the anger of the empress against Prussia and Austria. Before he was made grand general, he had accompanied Poniatowsky to Petersburg, previous to his being elected king. Although this envoy did not accomplish the great purpose of the republic, which was to annul all that had been done, he irritated Russian vanity, by representing to the empress that her honour was pledged not to suffer the Prussians and Austrians to display their despotism in Poland. Dehortatory letters were immediately expedited to the king, as well as to the empress queen, to induce them not to abuse that complaisance which the empress had hitherto paid to their interests.

The king replied to the exhortation with politeness, intreating the empress Catharine to recollect the fundamental article of the treaty of partition, and on which the equality of the portions rested. He further added that, provided the Austrians would prescribe just bounds to their acquisitions, he would willingly desist from any extent of his limits which should be

found disputable; there being no interest which he would not sacrifice to the advantage of preserving the friendship of the empress. The answer of the empress queen was of a very different complexion; the style partook of the temper of him by whom it was dictated; cold and haughty, it announced the firm resolution of the Austrians to preserve all of which they were in possession.

The details into which we have here entered ought not so far to engage our attention as to prevent us from taking a retrospect of the rest of Europe, all the powers of which are connected with the general chain that links their political interests; nor ought any of the events which may more or less influence whatever happens to be omitted.

At the beginning of the year (May) Louis XV. expired: he died of the small-pox. The bishops who were present during his last moments acted with most disgusting hypocrisy. They obliged him publicly to demand pardon of the nation for his errors. The sovereign was good, but wanted fortitude; his only defect was that of being a king. The French nation, insatiable in its thirst after novelty, and weary of so long a reign, attacked his memory with pitiless rage. At length the successor who had been waited

for with so much impatience assumed the seat of his grandfather, Louis XVI. because he was but lately become a king, was immediately applauded; his reign was the golden age; no mortal was to be dissatisfied under his government, and with him returned the days of Saturn and Rhea. Such was the language of enthusiasm. Truth confines itself to say that the young monarch chose the count de Maurepas for his Mentor, who had formerly been minister, and disgraced, under Louis XV.

The advanced age of this prime minister did not permit the flattering hopes that France during his administration should recover the respect she had lost; his politics extended no further than to maintain affairs in the state in which he found them. How indeed might he engage in grand enterprises, the end of which a man of eighty could not hope to see? It was no doubt his duty to labour to re-establish the finances. But what were his means? Must he lessen the expenditure? He would draw down on his own head the hatred of all the grantees of the kingdom. Was he to find new funds? Every resource was exhausted. There was no other prudent expedient than that of a partial, to prevent a total, bankruptcy, which he dreaded should happen during his life, and

which would remain a blot upon his administration. The only act which signalized his return to the ministry was his re-establishment of the former parliament, and his contributing to the banishment of M. de Meaupoux ; for which he was praised by the lawyers, and blamed by the politicians.

France, at this time, feared that the disputes which had arisen between Spain and Portugal, relative to the fort of St. Sacrament in America, would occasion a rupture between those powers. England feared it no less, for she herself had sent troops into America, to Boston and other colonies, to appease the discontents which had there taken birth, at the acts of government in the mother-country. Should war be kindled between Portugal and Spain, the king of England was obliged to succour Portugal. This would incontestably embroil him with the Spaniards, who, to avenge themselves, would assist the English colonies, and consequently would endanger the loss of the important possessions of America.

To free themselves from this embarrassment, the English ministry bribed the emperor of Morocco, and induced him immediately to declare war against Spain. By thus giving the court of Madrid an occupation so serious, the English  
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hoped hostilities between Spain and Portugal would be deferred, and time would be gained to reduce their own colonies to subjection. Events so various and important occasioned the English at that time to lose sight of Europe.

These conjunctures favoured the interests of the king. While the English and the other powers were themselves in an embarrassing situation, and thinking only on their own affairs, they paid less attention to what was passing in the rest of Europe; consequently his majesty had less to apprehend from the importunate jealousy of the English, who would certainly otherwise have interfered in what related to the treaty of partition. Attempts therefore were made, with the assistance of the court of Russia, to terminate the differences that existed with the citizens of Dantzic. The Prussian and Russian envoys negotiated with the magistrates and syndics of the city, but to no effect; the latter persisted so obstinately in a kind of commercial despotism, which they had arrogated to themselves over other towns situated on the banks of the Vistula, that they thought their dignity must be injured by ceding the least trifle. The Russian envoy perceived that gentle means would have no effect in the negotiation; he therefore declared that, since they paid no respect to the remon-  
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frances of the empress, he should leave them to their fate, after which he returned immediately to Petersburg, to render an account of his mission. The Prussian envoy in like manner departed for Berlin.

Had the declaration of the Russians been more firm, the citizens of Dantzic would, no doubt, have been less refractory ; but Catharine was better pleased to leave than to extract this thorn from the foot of her ally, because the differences of Prussia with Dantzic would furnish a ready subject of dispute, by which Russia might profit at any time, when the good harmony that existed between the two powers should be interrupted.

The concord of the two empresses was much more disturbed than that between Prussia and Russia. The obstacles which the court of Russia threw in the way of the Austrian encroachments began to offend the haughtiness of the empress queen ; and, at the time that anger was thus gaining strength, a copy of a treaty was received that had been signed between the court of Vienna and the Divan of Constantinople. It was dated in the year 1771. Though it has been printed, we still think it necessary here to give an abstract of the treaty.

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The empress queen undertakes (these are the words) to oblige Russia, either by negotiation or by arms, to restore all the conquests she has made on the Turks; and for this the grand Seignor shall pay her a subsidy of ten millions of piasters, to indemnify her for the expences of war. He shall further cede to her a part of Wallachia, and some districts in the territory of Moldavia.

Although the treaty was never ratified, prince Kaunitz was sufficiently artful to cause a considerable sum to be paid to his court, in advance; and, notwithstanding he had signed a partition treaty between the three crowns, he did not the less persist in his plan. He attended to the interest of his court alone, and was little delicate in the choice of the means he employed. Thus it was soon perceived that the Imperial minister, the sieur von Thugut, who assisted at the different congresses that were held between the belligerent powers, traversed as much as he was able the interest of Russia; yet not so adroitly but that the courts of Petersburg and Berlin discovered his manœuvres. This conduct of the court of Vienna occasioned it to lose the little remaining confidence that had been placed in its good faith; nor did the  
empress,

emprefs Catharine and the king of Prussia remain insensible to such acts.

It was perceived at Petersburg that the Russians had gained so many battles, and had made so many conquests, only for the advantage of the court of Vienna, which had but obliged the Russians to restore Moldavia and Wallachia to the Turks, that she might seize them, in part, herself. It was felt that these usurpations, which extended almost to Choczim, would render the Imperial court, whenever a war again should happen between the Russians and Turks, the arbitratix of fortune; because her new possessions afforded her the means of cutting off the Russians from Poland, by the Dniester, whence they drew their magazines.

The king had likewise subject of complaint against the court of Vienna; because this court had occasioned him to induce the Russians to desist from their conquests. Such procedure discovered the avidity which the Austrians had for aggrandisement, as well as their immeasurable ambition; and served but to caution other powers to be on their guard, against what might be attempted in future. It was known that the young emperor desired the conquest of the Venetian part of the province of Friuli; that he had formed projects on Bavaria; and that he meditated

dictated the capture of Bosnia ; without enumerating Silesia, Alsatia, and Lorraine ; the loss of which he had not forgotten. Such being the propensities of the sovereign, his increase of power must, by principle, be opposed.

The Russians were desirous that the king should take charge of all ; and that, like a valiant champion, he should dare Austria to the field. But the Turks, who had been wronged, kept a mournful silence ; and how may assistance be offered to him who does not complain ? The Russians were exhausted by the war which they had so lately waged, and neither had the power, nor the will, to join his majesty. France had hitherto given no explanation of her intentions, and England was engaged in a civil war with her own colonies, undertaken in the spirit of despotism, which ill-conducted war, it might be expected, would not be brought to a conclusion in a few campaigns. These united considerations occasioned the court of Berlin to remain inactive, and the king wrote to Petersburg it was improper that he should announce himself the Don Quixote of the Turks.

1775. While the animosity between the three courts was at its greatest height, the delegation was to send deputies ; who, in concert with the deputies of the three powers, were to regulate the

the limits of their possessions. Those that appertained to the Austrians and Prussians could not agree in any thing\*, not even on the places which were to fix the limits of their frontiers. Prince Kaunitz demanded the mediation of Russia and Prussia, but there was too much anger and bitterness in these courts for his request to be granted; and, though the empress queen and the king continued to hold their extended limits, they could not obtain the legal cession of them from the republic.

From all that we have related it results that the situation of Europe was not permanent, and that peace was not established on any certain foundation. Fire was every where concealed under the embers. In the south of Europe, it might be foreseen that the civil war, between the English and their colonies, would become general, should the least part be taken in it by France and Spain. The same might be affirmed of the partition treaty, which might occasion new troubles, should it not be confirmed by the sanction of the republic of Poland. With respect to the peace between the Russians and the Turks, the conditions had been thought so offensive at Constantinople that it seemed the

\* By what follows, the king must mean their deputies could not agree with the deputies of the delegates. T.  
interest

interest of the public good must forcibly break the agreement to which necessity had yielded. The seeds of discontent had in like manner been sown in the north, by the revolution of Sweden. And, still more especially, what might not be expected from the ambition of a young emperor, seconded by the artifices of an able and adroit minister?

All these considerations obliged prudent sovereigns to remain on their guard, to continue well armed, and not to leave watching over those affairs which might be embroiled at the moment when quarrels should be least suspected. If we take a general view of history, it should seem that vicissitude and revolution are a part of the fixed laws of nature; every thing on earth is subject to change; yet do madmen rivet their eyes on objects of ambition, which they idolize; nor do they undeceive themselves respecting the illusions of which this magic lantern is incessantly reproductive. But each age has its passion: love in youth, ambition in manhood, and the schemes of political calculation for the old.

## C H A P. II.

*Of the Finances.*

PRINCES should resemble the spear of Achilles, which gave the wound and afforded the cure. They bring evil upon nations; and the evil they cause it is their duty to redress. A war of seven years, against most of the powers of Europe, had nearly exhausted the treasures of the state. Prussia, the provinces on the Rhine, and those of Westphalia, as well as East Friesland, not having been defended, had fallen into the enemy's power. Their loss occasioned a deficiency of three millions four hundred thousand crowns in the revenue; while Pomerania, the electorate of Brandenburg, and the confines of Silesia, had been occupied, during a part of the war, by the Russians, the Austrians, and the Swedes; so that they were unable to pay in their contributions. This embarrassing situation obliged the king, during the war, to have recourse to the most exact œconomy, and to all that the most determined valour could suggest, that he might bring it to a happy conclusion. Those resources of which there was an urgent  
neces-

necessity were found in the contributions levied on Saxony, in the subsidies of England, and in the adulteration of the coin; the last was a remedy as violent as prejudicial, but the only one by which, under such circumstances, the state could be supported. These means, well managed, annually supplied the royal treasury with the advances necessary for the expences of the campaign, and the pay of the army.

1763. Such was the state of the finances when the peace of Hubertsburg was concluded. The supplies were in the treasury; the magazines formed for the campaign were stored; and the horses for the army, the train of artillery, and the provisions, were all complete, and in good condition. These resources, that were destined for the continuation of war, became still more useful for the recovery of the provinces.

In order to obtain a clear idea of the general subversion of the country, and to represent to ourselves the desolation and discouragement of the people, it is necessary we should imagine countries entirely ravaged, where the traces of former habitations were scarcely discoverable; towns almost erased from the earth; others half consumed by the flames; thirteen thousand houses no vestige of which remained; fields



lying fallow; the inhabitants destitute of the corn requisite for their support; the farmers in want of sixty thousand horses for the plough; and a diminution of five hundred thousand inhabitants, since the year 1756; a very considerable number in a population of only four millions five hundred thousand. The noble and the peasant had been pillaged, ransomed, and foraged, by so many different armies that nothing was left them, except life, and the miserable rags by which their nakedness was concealed. They had not sufficient credit even to satisfy the daily wants of nature. There was no longer any police in the towns. To a spirit of equity and regularity base interest, disorder, and anarchy had succeeded. The colleges of justice and of finance had been rendered inactive, by the frequent invasions of such numerous enemies. The slumber of the laws produced a licentiousness of spirit in the public, and hence avidity, and the desire of rapacious gain, took birth. The noble, the merchant, the farmer, the labourer, the manufacturer, all strove who should set the highest price on their commodities, their provisions, and their industry; and only seemed active to effect their mutual ruin.

Such was the fatal spectacle which so many  
provinces

provinces that had lately been so flourishing presented, at the conclusion of the war. There is no description, however pathetic, that can possibly approach the deep, the affecting, the mournful impression which the sight of them produced.

In a situation thus deplorable, courage must be opposed to adversity. This was not a time to despair, but to resolve to soften the evil, and endeavour to re-establish the state. A new creation must be undertaken. The treasury furnished supplies for the rebuilding of the towns and villages; the corn that was necessary for the subsistence of the people, and to sow the lands, was supplied by the stores found in the magazines. The horses that had been destined for the use of the artillery, the baggage waggons, and provisions, were employed in agriculture. Silesia was relieved from contributions\* for six months, Pomerania and the New Marche for two years. Relief was given to the provinces by a grant of the sum of two millions three hundred and thirty-nine thousand crowns, with which they acquitted the debts they had contracted, to pay their contributions,

\* Contributions may here mean taxes in general, or more probably only a part of the system of taxation. T.

and to gratify those impositions which the vagrant enemy had exacted.

However great this expence was, still it was necessary, or rather it was indispensable. The state of these provinces, after the peace of Hubertsburg, recalled to mind the condition of Brandenburg, after the famous war of thirty years. The electorate, at that time, remained in want of succour; because of the inability of the great elector to assist his people. And what was the consequence? An entire age passed away before his successors had again rebuilt the towns and cultivated the desolated countries.

An example so striking made the king determine not to lose a moment, under circumstances thus afflicting; but, by prompt and ample aid, to repair the public calamity. Multiplied largesses restored courage to the poor inhabitants, who had begun to despair amidst their sufferings. The means that were thus supplied inspired new hope; the citizens acquired renovated life; industry, encouraged, reproduced activity; the people were again inspired with patriotism; and from that time the lands were cultivated anew, manufactures recovered animation, and the re-established police successively corrected those vices which had taken root during a state of anarchy.

During

During the war, the most aged counsellors, and all the ministers of the grand directory, had died, in succession; and, in times of such trouble, it was impossible properly to fill up the vacancies. It was difficult to find persons capable of these different offices. The provinces were searched, in which men of talents were as uncommon as in the capital. At length, M. von Blumenthal, M. von Massow, M. von Hagen, and general Wedel, were chosen, to fill these important posts. Some time after M. von Horst was appointed to the fifth department\*.

The beginnings of administration were rigorous and oppressive; there were deficiencies in all the receipts: it was nevertheless necessary exactly to acquit the burthens of the state. Although, after its reduction, the army had been fixed, in time of peace, at a hundred and fifty thousand men, it was difficult to find the supplies necessary for the pay of the troops. During the war, all persons who did not appertain to the military had been paid in notes; and this was likewise a debt which must be discharged,

\* Meaning of the grand directory, in which from the text it appears there were five vacancies, though the number of the departments or directing ministers were six, to whom at that time was committed all the administration of home affairs, except for the province of Silesia. T.

and which, beside other necessary payments, was productive of much inconvenience. The king, however, the first year after the peace, found means to satisfy all the creditors of the state; and every incumbrance which had been incurred by the war was liquidated.

It might have been supposed that the devastations which war had occasioned were yet insufficient to ruin and overwhelm the kingdom. Scarcely was it terminated before frequent fires produced almost as much mischief as even the conflagrations of the enemy. Between the year 1765 and the year 1769, the city of Königsberg was twice reduced to ashes; a like destiny in Silesia destroyed the towns of Freystäd-tel, Ober-Glogau, Parchwitz, Haynau, Naumburg am Queis, and Goldberg; Nauen in the Electorate; Calies, and a part of Landsberg in the New Marche; and Belgard and Tempelburg in Pomerania.

To repair these misfortunes, additional expences were continually incurred; and, in order to supply so many extraordinary wants, it was necessary to imagine new resources: for, beside money exacted for the renovation of the provinces, very considerable sums were expended on the new fortifications, and the founding of other trains of artillery; but of these we shall speak

speak in their place. Industry exerted all her efforts. The revenues of the tolls and the excise were not exactly administered, because there wanted superintendents to watch over the collectors. That this important branch of the revenues of the crown might be established on a more permanent basis, those who had been at the head of this department having died during the war, the king found himself obliged to have recourse to foreigners, and took some Frenchmen into his service, who had long been in the routine of this kind of business. These duties were not farmed on leases, but were subjected to a directory, as the preferable mode; by aid of which the collectors might be prevented from pillaging the people, an abuse which we see but too frequently practised in France. The tax on corn was lowered, and the price of beer underwent some little advance, that there might be a compensation. By this new arrangement, the produce of the taxes was augmented; especially that of the tolls, which introduced foreign money into the kingdom.

But the greatest good which resulted from the regulation was that of diminishing contraband trade, so prejudicial to countries that are in possession of manufactures. When a country has but few products to export, and is obliged to

have recourse to the industry of its neighbours, the balance of trade must necessarily be unfavourable to such a country; it must pay more money to foreigners than it receives; and, if the practice be continued, it will necessarily, after a certain number of years, find itself destitute of specie. If money be daily taken out of a purse into which money is not again returned it must soon be emptied. Sweden may serve us as an example in support of this remark.

To obviate the inconveniency there were no other means than those of increasing the manufactures. The peculiar products of any country are wholly gain, and the price of workmanship, at the least, is gained from foreigners. These maxims, as true as they are palpable, served as principles to the government, and according to these were all the operations of trade directed. Thus, in the year 1773, there were two hundred and sixty-four new manufactories\*. Among others, there was a porcelain manufac-

\* *Fabriques*. There is a difficulty in translating the term, which should rather mean master tradesmen than manufactories, as is evident from the nature of things. But trade of every kind was so entirely a monopoly in Prussia, and at least a majority of these two hundred and sixty-four *fabriques* were individually such perfect monopolies, that there is no single term which will give a precise idea of their nature. T.

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tory established at Berlin, the workmanship of which, while it afforded subsistence to five hundred persons, soon surpassed the Saxon porcelain. A snuff manufactory was formed, which was put under the direction of a company. This company had warehouses in all the provinces, which supplied the consumption of those provinces, and gained by the sale the leaf tobacco, which must have been purchased from Virginia, from foreigners. The revenues of the crown were increased, and the proprietors were paid ten per cent for their capitals\*.

War had rendered the course of exchange disadvantageous to the Prussian commerce, although the adulterated coin had been immediately melted down, after the peace, and restored to its former value. To erect a bank was the only means that could be taken to obviate this inconveniency. Persons who were enslaved by prejudices, because they had not sufficiently considered the subject, affirmed that no bank could be supported, except under republican governments; for that monied men would never place any confidence in a bank that should be established in a monarchy. The assertion was false;

\* Nothing can better demonstrate how oppressive such a monopoly must be. T.

there



there is a bank at Copenhagen, another at Rome, and a third at Vienna. Men were therefore suffered to reason as they thought proper, but the project was put in execution. After having attentively compared these various banks and regulations, in order to examine what might be best adapted to the nature of the country, it was found that a *giro* bank, combined with a *lombard*, would be the most convenient. The court disbursed eight hundred thousand crowns for its establishment, which sum was to serve as a fund on which to form its operations. At the beginning the bank suffered some losses, either through ignorance or from the knavery of those to whose direction it was committed. But since it has been under the administration of M. von Hagen, exactitude and order have been established. No bills have been issued till funds were first realized for their payment.

Beside the advantage which this establishment procured the country, by facilitating commerce, there still was another. In preceding times, it had been the custom for the money of wards of chancery to be deposited with the court, and these wards, instead of deriving any advantage from their capitals, while any suits at law continued, were obliged to pay one per cent per annum. Such money was afterward deposited

at the bank, for which the minor received three per cent; so that, in effect, including what had formerly been paid into court, their real gain was four per cent.

The bankruptcy of Neuville, and other foreign merchants, occasioned some Prussian traders to fail. Credit would have suffered had it not been for the establishment of the bank, by which such traders were supported in their business. The course of exchange was presently at par, and the commercial world began then to be convinced, by the effects that followed, that this was a useful establishment, and necessary to trade. The bank soon had offices in all the great towns of the kingdom, and houses in every commercial city of Europe. By these means the circulation of money was expedited, as were the payments of the provinces, at the same time that the lombard\* prevented usurers from ruining the poor manufacturer, who could not sell the produce of his industry with sufficient promptitude. Exclusive of the good which resulted to the public, the court prepared for itself, by the credit of the bank, resources for the grand necessities of the state.

\* The Lombards were originally a kind of pawnbrokers, as bankers still in some degree are. Hence the term. T.

Princes,

Princes, like private persons, while they may amass with one hand, are under the necessity of expending with the other. The good husbandman cuts channels for the rivulets that, by their aid, he may water his thirsty lands, which otherwise, wanting humidity, would remain unproductive. On the same principle government augmented its revenues, that they might be employed in works of utility to the public. Nor did it content itself with restoring that which war had destroyed: it was desirous of perfecting whatever was capable of perfection. It therefore proposed to profit by every kind of soil, by draining the marshes, improving the lands by an augmentation of cattle, and even to render the barren sands useful, by planting them with trees. Although we relate circumstances that may be thought minute, we still flatter ourselves they will be deemed such as must interest posterity.

The first work of this nature regarded the Netze and the Wartha, the banks of which were cleared, after having drained off the stagnant waters by different channels, which, in different directions, carried these waters toward the Oder. The expence amounted to seven hundred and fifty thousand crowns, and three thousand five hundred families were settled in these countries.

The

The nobility, and the towns in the vicinity of the above-named rivers, found a very considerable increase of riches. The work was finished in 1773, and population from that time there increased to fifteen thousand souls.

The marshes which extend to Friedberg were afterward drained, and four hundred foreign families were there settled.

The lakes of the Madua and of Leba were drained in Pomerania, by which labour the nobility gained thirty thousand acres of meadow land. Similar works in like manner took place in the environs of Stargard, of Cammin, of Treptow, of Rugenwalde, and of Colberg.

In the Marche, the marshes of the Havel were drained; those of the Rhine, toward Fehrbellin; and those of the Finow, between Ratzenow, and Ziefar; without enumerating the money that was employed in the amelioration of the lands of the nobility, which amounted to considerable sums.

Mounds were at the same time thrown up in Friesland, in the Dollart, by which the land that had been overflowed by the sea, in 1724, was gradually recovered.

In the province of Magdeburg two thousand new families were settled. Their labour was the more necessary there inasmuch as, formerly,  
the

the peasants of Thuringia were accustomed to come and help to gather in the harvest. This was afterward done without their aid.

The crown possessed too many farms. More than a hundred and fifty were changed into villages; and, for its loss of revenue, it was richly rewarded by the increase of population. A farm seldom contained more than six people; and as soon as they were converted into villages they each contained thirty inhabitants, at the least.

However industrious the late king had been in his endeavours to repeople Prussia, which, in the year 1709, had been desolated by the plague, he had not restored it to the flourishing state in which it was previous to that destructive scourge; but the king was unwilling that Prussia should remain in a comparative state of inferiority; after the death of his father, he had there settled thirteen thousand additional families; and, if hereafter it be not neglected, its population may be increased by more than a hundred thousand souls.\*

Silesia no less merited attention and efforts for its re-establishment than did the other provinces: nor was it thought sufficient to restore affairs to their former state; an endeavour was

\* The king is reproached, by his own subjects, with having acted like a step-father to this province. T.

made to obtain greater perfection. The priests themselves were rendered useful, by obliging all the rich abbots to establish manufactures. In some of these the workmen were employed in fabricating table linen; at others in oil mills. Here they were tanners, and there they worked in copper, iron, or wire, according as best suited the place, and the products of the country. The number of husbandmen was likewise augmented in Lower Silesia, by four thousand families. It will perhaps afford surprise that such an increase might take place in that class, recollecting that no field of the country remained uncultivated. The reason was many lords, that they might increase their domains, had imperceptibly appropriated to themselves the lands of their subjects. Had this abuse been tolerated, many fee-farms would, in time, have been vacated; and the land, wanting labourers for tillage, would have been less productive; till at length each village would have had its lord, without having any fee-farmers. We know that the possession of property attaches men to their country. Those who have no property can have no reason for remaining in states where they have nothing to lose. These reasons having been alleged to the manor lords, their own  
 advan-

advantage induced them to consent to restore their peasants to their former privileges.

In return, the king aided the nobility by very considerable loans, that their credit, which was totally on the decline, might be recovered: Numerous families, indebted before, or by the war, were in danger of becoming bankrupts. The law granted them letters of credit, for two years, in order that, having time again to till their lands and render them productive, they might be in a situation to pay at least the interest of the money. These letters completely ruined the credit of the nobility. The king, who took a pleasure and made it a duty to assist the first and most splendid order of the state, paid three hundred thousand crowns of the debts of the nobility; but the sum total which had been borrowed on the lands amounted to twenty-five millions of crowns, and it was necessary to resort to means more efficacious. The nobles were assembled, and, as forming an assembly of the states, pledged themselves to pay the debts contracted. Notes to the amount of twenty millions were issued, which being put into circulation, aided by two hundred thousand crowns, which the king advanced to realize the payments that were most pressing, soon re-established credit; and four

hundred of the most distinguished families are indebted for their preservation to these salutary measures.

In Pomerania and the New Marche, as in Silesia, the nobility were in like manner ruined: The government paid a part of their debts, to the amount of five hundred thousand crowns; adding five hundred thousand more that were to be expended in putting their lands into a proper state of tillage.

The towns that had suffered most by the war were in like manner relieved. Landshut received two hundred thousand crowns: Striegau forty thousand; Halle forty thousand; Crossen twenty-four thousand; Reppen six thousand; Halberstadt forty thousand; Minden twenty thousand; Bielefeld fifteen thousand; and those of the county of Hohenstein, thirteen thousand crowns.

These expences were all necessary: it was requisite to be prompt in dispersing money through the provinces, that they might be re-established as hastily as possible. Had rigid œconomy been attended to, under such circumstances, a century perhaps would have passed away before the kingdom would again have flourished; but, by the celerity that was employed on the occasion, more than a hundred thousand persons returned to their country.



Thus, in the year 1773, compared to the year 1756, the increase of population amounted to two hundred thousand souls.

Nor was this all. Reflecting that the number of inhabitants constitutes the wealth of sovereigns, means were found to erect two hundred and thirteen new villages in Upper Silesia, the inhabitants of which amounted to twenty-three thousand. A plan was likewise formed to augment the number of husbandmen, in Pomerania, by fifty thousand; and those of the electoral Marche by twelve thousand; which was put into execution, toward the end of the year 1780. That the result of all these operations may be known, the best method will be to compare the population of the year 1740 with that of the year 1779; of which the following is an abstract.

Provinces	Date	Inhabitants
Prussia - - - in	{ 1740 1779	370,000 780,000
The Electorate - in	{ 1740 1779	480,000 710,000
Magdeburg and Halberstadt }	in { 1740 1779	220,000 280,000
Silesia - - - - in	{ 1740 1779	1,100,000 1,520,000
		<hr/>
		Increase 1,120,000

It

It may be supposed that largesses so numerous must have exhausted the funds, and the revenues of the crown; yet have we still to add the expences which the fortresses occasioned, as well those which were repaired and improved as the new ones which were built; and still further the money that was necessary to the founding of cannon; the sum total of which amounted to five millions nine hundred thousand crowns. Government notwithstanding firmly met every expenditure. The king made none of those disbursements of ostentation which are so common to great courts; he lived like a private person, that he might not fail in the performance of his principal duties. By the aid of rigid œconomy, the great and the little treasury were full; the former to supply all expences of war, the latter to purchase horses, and whatever was necessary to put the army in motion. There were still further nine hundred thousand crowns deposited at Magdeburg, and four million two hundred thousand at Breslau, for the buying up of forage. This money was in the treasury when war broke out between the empress Catharine and Mustapha. It was necessary, according to treaty, annually to furnish a subsidy of five hundred thousand crowns

to the Russians, so long as the troubles of Poland, or those of Turkey, should continue.

1769. The good of the state, and the faith of treaties, exacted this expence, which in other respects came mal apropos, especially because of the grand enterprises of finance which were undertaken, and which of themselves absorbed very considerable sums. It therefore was but right that politics should indemnify the state for the sums which had been sent into Russia, and which, under the present circumstances, might have been employed in a more useful manner upon the provinces under the Prussian domains.

1770. In the following year a general dearth prevailed throughout the north of Europe, occasioned by late frosts, which blighted and killed the productions of the earth. Hence arose the dread of new misery for the people, and new obligations of affording them aid. Corn was distributed to the poor gratis; but, as the consumption of provisions was diminished, there was a deficiency in the produce of the excise, to the amount of five hundred thousand crowns. The king had formed grand magazines of provisions, as well in Silesia as in his hereditary states. There were seventy-six thousand winspels prepared to feed the army,

during twelve months, and nine thousand win-  
spels entirely set apart as a supply for the ca-  
pital.

1771. Arrangements so prudent preserved  
the people from the dearth by which they were  
threatened. The army was fed from the maga-  
zines. Beside the corn given to the people,  
they had a further supply for seed.

1772. The harvest again failed the following  
year; and, although the bushel of rye was  
sold in the Prussian states at the rate of two  
crowns and some groschen, the dearth was much  
greater in the neighbouring countries. The  
bushel of rye sold for five crowns in Saxony,  
and in Bohemia. Saxony lost more than a  
hundred thousand inhabitants, who were either  
carried off by the famine, or who left their  
country; and Bohemia a hundred and eighty  
thousand souls at the least. More than twenty  
thousand peasants from Bohemia and as many  
from Saxony fled from want, and sought an  
asylum in the domains of the king. They were  
received with open arms, and were sent to peo-  
ple the new establishments that had been  
formed.

The misfortunes that fell upon the subjects  
of other countries were occasioned by their not  
possessing magazines like Prussia. Yet did

not these calamities, to meet which provision had been made, and which means were found to ward off, by the precautions that prudence had suggested, prevent government from continuing to act with the same ardour for the improvement of the country, according to the plans that had been projected. Experience had demonstrated that the mortality among the cattle was more frequent in Brandenbourg than in Silesia. Two reasons were discovered which occasioned this difference. The first that, in the Marches and other provinces, no use was made of petrified salt, which is extracted from the salt-pits of Wiliczka, except in Silesia; and the second that the inhabitants of the Marches, and of Pomerania, did not feed their cattle under cover, but led them to graze in seasons when sometimes the mildew had poisoned the herbage. After the new mode of feeding cattle had been introduced, the mortality visibly became less frequent, and the land owners did not labour under so many misfortunes as formerly.

In consequence of the attention paid to know all the foreign products which were introduced into the country, by searching the registers of the customs, it was found that foreign butter was entered to the amount of two hundred and eighty

eighty thousand crowns. That the kingdom might supply itself with an article so necessary, a calculation was made of what the new improvements were capable of producing. A cow, by converting her milk into butter, generally brought in five crowns; and, on the new lands that were clearing, it was estimated that forty-eight thousand cows might be fed, the product of which would be equivalent to two hundred and forty thousand crowns; but from these was to be deducted the consumption of the proprietors; and, after adding the deficiency that would result, the number of cows must amount to sixty-two thousand. This was a difficulty still to vanquish, but which still was capable of being vanquished; because, after all that had yet been undertaken, there were other lands less extensive to be cleared, and which might supply remaining wants.

The government, proposing to improve whatever was found defective in ancient customs, after an attentive examination of different parts of rural œconomy, found that, generally speaking, whatever land is called common, is prejudicial to public good. Agriculture among the English did not begin to flourish, till after the enclosure of these commons. All monarchical governments which imitate the

customs introduced into republics do not deserve to be accused of despotism; and therefore an example so laudable was imitated. Legal and agricultural surveyors were sent to separate the pastures and the fields, which were either mixed or in common. The undertaking at the beginning met with great difficulties; custom, empress of the earth, reigns with imperious despotism over the narrow minded. But, after some examples of these partitions had been executed to the satisfaction of the proprietors, and had made an impression on the public, they were soon generally introduced through the provinces.

In a part of Brandenburg and Pomerania there were some high lands, distant from rivers and rivulets, which consequently wanted pasturage, and the strength of soil necessary for cultivation. This was rather a local defect than one arising from a want of industry in the proprietors; and, though man is not permitted to change the nature of things, it was thought proper to venture some attempts, that experience might teach what was, or what was not, practicable. For this purpose recourse was had to an English farmer, by the aid of whom an essay was made on one of the bailliages of the crown. His method was to sow the sandy grounds

grounds with turnip-feed; the turnips were suffered to rot, after which the lands were sowed with clover, and other grass seeds, and thus were transformed into artificial meadows, by the aid of which the number of cattle was increased one third on each estate. The experiment having been so successful, care was taken to generalize a species of agriculture so advantageous through all the provinces.

We have already said that war; and the frequent invasions of enemies, had introduced a pernicious anarchy into the hereditary provinces, which extended not only over rural œconomy and the finances but likewise over the woods, which had been ruined by the grand masters of the forests, according to their own fancies, they having no superintendents. An obstinate war, the success of which was dubious, and might be destructive, occasioned these forest-keepers, and some sub-counsellors of finance who participated in the depredations committed, to imagine that the state was lost past resource; that it soon was to become the prey of the foe; and that they could not do better, in a situation so desperate, than to sell all the timber they could fell for their own profit, for that no one would bring them to account for their malversations. In consequence of this false  
 opinion,



opinion, they had so entirely thinned the forests that a few scattered trees were scarcely to be found, instead of the tufted woods with which they formerly abounded. New ordinances were obliged to be published, as well to plant the forests as to keep a proportional distance, according to the different species of trees; that there might be regulations which no person should infringe, and that a sufficient supply of timber might be obtained as well for building as for burning, an article which ought not to be neglected in northern climates.

Previous to the war an annual revenue had been drawn from the Marches, and Pomerania, in wood, which often exceeded a hundred and fifty thousand crowns. It was necessary to have recourse to expedients that a substitute might be found for this product; to which purpose a transport duty was laid on the wood coming from foreign countries, and sent in floats, down the Elbe and the Oder, by the means of which wood might be bought cheap from Saxony, Bohemia, and Poland, and sold again with advantage to the nations that had merchant fleets, or ships of war to build. Thus too was time gained, to spare the forests and leave them to grow, and the loss which the revenue had suffered thus obtained a durable equivalent.

Govern-

Government must not confine itself to a single object : interest ought not to be the only motive of its acts. Public good, which is divided into such various branches, presents a multitude of particulars that ought to be attended to ; and among the principal of these must the education of youth be considered. Education influences the whole mass : true it is that it creates nothing, but it may correct errors. This part of administration, in itself so interesting, had perhaps been formerly but too much neglected ; particularly in the open countries and the provinces. The following were the vices which stood in need of correction. In the villages appertaining to the gentry, tailors performed the functions of the schoolmaster ; and, in the estates appertaining to the crown, the farm-bailiffs chose masters without discrimination. That an abuse so pernicious might be reformed, the king sent into Saxony to procure good teachers. Their salaries were increased, and the peasants were obliged to send their children to be taught. An ordinance was at the same time published by which the clergy were enjoined not to admit young persons to the communion table, unless they had been first instructed at school in their religion. The fruits of arrangements like these are not immediately  
to

to be gathered, but must be waited for with time and patience.

The same cares were employed to reform all the colleges that had been founded for the education of youth. Pedagogues only apply themselves to load the memories of their pupils, and use no endeavours to form, or bring their judgments to perfection. This custom, which was but a continuation of ancient Tudescan-pedantry, was corrected; and, without neglecting the subjects which appertain to memory, teachers were ordered early to familiarize their scholars in the art of reasoning, that they might learn the use of that art, and draw just consequences from principles which had been established and demonstrated.

While all was put in action throughout the state, and each man was labouring for the improvement of such affairs as were within his capacity, the partition treaty between the three crowns was signed. Prussia, as we have before related, acquired Pomerellia, the palatinates of Culm and Marienburg, the bishoprick of Warmia, the town of Elbing, a part of Cujavia, and a part of Posenania. This new province contained about five hundred thousand inhabitants. The good lands lie toward Marienburg, on the banks of the Vistula, on each side of the Netze,  
and

and in the bishoprick of Warmia. But, on the reverse, there are many districts encumbered with barren sands, in Pomerellia, and the palatinate of Culm. The principal advantage of the acquisition consisted in the junction that it formed with Pomerania and Prussia Royal; and in rendering the king master of the Vistula, consequently of the commerce of Poland; so that, the quantity of corn which that kingdom exports being remembered, the Prussian states no longer had any thing to fear, either from dearth or famine.

The parts gained were therefore useful, and by the aid of sage regulations might become important; but at the time this province fell under the Prussian dominion every thing in it partook of anarchy, and of the confusion and disorder which of necessity reign among a barbarous people, who are crouching under the yoke of ignorance and stupidity. A survey of the lands was first made, that the taxes might be proportionate, and these followed the same regulations which prevailed in Prussia Royal. The ecclesiastics paid according to the rates of the bishops and abbots of Silesia. The starosties devolved to the crown; they had been fiefs granted for life, similar to those of the Timariots among the Turks. The king indemnified  
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the proprietors by a gross sum of five hundred thousand crowns.

Post-houses\* were introduced into this wild and barbarous country; and particularly colleges of justice, the name of which had before scarcely here been known. A great number of laws, equally capricious and extravagant, were abrogated; a final appeal was granted from these colleges to the superior tribunal of Berlin.

The king dug a canal (1773) at the expence of seven hundred thousand crowns, from Nakel to Bromberg, to form a junction between the Netze and the Vistula; by the aid of which this great river had a direct communication with the Oder, the Havel, and the Elbe. There was a double advantage in this canal, for into it a great extent of land was drained of stagnant waters, and on which foreign colonies might be settled.

All the public buildings† were in ruins, and more than three hundred thousand crowns were expended to put them in repair.

The towns were in the most pitiable condition. Cülm had good walls and grand churches, but

\* *On introduisit des postes dans ce pays*—It is difficult to say whether post-houses or officers for the better government of the country be here meant. T.

† *Batimens economiques*. T.

instead of streets nothing were to be seen but the cellars of houses which had formerly existed. Of forty houses, which formed the great square, twenty-eight were without doors, without roofs, without windows, and without proprietors. Bromberg was in the same state. Their ruin took its date from the year 1709, when that province had been ravaged by the plague. The Poles had never imagined it was necessary to redress evil. It would scarcely be believed that a tailor was a man very rarely to be found in these wretched countries; it therefore was necessary to settle tailors, as well as apothecaries, wheelrights, carpenters, and masons, in all the towns. These towns were rebuilt and peopled.

An academy was instituted at Culm, where fifty young noblemen were educated, by masters appointed for their instruction. A hundred and fifty schoolmasters, protestant and catholic, were appointed to reside in different places, and paid by the government. The word education had been unheard of in these miserable parts, consequently the inhabitants were equally destitute of breeding and information.

Four thousand Jews were banished into Poland, who begged from, or robbed, the peasants. As the principal wealth of Western Prussia consisted

sisted in trade, means were carefully sought after by which trade might be extended. The town of Elbing gained the most by attracting that commerce which had been formerly carried on at Dantzic. A company was formed for the sale of salt, the associates of which, paying an annual stipend of seventy thousand crowns to the king of Poland, had the monopoly of that article granted through the whole kingdom; and who, by obliging the Austrians to sell them their salt of Wiliczka, rendered their affairs flourishing.

The revenues of Western Prussia amounted to the sum total of two millions of crowns, which, added to the produce of the bank, the excise, and the tobacco, augmented the revenues of the state by upward of five millions.

Thus was a system of finance, continually improved from father to son, sufficient to effect these changes in the government; and, poor as it had been, was capable of rendering it wealthy enough to throw its mite into the balance of power, held by the greatest monarchs of Europe.

## C H A P. III.

*Of the Military.*

**S** EVEN campaigns, during which seventeen pitched battles had been fought, and almost as many inferior but not less bloody combats, three sieges undertaken by the army, and five sustained, without enumerating attacks made on the winter-quarters of the enemy, and other military expeditions of a similar kind, had so far ruined the army, that a great part of the best officers, and the veteran soldiers, had perished in the field. To form some estimate of this, we need but recollect that the gaining of the battle of Prague alone cost twenty thousand men. Let us add to the calculation that we had forty thousand Austrian prisoners; and that Austria had nearly as many of the Prussians, among whom must be enumerated more than three hundred officers; that the hospitals were full of the wounded; and that in the regiments of foot there were seldom more than a hundred men found, who had served at the commencement of the war.

Above fifteen hundred officers had fallen in the different actions, by which the number of nobility had been extremely diminished; and



those who remained of that class, in the country, were either old men or children incapable of serving. The want of gentlemen, and the numerous vacancies which were left in all the regiments, of necessity occasioned recourse to be had to the ignoble, who were appointed officers. There were some battalions in which not more than eight officers remained; the others being either dead, prisoners, or wounded. It may easily be concluded, under circumstances so afflicting, the old corps themselves were destitute of order, discipline, and exactitude; consequently were destitute of energy.

Such was the state of the army when, after the peace of Hubertsburg, it returned into its former quarters. The regiments, at that time, were composed more of natives than of foreigners. The companies were each a hundred and sixty-two strong; forty of the number were dismissed, who were of utility in the cultivation of the earth. The free battalions served to complete the garrison regiments, from which, in like manner, when they obtained more than the complement of recruits, the native soldiers were discharged. A hundred and fifty men were dismissed from each regiment of cavalry; four hundred from each regiment of hussars; and thus the provinces gained by the reform thirty thousand

thousand seven hundred and eighty husband-men, of whom they stood in need. Nor was this all; the number of natives had formerly been discretionary; it was fixed in future at seven hundred and twenty men for each regiment; and the remainder, to complete the companies, were raised in foreign countries.

The soldiers of the cantons had permission to marry without the consent of their captain; few of them remained in a state of celibacy; the greater number were better pleased to contribute to the increase of population. The effects of these good regulations corresponded to the expectations of government; and, in the year 1773, the number of men enrolled considerably surpassed that of the year 1756.

In preceding times the captains recruited their companies themselves, with the money which they drew from the six months pay\*, which method had given rise to great abuses. The officers, that they might save the money, enlisted men by force; every body exclaimed against the practice, and no prince would suffer such violence to be committed upon his territories. The mode of this œconomy was therefore changed, and general Wartenberg only was allowed to receive the six months pay, from which thirty crowns per month were deducted, for the

\* *La paye des semestres.* T.

use of the captains, exclusive of their pay. The surplus was employed as enlisting money, which annually produced from seven to eight thousand foldiers, raised in foreign states, who, accompanied by their wives and children, formed a military colony of about ten thousand people. Although if a peasant had but one son that son was not obliged to serve, the stature of the men was from year to year improved; and, in 1773, there was no company of foot the foldiers of which were less than five feet five inches in height.

The regiments both of foot and horse were formed into different divisions, over which inspectors were placed, that order, exactitude, and severity of discipline might be renewed; that perfect equality might reign throughout the army; and that both officers and soldiers might have the same directions in one as in another regiment. The inspector, placed over the regiments of the Rhine and the Weser, was general Düringshofen; over those of the dutchy of Magdeburg, general Saldern. M. von Ramin, M. von Steinkeller, and colonel Butler, were inspectors over the regiments of the electorate. The regiments of Pomerania fell to the lot of general Möllendorf; those of Prussia to general Stutterheim; and those of Silesia

Silesia to Tauenzien, the general of the infantry. Lieutenant-general Bulow had the inspection of the Prussian cavalry; general Seidlitz of the Silesian; general Löllhöffel of the cavalry of Pomerania, and the New Marche; and general Krusemarck had the direction of the cavalry of the electorate, and the country of Magdeburg.

Nothing could be more difficult than to re-establish order and discipline in the infantry, which had been so exceedingly degraded. Severity was necessary to render the soldier obedient, exercise to make him active, and long habit to teach him to load and discharge his piece four times in a minute; to march in a line without fluctuation, and in fine to be able to perform all the manœuvres which might be required of him, in the various operations of war.

Yet, when all this was accomplished with the soldier, it was still more difficult to form the young officers, and to impart that degree of intelligence which was requisite for the exercise of their profession. That they might acquire the routine of the manœuvres, they were disciplined in the vicinity of their garrisons, and taught the different evolutions; to make attacks on a plain; attacks on fortified posts, as well

as on villages; the manœuvres of the van-guard, and those of retreat; to form squares; to conduct assaults; and were instructed in the knowledge of the defensive. These exercises were continued all the summer, and they were each day obliged to repeat a part of their lesson.

That the practice might be generalized, the troops were assembled twice a year, once in the spring, and again in the autumn. At these times they only performed the grand evolutions of war; such as the defence and attack of posts; to forage; to march in every mode, and direction; and to imitate battles, where the troops in action displayed dispositions similar to those of the battle that was imitated. Thus, according to the expression of Vegetius, peace to the Prussian armies became the school and the practice of war.

It must not however be imagined that the manœuvres immediately after peace were of the most excellent nature. Time must be allowed for practical tactics to become habitual, and for them to be executed without difficulty by the troops. That precision which it was desired to establish did not begin to make any sensible impression till the year 1770; from which time the army, assuming another face, might, without fear of being deceived, have been led by  
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the commander to the field with great confidence.

To acquire this degree of perfection, in which the welfare of the state was so much interested, the corps of officers was weeded of all persons of low birth. This class of people were placed in garrison regiments, where they at least equalled their predecessors; who, being too infirm for service, were put on the pension list. And, as the country itself did not furnish a sufficient number of gentlemen to supply the wants of the army, foreigners were engaged from Saxony, Mecklenburg, or the empire, among whom some good officers were obtained. It is more necessary than is imagined to pay such attention to the choice of officers; because, in general, the nobility are possessed of honour. Not but that it must be allowed merit and abilities are sometimes met with in persons of low birth; though such incidents are rare; and when men of this description are found they ought to be cherished. In general however the nobility have no means of obtaining distinction except by the sword; if they lose their honour they do not find refuge, not even in their paternal mansions. Whereas a man of mean birth, after having been guilty of mean actions, returns to the occupation of

his father without blushing, or without supposing himself dishonoured.

An officer has need of various knowledge; and one of the principal sciences he ought to be taught is that of fortification. Is he employed in besieging a town? He then finds an opportunity of acquiring fame. Is he in a town besieged? He may there render essential service. Is it necessary to fortify a camp? His abilities are then brought into action. Is there some village to be fortified, in the advanced posts of the chain of winter quarters? He is employed there; and, if he understands but a little of the art of fortification, he finds a thousand occasions of displaying his talents. That the officers might not be deficient in a branch of knowledge so useful, the king added to each inspection an engineer officer, who was to instruct the young officers, and impart to them all necessary knowledge. After they had learnt the elements of fortification, they were made to trace out works, adapted to the varieties of ground. They assumed camps, and regulated the march of columns; nor were they allowed in laying down their plans to omit even the advanced posts of the cavalry. The study extended the sphere of their ideas, and they learned to think in the great. The whole art of cam-

trametation

trametation became familiar to them, and they acquired in their youth that degree of information which is necessary for the experienced general.

The attention which was paid, to bring the field regiments of foot to perfection, did not prevent a similar attention being paid to the infantry that was to serve in garrison. Men who defend towns may render as essential service as those who gain victories. These regiments were purified of all suspicious persons, as well among the officers as the soldiers. They were disciplined in the same manner as the field regiments; and, whenever the king made a review of his troops in the provinces, the garrison regiments there appeared with equal distinction. The men in garrison were inferior in height to the field infantry; but there were no soldiers among them less than five feet three inches high; and, though they did not charge with the same celerity as the former, there was no general, in the year 1773, who would not gladly have had them in his brigade.

With respect to the cavalry, this had by no means sustained the same proportionate losses as the infantry; for the horse had been victorious on all occasions, so that the veteran soldier and the veteran officer were nearly alike preserved.

Whenever



Whenever there is a continuance of war, it always happens that the infantry suffers ; and, on the contrary, the cavalry by the same procraftination acquires perfection. Particular care was taken to supply this respectable corps with the best horses that could be obtained.

. There were however reproaches due to some of the Prussian generals of cavalry, who, having had detachments to conduct, had caused the infantry to manœuvre mal-adroitly.—Similar errors might be also imputed to some of the officers of infantry, who employed their cavalry with an equal want of discernment. That faults so gross might in future be prevented, the king wrote a work on tactics, and the art of encampment, which contained general rules, as well for offensive as for defensive war. The different rules for attack and defence were here laid down, with every disposition adapted to posts that were known to the whole army. This methodical work, full of self-evident precepts, that had been confirmed by the experience of all past wars, was deposited in the hands of the inspectors, who gave it to be read as well by the generals as by the commanders of battalions and regiments of cavalry ; but, these excepted, the greatest attention was paid to prevent it coming to the knowledge of the public. The  
work

work produced better effects than might have been hoped ; it enlarged the understanding of the officers concerning manœuvres the meaning of which they did not before comprehend ; their intelligence made a very visible progress ; and, as the success of war principally depends on the execution of the dispositions that are made, and as the greater the number of able generals an army possesses the more is success ascertained, there was reason to believe that, after so much trouble had been taken to instruct the officers, orders would be exactly followed, and generals would not commit faults sufficiently great to occasion the loss of a battle.

According to the custom that had been established during the last war, the artillery was become a principal part of an army. The number of field pieces had been so prodigiously augmented that the practice had degenerated into abuse. Yet, not to suffer any disadvantage, it was necessary to possess equal strength with the enemy ; and for this purpose the field pieces were begun to be restored to a proper state, and eight hundred and sixty-eight cannon were ordered to be refounded. Heavy artillery for fortresses was next cast, the cannon of which were in part become too wide in the bore.

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A species of tumbrils was invented, that each battalion of foot might always carry with it charges in reserve, which were inclosed in separate bags for each platoon; and distribution was by these means facilitated.

The number of powder mills was doubled, and six thousand quintals of powder were annually manufactured. The forges at the same time were busy in casting bombs, balls, and royal grenades.

The fortresses were provided with timber and stakes for the use of batteries; and, as it was determined to have a reserve of artillery for the army, eight hundred and sixty-eight additional field pieces were cast. All these various articles, with an increase of sixty thousand quintals of powder, were sent to the arsenals about the end of 1777. The disbursements for the artillery, and the repair of its carriages and train, amounted to one million nine hundred and sixty thousand crowns: the sum was great, but the expence was necessary. At the commencement of the war of 1756, Prussia had only two battalions for its train of artillery. This number, being very inferior to that of the foe, was increased to six battalions, each of nine hundred men; beside the companies that were detached and distributed through the various

rious fortresses. After the peace the corps remained on its former establishment, and grand barracks were constructed at Berlin; that, being always assembled, it might the better, and with the greater equality, be disciplined to the purpose to which it was destined.

The officers were instructed in the art of fortification, that they might perfect themselves in the art of besieging towns. The gunners and bombardiers were annually exercised. They were obliged to erect a battery in a single night; were taught ricochet-firing; to dismount the artillery of the enemy; and the manner of throwing bombs with exactness, notwithstanding the variations of the wind, which might drive them from side to side, and alter their direction. The field pieces were made to advance in a line, as if they had been distributed between the battalions. The gunners were obliged to profit by the least hillock, that they might not neglect any advantage; and to take fight continually before they gave fire.

As refinements of every kind were made, a new species of howitzer was invented, which threw grenades as far as four thousand paces. The bombardiers were taught to understand, and usefully availed themselves of various distances; and it was perceived that, to impart  
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the utmost degree of speed of which field pieces were capable, a certain number of manœuvres still must necessarily be added to the corps of artillery, in order that, drawn by force of arm, the guns might invariably remain beside the battalions as they advanced.

The army had made many campaigns, but the general quarters had often been in want of good quarter masters. The king was desirous of forming such a corps, and chose twelve officers who already had some knowledge of fortification, that he might instruct them himself for this purpose. They were taught to lay down plans, mark out situations for the corps, fortify villages, intrench heights, raise what is called palanques, indicate the marches of columns, and especially were habituated to examine and sound the depths of marshes and rivulets, in person, that no mistake of negligence might be committed, and that a fordable stream might not be given as a support to an army, or to a march, over which infantry might proceed without wetting their ancles. Such errors are of great consequence, since, if it had not been for such, the French would neither have lost the battle of Malplaquet nor the Austrians that of Leuthen.

The education of young men of quality who devote themselves to arms is a subject that merits  
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the utmost attention. They may be formed from their youth to the exercise of their destined profession, and by good instruction their abilities may be quickened; like the ripening of fruit, which is but the better for being premature. During the last war, the education of the corps of cadets had been so degenerate that the youth who were sent from this corps scarcely could read and write. That the ax might be laid to the root of the evil, the king placed general Buddenbrock at the head of the institution, who of all the men of the kingdom was, past contradiction, the most capable of filling this office. Good teachers were at the same time selected, and their number was increased in proportion to that of the scholars they had to instruct.

That the young nobility of Pomerania might no longer want education, the parents of whom were too poor to be at the expence themselves, the king instituted an academy, in the town of Stolpe, where fifty-six boys of condition were maintained, clothed, and taught at his expence. After having acquired the first elements of knowledge, and ended their philological and grammatical studies, they were entered among the corps of cadets, where their education was finished. The principal subjects in which they

were instructed were history, geography, logic, mathematics, and the art of fortifications; with all of which an officer ought to be acquainted.

An academy was at the same time formed for the still greater improvement of those cadets who gave tokens of the most genius. The king regulated the forms of this academy himself, and gave rules which contained the object of the studies of those who were placed there, and of the education they were to receive. The most able professors that were to be found in Europe were chosen, and fifteen young gentlemen were there educated under the tuition of five governors. Their whole education tended to form the judgement. The academy prospered, and has since furnished useful subjects, who have been placed in the army.

After the conquest of Silesia, different forts had there been constructed; the most of which were in need of improvement. Another was still necessary to be built at Silberberg, in order to maintain the defiles which proceed toward Glatz, on the left, and Braunau, on the right. In 1777 these different works had cost the sum of four millions one hundred and forty-six thousand crowns. The town of Colberg was also fortified, in Pomerania, which cost a further sum of eight hundred thousand crowns. After  
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the invasion of the Russians, it was perceived that, in similar cases, this place might become of the utmost importance. Although the labours of these fortresses were prosecuted with vigour, there were yet some further expences to be made, in 1778, that the whole, which was nearly finished, might be rendered complete; and these might amount to the sum of two hundred thousand crowns.

General Wartenberg, who directed the military œconomy, was as active in his department as the other officers were in the duties committed to their charge. Advantage was taken of peace to prepare for war. A hundred and forty thousand new muskets had been fabricated at Spandau, in the year 1777; a complete set of swords for the cavalry had been made, as well as bandoleers, saddles, bridles, girdles, kettles, pickaxes, hatchets, and a supply of tents for the whole army. These immense preparations were deposited in the two grand buildings which are called the army wardrobes, except the muskets, which were arranged in the arsenal.

Exclusive of all this, the sum of three millions had been set apart to remount the cavalry, in time of war, and to renew the uniforms which might be lost in battle. Another sum was destined for the expences which an increase of



twenty-two free battalions would incur: all which previous measures would, at least for some campaigns, lighten the burden of war, which weighs so heavy on the finances when it is of long duration.

The article of military magazines was not forgotten. Two were formed; the one at Magdeburg, the other in the fortresses of Silesia, each of thirty-five thousand winpels of rye, to maintain two armies of seventy thousand men for the space of a year. The first was destined for troops which might act toward Bohemia, or Moravia; and the second for such whose operations might be directed on the side of Saxony or Bohemia. The value of these magazines was estimated at one million seven hundred thousand crowns. They were in part distributed, during the three years of dearth of which we have before spoken; but in the year 1775 they were again completed, and restored to the state in which they had before been.

We have spoken of the magazines of general Wartenberg, and of the grand magazines of subsistence which had been amassed. But these still were insufficient to enable the army to enter the field with that promptitude which necessity might require. One of the most difficult articles was to find, and to collect, as many horses

as would be necessary to put a machine so vast in motion. That multiplicity of field pieces which custom had introduced required an immense number of horses for their transportation; others were further necessary for the baggage, tents, officers, and provisions. It was estimated that the whole number would amount to sixty thousand.

After the peace, the army had been put on an establishment of a hundred and fifty-one thousand men. The troubles which arose in Poland making it apprehended that a new war was on the eve of breaking out, the king thought proper, in 1768, to add forty men to each company of twelve of the regiments of infantry. To lodge these levies it was necessary to build barracks, which cost three hundred and sixty thousand crowns. The hussars and troops of Bosnia, amounting formerly only to eleven hundred men, were increased to fourteen hundred. A battalion of a thousand men was levied, under the command of M. de Rosfieres, for the defence of Silberberg. The different augmentations increased the peace establishment of the army to the number of a hundred and sixty-one thousand men, at which it remained.

Such efforts were necessary. The circumstances of the times made it a duty to prepare

for all accidents. During the course of the year 1771, while negotiations were carried on with the greatest warmth, it was impossible to divine what part the court of Vienna would take, or whether she would declare in favour of the Porte or of Petersburg. But as, according to appearances, the house of Austria was more inclined to favour the Turks than the allies of his majesty, it was resolved that all the cavalry should be remounted, and that the number should be augmented. Eight thousand horses were purchased at one time. The rumour of this purchase was soon spread throughout Europe, and by this the court of Vienna comprehended that the king of Prussia was determined to support his ally, the empress of Russia, with his whole power.

The agreement of the three courts occasioned the partition of Poland, as we have before remarked, in the chapter wherein we have treated of politics. The present chapter being set apart to treat only of the military, we shall consider this acquisition under a military point of view. It was of great importance, inasmuch as it joined Pomerania to Prussia royal. That the king was obliged to abandon all the provinces which were divided, or too distant from the body of his domains, may have been remarked in read-

ing the history of the last war. Such were the provinces situated on the Lower Rhine, those of Westphalia, and especially Prussia royal. The latter was found not only to be separated but cut off from Pomerania and the New Marche, by a deep and considerably wide river. In order to support Prussia royal, it was requisite to be master of the Vistula; and, after the dismemberment of Poland, the king was empowered to build fortresses on the banks of that river, and ascertain passes over it, according as he thought proper. Thus he could not only defend the kingdom against its enemies but, should misfortune happen, could employ the Vistula and the Netze as good barriers to prevent the foe from penetrating either into Silesia, Pomerania, or the New Marche.

In another point of view this acquisition supplied the means of considerably augmenting the army, which accordingly was increased to a hundred and eighty-six thousand men, on the peace establishment; and it was determined, by the addition of free battalions, and other similar corps, its number, in time of war, should consist of two hundred and eighteen thousand.

The augmentations were as follow :

Four garrison battalions and companies	MEN.
of grenadiers amounting to —	3,150
Two new battalions of artillery —	2,510
Six regiments of infantry on the peace	
establishment — —	8,500
A regiment of hussars — —	1,400
Thirty-six regiments of foot, an increase	
of twenty men to each company —	8,640
An augmentation of chaffeurs to the	
number of — —	300
A new company of miners —	150

Twenty-five new majors, with as many aides de camp, were created to command the battalions of grenadiers. They had formerly been selected, during the war, from the regiments; at present they are rendered permanent. Exclusive of all these, the matrosses who served the flying artillery were remounted; in order that, being exercised in time of peace, they might become more useful in time of war. The sum-total of the new augmentations amounted to twenty-five thousand two hundred and twenty men; and one million two hundred and fifty thousand crowns were to be raised in West-Prussia, and set apart for the maintenance of these new troops.

Whatever

Whenever changes are effected in a kingdom, consequences will continually follow to which government ought to pay timely attention. The forces of the state being increased, it was necessary to make a new calculation of what, in future, would be the expence of a campaign. In the year 1773, the army consisted of a hundred and forty-one field battalions, sixty-three squadrons of cuirassiers, seventy squadrons of dragoons, and one hundred squadrons of hussars, exclusive of the field artillery service, which amounted to nine thousand six hundred gunners and bombardiers, beside twelve hundred matrosses, distributed among the fortresses, and thirty-six garrison battalions. On taking this retrospect of the army, according as it is here represented, and adding an augmentation of twenty-two free battalions, an estimate was made of the amount of the first expences, which must act as a momentum to the machine.

Pursuing the same principle, the extraordinary expences of the army for the duration of a campaign were calculated; and, to avoid being led into error, an estimate was made according to the most expensive campaign of the last war, and during which the most bloody battles had been fought, that is to say, the campaign of the

year 1757. It is better, in this kind of valuation, rather to increase than to diminish the sum; because there is no evil in a surplus, but there is great risk in deficiency.

## C H A P. IV.

*Of the most important Events which happened from  
the Year 1774 to the Year 1778.*

1774. **I**T well may be imagined that the jealousy, hatred, and envy, which the dismemberment of Poland had excited among the powers of Europe, were not very suddenly dissipated. The affair was recent, and the sensation it had occasioned was too strong for sovereigns to behold with the eye of habit an event by which their self-love had been wounded. France, with secret chagrin, recollected the useless efforts she had made to support the confederation of Bar; nor could she conceal from herself the ill success of the war she had counselled the Turks to undertake against Russia. She was in some degree humbled to perceive that a monarchy like hers should have so little influence in the troubles by which Poland had been distracted; nor did she less apprehend the friendly intercourse which began to take place between the empress queen, the empress of Russia, and the king of Prussia. Such a union would give these powers a too decisive preponderance



derance in Europe, for the court of Versailles to behold it with indifferent eyes. But appearances were deceitful; the friendship of the three powers was far from being so firm as the public might imagine.

Louis XVI. had lately ascended the throne. A bishop put the political will, which the dauphin, the father of the king, had confided to him, into his hands, that he might give it his son when he should arrive at monarchy. The king imposed it as a law upon himself to follow in all things the will of his father; and it was in consequence of this will that M. de Maurepas, who had been disgraced by Louis XV. became the prime minister of Louis XVI.; that M. d'Aiguillon was exiled; and that the duke de Choiseul for ever lost all hope of being restored to favour. M. de Maurepas approached his eightieth year; he had long been minister under the preceding reign, was acquainted with the routine of business, was possessed of a mind embellished by taste, and a head capable of vast designs: but he no longer was of an age, as we have remarked, when the soul, ardent and overflowing, boldly undertakes grand enterprises. The mal-administration of the finances, under the preceding reign, might lead to a general bankruptcy. He was the more despondent at  
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the supposition because such a bankruptcy would, at least, have ruined forty thousand families, who had placed their whole wealth in the public funds; and though ministers have little feeling for the miseries of the people, they are very much alive to the blame which must necessarily fall upon themselves.

The treaty of Versailles, though of little advantage to France, still was in being. M. de Maurepas had further to act cautiously respecting the young queen, sister of the emperor Joseph II. and daughter of Maria Theresa, who, aided by a small share of complaisance, was daily liable to gain sufficient ascendancy over the understanding of the king, her consort, to govern him entirely. Hence this old Mentor of a pupil who had no fixed character was alternately obliged to employ prudence and fortitude, lest the sceptre of the kingdom should degenerate into a distaff.

France, on the other hand, the eternal rival of England, with pleasure beheld the rising troubles in America, between the colonies and the mother country. She secretly encouraged the spirit of revolt which there began to be manifest; and animated the Americans to maintain their rights, against the despotism which George III. wished to establish; presenting  
them,

them, at the same time, with a prospect of the succour they might expect, from the friendship of the most christian king.

The court of London afforded a picture very different from that we have just sketched. The Scotch earl Bute governed the king and the kingdom. Resembling those malignant spirits of which we continually speak, but which we never see, he concealed both himself and his operations in deep darkness. His emissaries, his creatures, were the engines by which he moved the political machine, according to his will. His system of politics was that of the old Tories, who maintain that the happiness of England requires the king should enjoy despotic power; and that, far from contracting alliances with the monarchs of the continent, Great Britain ought solely to confine herself to extending the advantages of her commerce. Paris, in their eyes, is what Carthage was in the eyes of Cato the censor. Bute, had he possessed the power, and the means of collecting them, would in a single day have destroyed all the ships of France. Imperious and severe in government, with little delicacy in his choice of expedients, his ill address in the conduct of public business was greater even than his obstinacy.

That he might accomplish his grand views,  
this

this minister began by introducing corruption into the house of commons. A million sterling, which the nation annually paid the king for the support of his civil list, scarcely was sufficient to satisfy the venality of the parliamentary members. This sum, destined for the maintenance of the royal family, the court, and the pay of ambassadors, being annually employed to rob the nation of its energy, there only remained to George III. for his household and the support of the royal dignity at London, the five hundred thousand crowns which he drew from his electorate of Hanover. The English nation, degraded by its own sovereign, henceforth had no will but his; yet, as if such numerous prevarications were insufficient, the earl of Bute was desirous of striking a more bold and decisive stroke, that he might more hastily accomplish the despotism to which he aspired.

For this purpose, he prevailed on the king to lay arbitrary taxes on the American colonies, as well that he might thereby increase his revenues as to give an example of what, in future times, might be imitated in Great Britain. But we shall perceive that the consequences of this act of despotism were by no means correspondent to his expectation.

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The Americans, whom government had not deigned to corrupt, openly opposed a tax so contrary to their rights, their customs, and especially to the liberties which from their first establishment they had enjoyed. A wise government would have been in haste to appease these rising troubles; but the English ministry acted on other principles, and excited new broils with the colonies, by endeavouring to oblige them to purchase, from the merchants who were possessed of the monopoly, certain kinds of merchandize brought from the East Indies. 1775.

The rigour and the violence of these proceedings made the revolt of the Americans universal. A congress was held at Philadelphia, in which they renounced the English yoke, that was become insupportable; and declared themselves free and independent. From this time we shall find Great Britain engaged in a ruinous war with her own colonies.

But, if lord Bute discovered his incapacity by incurring the war, this incapacity appeared still more visible in carrying it on when war was incurred. He had the simplicity to suppose that seven thousand regulars was a sufficient number of troops to subjugate America; and, as he did not possess all the genius of Newton, in calculation, he was continually deceived. General

ral Washington, who was called at London the chief of the rebels, gained, at the commencement of hostilities, some advantages over the royalists who were assembled near Boston. The king, who expected to hear of victories, was surprised at receiving the news of this check; and government saw itself obliged to change its measures. It was evident that the number of troops in America was too feeble to accomplish the design that was intended to be executed; an army therefore must be procured, though the numerous difficulties of procuring and assembling an army were felt.

The English, in all ages, have wanted art and subtlety in negotiation. Vehemently grasping their own interest, they know not how to flatter the interests of others: they imagine that by offering their guineas they may obtain what they please. 1776. They first addressed themselves to the empress of Russia, to whom their demands were the more offensive because the haughtiness of this sovereign held it much beneath her dignity to accept subsidies, from any power. In Germany they at length found covetous or ruined princes who accepted their money, with which they purchased twelve thousand Hessians, four thousand men from Brunswick, twelve hundred from Anspach, and as many from Hanau; without

without including some hundreds with whom they were furnished by the prince of Waldeck. Beside these they sent four thousand Hanoverians to Gibraltar and Port-Mahon, to relieve the English garrisons who were shipped off in transports for America.

All these troops served under the command of lord Howe and his brother the admiral\*, as we shall relate in its place. Each campaign cost England six millions sterling, or thirty-six millions of crowns. The debt of Great Britain was at that time estimated at the sum of nine hundred millions of crowns. One campaign would not be sufficient to subject the colonies, and thus it was foreseen that the national debt would soon exceed ten hundred millions of crowns. The following campaign was productive of no decisive event. The Americans maintained their cause against sir William Howe, and all the re-inforcements by which he had been joined; and, toward the close of the year 1777, fortune began to declare in favour of the colonies.

General Burgoyne, in obedience to the orders of the court, departed from Canada, with thir-

\* This is a mistake. Sir William Howe was the general, and lord viscount Howe the admiral. T.

teen thousand men to march to Boston, according to the plan which had been given him to put in execution; while sir William Howe, who was informed of nothing that passed, had seized on Philadelphia. The defect of not acting in concert completed the ruin of the cause. Burgoyne, who was in want of horses for the transport of provisions, and had undertaken an impracticable expedition, impracticable relative to subsistence, was obliged to surrender himself and his army prisoners to those Americans whom in imagination he had subjugated.

An event like this would formerly have made the whole people revolt against the government. On the present occasion it only produced some feeble murmurs: so much more powerful was the love of riches than the love of their country; and so much did this nation, once so noble and so generous, prefer personal advantage to general welfare. The king of England, who pertinaciously supported the system of Bute, was but rendered the more obstinate by the difficulties which continually started up. Little sensible of the misfortunes which would alight on his people, his ardour for the execution of his projects increased; and, that he might gain the superiority in America, he negotiated in every court



of Germany, purposely to obtain such further succours as they could afford.

The empire already felt the loss of the numerous men which had been drafted from it, and transported into distant climates; and the king of Prussia beheld with pain Germany deprived of its defenders, especially should a new war be kindled; for, in the troubles of 1756, Lower Saxony and Westphalia alone had supplied an army, with which the progress of the French had been impeded and deranged. For this reason he disputed the passage of the troops which the princes granted to England, when such troops were obliged to pass through the country of Magdeburg, of Minden, or by the Lower Rhine.

This was but taking a feeble revenge for the evil proceedings of the court of London, relative to the city and port of Dantzic; neither did the king desire to come to extremities. Long experience had taught him that a multitude of enemies are found in the world, and that we ought not in sport to raise up foes.

Such is the general idea we may form of England, during the short space of time of the events of which we here propose to write. We shall quit this country for the present, that we may  
give

give an abstract of such memorable incidents as happened during the same epocha in Russia.

1774. The empress of Russia concluded peace with the Turks, resplendent with glory by the success which her troops had met with against her enemies, during the war. But government was nearly exhausted of men and money; and the state of affairs was so uncertain that the grand vizir himself declared to prince Repnin, ambassador at the Porte, that, unless the khan of the Crimea should return under the dominion of the Porte, and the empress of Russia should restore Kerch and Jenikala, the peace which had been extorted from the Turks could not be of long continuance. The Russian troops, on this declaration, occupied Perekop; and hostilities immediately recommenced in the Crimea. This was not a formal and open war, in which two grand armies encamp in presence of each other, but a war of incursions. Turkish troops disembarked in various places, which occasioned skirmishes, and in which the Russians were continually victorious.

Such a state of incertitude disturbed the empress, because she was obliged to assemble an army on the frontiers of Tartary, and to keep a large body of men at Kiow; to oppose, if necessary, a corps of forty thousand Turks, encamped

near Bender; who, traversing Poland, might easily march thence toward those Russian provinces, which are situated on the opposite shore of the Niester. Thus, without being either at peace or war, the expences of the empress were as great as though war had been declared between the two powers.

1773. The internal affairs of the court of Petersburg furnished events of another nature, but which equally appertain to the history of the times. The empress, seeing her son the grand duke of a proper age to marry, deliberated concerning the choice of a proper consort, who it was necessary should be a German princess, whose age and person should be found agreeable to her son. A choice like this was no matter of indifference to the court of Berlin; for such a new connection might become favourable or unfavourable to the Prussian interests. There was a dearth of princesses at that time in Germany, where there were not above three or four who might be selected, because that some were too old, others too young. Those on whom the choice might alight were, a sister of the elector of Saxony, a princess of Wurtemberg, too young, and three princesses, daughters of the landgrave of Darmstadt. The elder sister of the three princesses of Darmstadt was married

to the prince of Prussia; therefore much was to be gained should one of these princesses become grand dutchess; for the ties of family, added to those of alliance, would then seem to announce an increasing stability to the subsisting union between Prussia and Russia. Every engine was employed by the king to accomplish this purpose, and he was fortunate enough to be completely successful. The princesses of Darmstadt passed through Berlin, and arrived at Peterburg. The apple was bestowed on the second of the daughters of the landgrave, and the marriage was solemnly celebrated; but it was unsuccessful, and was the cause of a great number of cabals and vexatious scenes.

New disputes, at the same time, arose at Warsaw, concerning the possessions which the co-partitioning powers occupied in Poland. The Sarmatians\*, with bitter complaints, accused the Austrians and Prussians of having extended their limits much beyond what had been granted them by treaty. Their remonstrances made an impression on the empress of Russia, whose ambition, applauding itself for having bestowed provinces on great monarchs, was still more flattered by

\* The word is employed figuratively to signify barbarians, and geographically for the Poles; Poland being a part of ancient Sarmatia. T.

fixing the boundaries of these provinces. To prevent the consequences which might result from the dissatisfaction of the empress, if not immediately appeased, the king determined to send prince Henry to Petersburg, under the pretence of paying a visit to the empress, by whom he had been invited to her court. Here it is necessary to add that the king had concerted with the court of Vienna, and agreed, that the two powers should preserve their possessions entire, suffering the Poles to complain, and endeavouring to pacify the court of Russia. But prince Kaunitz, enamoured of his politics, intending to embroil the courts of Berlin and Petersburg, declared to the latter that the empress queen, with no other motive but the desire of obliging the empress of Russia, determined to restore a part of the palatinate of Lublin, all the districts which lie beyond the right shore of the Bug, the town of Casimir, and some other encroachments which she still held, to the republic of Poland.

Prince Henry therefore arrived, at Petersburg, under circumstances equally singular and vexatious. He had to combat with the French, the Spaniards, and the Austrians. Scarcely had he been favoured with an interview by the empress before the grand dutchess died, after bringing a  
dead

dead child into the world. The prince, being present at this scene, aided the empress at a moment so mournful, as much as was in his power. He particularly directed his cares to the grand duke, who was overwhelmed by a spectacle as new to him as it was gloomy. He did not quit him ; and, after having contributed to the restoration of his health, he completed his work by effecting the entire reconciliation of the mother and the son, the misunderstanding between whom had been greatly increased, since the marriage of the grand duke, and had inspired apprehensions that very serious consequences, to one or the other, might be the result.

The empress was highly affected by the service which had been rendered her, by prince Henry, and from that time his influence daily increased. Of this influence he presently made good use. The empress intended her son should quickly be provided with another consort. The prince proposed the princess of Wurtemberg, the grand niece of the king ; which proposal was immediately accepted. It was further determined that prince Henry should conduct the grand duke to Berlin, where he should meet the princess, and where pledges should mutually be given : after which the grand duke was

to return with his consort to Russia, that the nuptials might be celebrated at Petersburg.

The prince found greater difficulties in eluding the restitutions which the Poles demanded of the king. An example of restitution had been afforded by the court of Vienna, and Russia insisted his majesty should imitate the conduct of that court. The affair was therefore confided to the mediation of M. von Stackelberg, the Russian ambassador in Poland; and, after having managed the business as well as circumstances would permit, the court of Berlin restored a part of the lake of Goplo, the right shore of the river of Drevenza, and some villages in the vicinity of Thorn, to the republic. We shall not here give a circumstantial account of the reception of the grand duke, which was one perpetual festival from the frontiers to Berlin, at which city luxury and taste contended for the honours that were rendered this illustrious foreigner. It was not imagined at Vienna that the grand duke would go to Berlin. Prince Kaunitz, depending on the success of his insidious arts, was persuaded that, his court having been the first to restore some districts to the Poles, he had by this complaisance irremediably embroiled the courts of  
Berlin

Berlin and Petersburg; whereas, at the very instant he was enjoying his imaginary triumph, he was informed that the grand duke was at Berlin; that he had espoused the princess of Wurtemberg; and that the intimacy between Prussia and Russia had increased to friendship.

But, though this minister had failed in his attempt in Russia, he indemnified himself at the expence of the Turks. For the court of Vienna, under the pretence of regulating the limits which separate Hungary and Wallachia, had seized on the district of the Buckowina, which extends to within a mile of Chotzim. The Turks had been ignorant enough, or more properly speaking stupid enough, to consent to this dismemberment of their states, without receiving any equivalent by which it might have been authorised, and without complaint. Other powers did not think in the same manner. Russia had reason to be jealous of the acquisition of the court of Vienna, toward the Dniester, because such possessions, by approaching so near to Chotzim, empowered the Austrians to dispute the passage of the Dniester with the Russians, whenever the latter should attempt to extend their conquests, either into Moldavia



or Wallachia ; or, even should they suffer their troops to pass, the Austrians, by being masters of the Buckowina, might cut off their subsistence ; or at least incline the balance in any wars between the Russians and the Turks, according as they should find it most to their interest.

1774. The Austrians, likewise, incessantly caballed at Constantinople, that they might increase the animosity which the last peace had occasioned between the Porte and Russia, and give rise to new quarrels. The French, on their part, were equally active. These clandestine arts at length produced their effect on the grand Seigneur, and were the cause of the declarations already mentioned, that were made to prince Repnin, and of that species of war in the Crimea which was afterward appeased. Vienna was at this time the hot-bed of Europe for projects and intrigues ; and that haughty court, that she might overawe all others, extended her views on every side, that with them she might extend her limits, and ingulph those states in her monarchy which she found conveniently situated for her purpose. Toward the east, she meditated the addition of Servia and Bosnia to her vast possessions ; on the south, tempted to seize on countries that belonged

belonged to the republic of Venice, she only waited for an opportunity that might enable her to join Trieste and the Milanese to Tyrolé, by a dismemberment to be made at her good pleasure. Nor was this sufficient : she promised herself that soon after the death of the duke of Modena, the heirs of whom had been espoused by an arch-duke, she might claim the dutchy of Ferrara possessed by the popes, and despoil the king of Sardinia of the Tortonese, and the district of Alexandrino, as having always appertained to the dukes of Milan. On the west, Bavaria presented her with a most alluring morsel ; in the neighbourhood of Austria, it opened her a passage toward the Tyrolé. Possessing this, the house of Austria would behold the Danube almost perpetually flow through her domains.

Exclusive of this reason, it was supposed contrary to the interest of the emperor to suffer the union of Bavaria and the Palatinate under the same prince ; and, as such an inheritance would have rendered the elector palatine too puissant, the emperor held it to be better policy to take it to himself.

Ascending the Danube, we come to the dutchy of Wurtemberg, on which the court of Vienna imagined she had legitimate claims. These various

of the chagrin he felt to escape him, at beholding the excellent establishments of manufactures, trade, and other similar circumstances, which all were so many proofs of national industry. Trifling as such incidents were, they did not escape the sagacity of the French. The emperor had distinguished himself by his politeness at the court; but, laying less constraint on himself in the country, he rather appeared to envy than love the nation through which he travelled, and lost all that influence which by engaging arts he had acquired.

In another point of view, this journey made a very different impression on Joseph II. He had visited the provinces of Normandy, Brittany, Provence, Languedoc, Burgundy, and Franche Comté; all which had formerly been governed by sovereign princes, though vassals, and during a succession of past ages had gradually been incorporated with the French monarchy. Such objects, which struck him forcibly, occasioned, according to him, the humiliating comparison he made between this mass, all governed by one chief, and the Germanic body; of which indeed he, as emperor, was the head, but among the members of which he met with kings and sovereigns sufficiently puissant to resist, and even make war upon him. Had he possessed

the means, he would incessantly have reunited all the provinces of the empire to his domains, that he might render himself monarch of districts so vast, and thus raise himself superior to all the monarchs of Europe.

Such were the dreams by which he was continually haunted ; such the projects of which, it was his opinion, the house of Austria never ought to lose sight. From principles thus ambitious was the ardour derived with which he coveted Bavaria ; and, although the death of the elector did not appear to him near, he omitted nothing which might bring the elector palatine and his ministers over to his interests.

The king of Prussia, ever attentive to the procedure of the court of Vienna, was one of the first to discover the mystery. That court was too dangerous, and too puissant, to be neglected ; beside that, in order to oppose the projects of an enemy, it is necessary those projects should be known. The result of the various facts which we have just related was that the tranquillity of Europe was every where menaced ; the embers were glowing under the ashes, and the least breath would set them in flames. Russia was in momentary expectation of being attacked by the Turks ; for, though war was not declared, hostilities were committed,

ted by both parties. The last war had been attended with very enormous expences, and Russia had been almost exhausted by it; more especially because of the ravages of Pugatschef, in the province of Casan, and of the destruction of the mines, the revenues of which, in these countries, are very considerable.

Thus was a youthful emperor, devoured by ambition and avaricious of fame, waiting at Vienna the opportunity that should enable him to trouble the repose of Europe. He possessed two generals, Laudon and Laschy, who had acquired reputation in the preceding war. His army was better maintained, and on a more excellent establishment, than it had ever been. He had increased the number of his field pieces of artillery till they amounted to two thousand. His finances indeed, still sensible of the immense expences of the last war, were not equally in good condition. The debts of the state were estimated at a hundred millions of crowns, the interest of which had been reduced to four per cent; but the people were loaded with the most rigorous taxes, and each day gave birth to new. In despite of all the money which, by oppressing the provinces, was collected at Vienna, after deducting the fixed and stated expences, according to the written documents, there only remained

two millions to the empress queen, of which she could dispose. Thus there were no other funds than the money, amounting to four millions of crowns, which marshal Laſcy had ſaved out of the army allowance. But, by the exactneſs with which the bank of Vienna had paid the intereſts of the loans of the court, credit was ſo well ſecured and consolidated, in Holland and at Genoa, that, ſhould the court think proper to have recourſe to new loans, there was little doubt but it would find new reſources. To this good ſtate of public credit add a ſtanding army of a hundred and ſeventy thouſand men, and every reader will allow that Auſtria was at this time a more formidable power than it ever had been, under any of the preceding emperors, not even excepting Charles V.

If we compare the political ſtate of France, ſuch as it has here been deſcribed, to what it was during the flouriſhing period of the reign of Louis XIV. we ſhall find it to have greatly declined. The fecundity of the kingdom ſeemed to be exhausted, it appeared no longer capable of producing men of ſuch vaſt genius as thoſe by whom in that age it was honoured. Overwhelmed by enormous debts, it was inceſſantly in want of expedients. A comptroller general of the finances was ſuppoſed to be an alchymiſt: he

was required to make gold ; and, when he could not furnish sufficient for all demands, he was immediately dismissed. Election, at length, was made of M. Necker, calvinist as he was. It perhaps was hoped that a heretic, fiend against fiend, by making a compact with the devil, might find supplies necessary for the purposes of government. The state maintained a hundred thousand regular troops, and a body of sixty thousand militia. The ports of the kingdom contained no ships. M. de Maurepas employed the moment when England so unseasonably made war on her colonies to renovate the French marine. The workmen were active in all the dock-yards ; in the year 1776, thirty-six ships of the line were built ; and in 1778 the number was augmented to sixty-six, without including frigates, and other vessels. The islands and colonies of America were all furnished with troops. The French perhaps did not pay the same attention to their possessions in the East Indies.

So many preliminary steps ought to have opened the eyes of the English ; ought to have prognosticated an approaching rupture with France, had they been capable of foresight. The situation of France, though little splendid, did not the less deserve the attention  
of

of other powers. Her debts denied her the ability of maintaining a long war ; but, strengthened by the alliance of Spain, and the aid which she might then deduce, she was seen to watch the moment when she might fall like a hawk on his prey, and avenge on Great Britain all the evils the latter had inflicted in the course of the preceding war. It may in general be affirmed that no subject of importance, either in Germany or the south of Europe, could be treated on, nor any plan concerted, without the concurrence of that power.

England, as we have said, was under the yoke of the tories, overwhelmed in debt, and engaged in a ruinous war, by which this national debt was annually increased by a sum equal to thirty-six millions of crowns. That her right arm might combat with her left, she exhausted every resource, and was hastily striding toward decay. Her ministers added fault to fault, and the greatest of their errors was carrying a war into America, from which it was impossible any advantage should be derived. This nation quarrelled with every other ; and with as little reason as with America, the French excepted, for they are the perpetual enemies of England. But the court of London was on equally bad terms with Spain, relative to the disputes that had



arisen concerning Falkland's islands ; and, after the death of the last king of Portugal, England had entirely lost the influence she had possessed in that kingdom. Her haughty, rigorous, and despotic proceedings, toward the governor of St. Eustatia, had deprived her of the friendship and confidence of the United Provinces. The king of England, as elector of Hanover, had given discontent to the court of Vienna, by refusing passports for horses to remount the Austrian cavalry, which had always been granted in similar cases. He had dissatisfied the empress of Russia, and since the adventure of his sister, queen Matilda, the enmity of Denmark was become manifest. The king of Prussia had greater subjects of complaint than all the rest. He had to reproach the English monarch with the peace he had concluded with France, by which England had abandoned Prussia, and with all the arts that had been used to dispossess him of the port of Dantzic. England therefore could only attribute the manner in which she was generally abandoned and avoided to her own misconduct.

Sweden, though she had changed her form of government, had not acquired new strength. The balance of trade was unfavourable to her. She no longer received the subsidies of France. She therefore scarcely had the means of self defence,

fence, and found herself wholly unable to attack.

Denmark was in possession of a good fleet, and thirty thousand soldiers ; but her debility was nearly on a level with that of Sweden.

The king of Sardinia found himself tied hand and foot, as it were, by the alliance of France and Austria. Of himself he could effect nothing : he only was of consequence when aided by some puissant ally ; and, in the present state of affairs, he could not be ranked higher than Sweden and Denmark.

Poland, abounding with busy but trifling persons, maintained no more than fourteen thousand men ; nor were her finances sufficient to put this small number of troops in motion. The Russian ambassador governed this kingdom, in the name of the empress, nearly in the same manner as the pro-consuls formerly governed the provinces of the Roman empire. What therefore was thought or projected at Warsaw was in reality of no moment. It was enough to know what had been determined on at Petersburg, in order to form a judgment concerning Poland.

Prussia had enjoyed some tranquillity during the peace. Attentive to the projects that were forming by her neighbours, but not directly interfering

terfering in any of them, she had principally applied herself to the renovation of her ruined provinces. The increase of population had been considerable. The revenues of the state were augmented more than one-fourth, compared to their amount in 1756. The army was entirely re-established, and, from the year 1774, the king had maintained a hundred and eighty-six thousand men, well disciplined, and whom he could at any time bring into the field. Most of his fortresses were finished, and in good condition. His magazines were filled for one campaign, and he had sufficient sums in reserve singly to support a war for some years.

Russia was the only ally of Prussia; nor would any other have been necessary, had there not been reason to fear that a new war, in the Crimea, might prevent the empress of Russia from furnishing the king with that aid which she was, by treaty, obliged to furnish. The court of Berlin, having acted with discretion toward every power, was not embroiled with any one; but the suspicions which the ambitious views of the emperor excited occasioned it to be foreboded, with certainty, that the first unexpected great event would produce an explosion of the volcano.

Troubles already had arisen in the empire,  
which

which were occasioned by the visitation of the imperial chamber at Wetzlar. This court of justice had executed its functions with great injustice, which was productive of complaints from a number of princes, who were sufferers by its prevarications. Far from punishing or expelling the guilty, who were its creatures, the court of Vienna persisted in giving them support. The king of Prussia and the king of England, as electors, being at the head of a considerable party, constrained the Austrians to cede several points in dispute.

In fine, look which way he would, the king saw the tranquillity of Europe in danger of being disturbed. Not to act inconsiderately under circumstances so critical, it was necessary Prussia should come to a right understanding with other powers, and should be truly informed of what were the propensities of France. The former alliances between the courts of Berlin and Versailles had, ever since the year 1756, been interrupted. The war which then broke out, the enthusiasm of the French in behalf of Austria, the efforts they mutually made to crush the king of Prussia (an expression which they frequently employed) and the animosity which had been the consequence, had not disposed these courts to terms of amity. Such wounds

are too deep, too painful, to be quickly healed. After the peace of 1763 animosity was changed into reserve; and the court of Berlin having united itself by treaty to that of Petersburg, as the empress of Russia did not love France, the king of Prussia had not, at that time, the power, if he wished to keep well with his sole ally, to be too intimate with the French. It was for this reason that M. de Guines, the creature of the duke de Choiseul, an ambassador from the court of Versailles to Berlin, could not negotiate with all the success he desired. For in the year 1770, the affairs of Poland began to be in agitation, and the king could not, at the same instant, be of the Russian party which supported the king, Poniatowsky, and of that of the French, which lent its aid to the confederation of Bar. Those incidents that produced the dismemberment of Poland, of which we have before spoken, soon after followed; and from that time more than ever all friendship with the court of Versailles was interdicted.

Beside the impediments we have here recited, there was, still further, the alliance which subsisted between France and Austria, by which more considerable shackles were put on all connections which might otherwise have been contracted with France; for, while this treaty subsisted,

sisted, it was impossible, without infringing on its articles, for France to enter into the views of the court of Berlin.

But as, toward the year 1777, the affairs of Poland were terminated, and the scenery of the political theatre was entirely changed, beside that a new king, and other ministers, at that time governed France, means were then found to conciliate the courts of Petersburg and Versailles; since the same actors no longer existed, and the resentment of the empress of Russia could not properly extend to their successors.



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M E M O I R S

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# M E M O I R S

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**A**FTER having related the manner in which the partition of Poland was made between Russia, Austria and Prussia, we imagined this would have been the last remarkable event during the reign of the king. It was the will of Fate however, who sports with human foresight, that it should be otherwise ordained. The sudden death of a prince, of which there was no apparent probability, as suddenly disturbed the peace which Europe then enjoyed. The elector of Bavaria was seized with the small-pox, and the news of his decease arrived at the moment  
when

when his recovery was hoped, by all who were interested in his preservation. From that time war became almost inevitable, for it was known that the Imperial court and the young emperor, Joseph II. had formed the project of invading Bavaria, after the death of the elector.

This plan had been conceived by the emperor Francis, who, that he might gloss it over with an appearance of justice, had caused his son to espouse the sister of the elector of Bavaria, that he might acquire the claim of the allodial inheritance of that succession. But, the princess having died childless, the pretext would no longer serve the intended purpose. The Imperial court, possessed of no legal, no apparent pretension to that electorate, employed certain ancient documents and claims of sovereignty, which it imagined itself to enjoy over the fiefs of Bavaria, in right of the sovereignty of Bohemia. She had previously gained over all the ministers of the elector palatine, as well as the prince himself, to whom advantageous establishments were promised for his natural children, provided he would sacrifice his legitimate successors, at the head of whom was the duke de Deuxponts.

Scarcely was the news of the death of the elector of Bavaria received at Vienna before a council

council was assembled. The emperor proposed to invade Bavaria. The empress queen consented with reluctance to a step so violent; or she rather suffered herself to be won by the persuasions of prince Kaunitz, who assured her such an event could have no bad consequences, and that Europe, in a state of lethargy or consternation, would not dare to oppose the emperor in an enterprise equally bold and decisive.

Sixteen battalions and twenty squadrons, with eighty field pieces, immediately began to march. The elector palatine, who was at Munich, turned pale at the news; and signed a convention in which he abandoned two-thirds of Bavaria to the Austrians. This violent action was every where rumoured. The character of the emperor was too well known for Europe not to judge that his proceeding did but announce further consequences from his headlong ambition. In a moment so critical, some part must be taken. The torrent must either be opposed vigorously, for if not opposed it would sweep all before it, or every prince in the empire must renounce his privileges and his freedom; since, should they remain inactive, the Germanic body would seem tacitly to approve the right of the emperor to arrogate to himself, and despotically to seize on, any succession which should become

vacant; which would but tend to the general overthrow of those laws, treaties, confraternities, and privileges, by which the possessions of these princes were confirmed.

This assemblage of fatal consequences had not escaped the penetration of the king; but, before any violent remedies could be employed, preliminary measures must be taken. It was requisite the duke de Deuxponts should protest against the treaty of Munich; that Saxony should claim the aid of his majesty, in behalf of its allodial succession; and, especially, that enquiries should be made at the courts of Versailles and Petersburg, that the mode of thinking at those courts might be known, and that a certainty of their intentions might be obtained.

The elector of Saxony was the first who addressed himself to the king, after having in vain made application to the court of Vienna, the haughtiness of which did not even deign to honour him with an answer. The elector palatine, having been stripped of most of his possessions, was wholly incapable of satisfying the demands which Saxony had on the allodial succession. But the court of Vienna had acted with more precipitation than prudence. She had neglected to secure the duke de Deuxponts, who was the legitimate successor of the elector

palatine, and whose acquiescence was absolutely necessary, before the treaty of Munich could be of any value. She had beside treated the affair with so little secrecy, and caution, that every step she had taken, during the course of ten years, since which the project had been conceived, was known. This it was that induced the king to send count Görtz, incognito, to Munich, where he arrived exactly in time to prevent the duke de Deuxponts from casting himself headlong down that precipice on the brink of which he stood. Count Görtz remonstrated to him that he would gain nothing by ratifying the treaty of his uncle; but that, on the contrary, by protesting against the act, as illegal, he would preserve the hope of recovering a part of the circle of Bavaria, which the elector palatine had given up to Austria. The force of truth was felt by the young duke, and his protest soon after appeared. He wrote at the same time to the king to request his support and assistance.

From that time the affair began to assume a regular form. The court of Berlin, being authorised to support the claims of the elector of Saxony and the duke de Deuxponts, was possessed of sufficient motives to begin a negotiation, with the court of Vienna, concerning the

Bavarian succession. Political skirmishes were the result, and these gave time to gain full information of the part which France meant to take, and of what were the sentiments entertained at Petersburg. Affecting ignorance, the court of Vienna was requested to explain what her pretended claims on Bavaria were. Doubts were recapitulated; the rights of nations, and whatever law and usage had opposed to these pretensions, were alleged. An appeal was made to the precise articles of the treaty of Westphalia, by which the succession was regulated. In reality, the Imperial court was in the utmost embarrassment, because, having been surprised by the unexpected death of the elector of Bavaria, she had wanted time to give that colouring to her usurpation which might impose upon the world. For this reason her defence was so feeble, and so deficient, that it was easily refuted.

During this conflict of great events, the king found himself under more restraint from the actual situation of the preponderating powers than from that of Austria. France and Austria were united by the treaty of Versailles. Had she, or had she not, made arrangements with the emperor? Had this monarch promised her cessions in Flanders, provided she would consent to his usurpation of Bavaria? Which would she prefer,

prefer, her guarantee of the treaty of Westphalia, or the treaty of Versailles? In fine, while the ensuing disputes should continue, would she remain neuter, or would she assist Austria?

To obtain security on all these points was of the last importance, that an enterprise might not be rashly undertaken, the consequences of which could not be foreseen. Every one of these doubts were successively explained at Versailles. It was known that the ministry privately disapproved the conduct of the Austrians; that, out of respect to the queen of France, the daughter of Maria Theresa, no declaration would be made against the emperor; but neither was it intended to depart from the guarantee of the peace of Westphalia.

This was equal to saying it was the intention of France to remain neuter, which indeed appeared a very trifling part to be acted by so great a power; a power that, in the time of Louis XIV. had fixed upon herself the eyes of astonished Europe. But numerous were the motives of this conduct. The enormous load of debt which the kingdom bore, and which augmenting threatened universal bankruptcy; the great age of M. de Maurepas, who was then near eighty; the aversion that the French nation had for a German war, which was in-



creased by the little reputation the French arms had acquired in the last campaigns, made against the allies, under the command of prince Ferdinand of Brunswick ; and the engagements into which France had entered with the English colonies in America, by which she had bound herself to maintain their independence, for this was the moment when she had determined to declare war by sea on Great Britain ; by all these was she actuated. Her dock-yards were actively busied in fitting out numerous fleets, for the equipment of which all the money industry could amass was set apart, and nothing remained for other operations.

The important state of the kingdom did not prevent the French ministry from beholding, with vexation, the audacious strides with which the young emperor was approaching despotism. Bavaria was but a gallery to him, through which he must proceed toward Alsatia and Lorraine. He was at the same time clearing himself a road into Lombardy, a project which inspired the king of Sardinia with the greatest apprehensions, and concerning which he made the bitterest complaints to France. These various designs, and these collective reasons, occasioned the ministry of Versailles to entertain sentiments the most favourable in behalf of the king of Prussia ;

Prussia; for they were very willing some power should oppose the unmeasured ambition of a youthful monarch, who might extend his projects of aggrandizement far indeed, should he not be stopped at the beginning of his career. France remained in a kind of apathy, and at once beheld the two most powerful princes of Germany reciprocally enfeeble each other.

Such were the dispositions of the court of Versailles, on which dependence might be placed. The same care was to be exerted that the views and ideas of the court of Petersburg might be penetrated. The empress of Russia was the ally of the king; but she was then at the eve of a new war with the Porte, by which she might be incumbered, and deprived of the power of fulfilling the engagements she had entered into with Prussia. It was easy to foresee the Austrians would employ artifice, that they might accelerate hostilities between the Russians and the Turks. This would occasion a diversion, which, employing the court of Petersburg elsewhere, would prevent her from sending succour to the Prussians, and consequently would give full scope to the vast attempts of the emperor. It was of importance to the Prussians that they should anticipate the court of Vienna, and counteract those intrigues which she was pre-

paring to put in practice at Constantinople. It was for that purpose that the king had recourse to the mediation of France at the Porte. Of this mediation the court of Versailles took charge, and, as we proceed with these memoirs, we shall see that her interference had its effect.

The negotiation of the French was seconded by a dreadful affliction. A pestilence of more than common malignity ravaged the city of Constantinople, where it committed dreadful desolation, and, gaining entrance into the very seraglio, obliged the grand Seigneur to take refuge in one of his palaces at some distance from the metropolis. A calamity so general inspired the nation with the most pacific sentiments, and appeased the active and turbulent spirit of Hassan Bacha, high admiral of the Porte, who was the real promoter of the war which the grand Seigneur meditated against Russia. Thus was the road smoothed for the pacific insinuations of France.

Though these different measures removed many impediments, there still were other difficulties to be surmounted; which difficulties originated with the Russian ministry, the members of which had few or no ideas of the Germanic system. The court of Petersburg was nevertheless convinced of the injustice of the emperor's procedure, and well understood that  
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this monarch, who ought to be no more than the head of the empire, aspired at rendering himself its despot.

Thus were negotiations carried on in all the courts of Europe, while it was perceived at Vienna, by the memoirs which baron Riedesel presented, on the part of Prussia, that the court of Berlin reasoned from principles totally opposite to those of the Imperial court, in what related to the Bavarian succession. Suspicions were entertained at Vienna; and, imagining that an open quarrel might be the consequence, it was there determined to assemble forces in Bohemia, at the beginning of March. Orders were accordingly sent to the regiments of Italy, and to those of Hungary, and of Flanders, to hasten their march into that kingdom.

No sooner does an army so numerous assemble on the frontiers of a province than the safety of the state requires an equal force should be put on foot, or it would be in danger of receiving laws from its neighbour. These considerations induced the king to put his troops in motion, that he might form two armies, each of eighty thousand men. The one, under the command of prince Henry, was to assemble in the vicinity of Berlin; that it might be ready instantly to join the Saxons, should the emperor

attempt any invasion of Saxony. The rendezvous of the other, which the king had resolved to head himself, was in Silesia. His majesty departed from Berlin, on the 4th of April, on his journey to Breslau, whence he repaired to Frankenstein; where, on the same day, the troops of Silesia arrived. These troops formed a corps of thirty thousand men, with whom it was necessary to act on the defensive, that the Prussian, Pomeranian, and Brandenburg regiments might have time to come up. With this intent an intrenched camp was prepared, in the county of Glatz, on the heights of Pischkowitz, the left of which was flanked by the artillery of the fortress, and covered by the rivulet of the Steina, the waters of which, turned into a sluice, were employed for the purpose of inundation.

While these preparatory measures were taking, a courier arrived from the emperor with letters for the king\* which contained vague commonplace assurances of a desire of maintaining peace, and of coming to a better understanding. The monarch replied with all due politeness, insinuating that, if the emperor thought proper to limit his pretensions on Bavaria, peace was in his own power; and that moderation would be

\* Copies of the letters will be found at the end of the *Memoirs*,

more honourable to him than could the most splendid conquests. The courier soon returned with another letter, in which the emperor attempted to justify his claims. These were refuted by arguments drawn from feudal rights, family compacts, and the treaty of Westphalia. A third courier succeeded the former, and the emperor, pretending to relax, proposed a negotiation, with which count Cobenzl, the Austrian ambassador at Berlin, was entrusted.

The king comprehended that the emperor wished to gain time, that he might assemble all his troops in Bohemia, to fortify the posts it was his intention to occupy, and to collect horses for the artillery, baggage, and subsistence, of which his army was still in want. Yet, as it was prudent to discover moderation in pursuing his purpose, that he might not offend France and Russia, the king consented to the proposed negotiation, though it was easy to see what must be the issue. The Austrians retailed all their insignificant proofs, which were victoriously refuted by the Prussian ministers, though this did not occasion the court of Vienna to desist in the least from its usurpations.

That an end might be put to such fruitless pleadings, an *ultimatum* was delivered informing the Austrians that, if they did not consent

sent to restore the greatest part of Bavaria to the elector palatine, the refusal would be understood as a declaration of war.

This was what the emperor wished. He aspired at rendering himself independent of the empress his mother, by the command of armies, and by the splendor he should acquire from success. But it has generally happened, as consequences have shewn, that his calculations were inaccurate and deceitful. He was hated by the nobility, who accused him of intending to lower their influence.

By the 4th of May, the armies, as well that of Silesia as that of Saxony, were formed. The negotiation of Berlin was broken off, on the 4th of July; and on the 6th, the troops began their march. The better to conceal what was intended, the army of Silesia was cantoned in a kind of elbow, from Reichenbach and Frankenstein to Neifs. By this position it was impossible for the enemy to divine whether the forces of the king should incline toward Moravia or into Bohemia. The Imperial army had a corps of thirty thousand men in Moravia, commanded by the prince of Teschen. This corps was intrenched near Heydepiltsh, on the banks of the Mora, to cover Olmutz.

The army of the emperor was behind the  
Elbe,

Elbe, in impenetrable fortifications, from Königsgrätz, to the small town of Arnau.

The corps of marshal Laudon, consisting of between forty and fifty thousand men, garnished the posts of Reichenberg, Gabel, and Schluckenau, toward Lusatia. The chief of his troops were between Leutmeritz, Lowositz, Dux, and Töplitz.

The plan of campaign which the king had formed was far different from that he was obliged to put in practice. He had proposed to carry the war into Moravia, to leave about twenty thousand men to cover the county of Glatz, and the passes of Landshut, to turn the post of Heydepiltsh, which was practicable to come to action with the Austrians, and, if he should be successful, to send a detachment of twenty thousand men, behind the Morava, immediately for Presburg, by which he would gain the bridge over the Danube, at that place, and cut off all the subsistence which the Imperial army should draw out of Hungary. Hence making incursions toward Vienna, that court would be obliged, for its own safety, to send a part of its troops on the other side of the Danube to secure the metropolis; by which means the armies of Bohemia being enfeebled, prince Henry would have enjoyed great advantage,  
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and all his operations would have been facilitated.

However advantageous this plan might be, the king was obliged to desist from putting it in execution for the following reasons.

The Austrians only left about ten thousand men in Moravia; the remainder, under the command of the prince of Teschen, joined the emperor, near Jaromirs. The result of this was that, should the king enter Moravia with sixty thousand men, the whole army of the emperor, amounting to eighty thousand, would have made a diversion into Lower Silesia, against which the troops that were meant to be left under general Wunfch would have been too inferior, in numbers, to offer opposition. This would have obliged the king to forsake an offensive war in Upper Silesia, that he might hasten to the defence of the county of Glatz, or the hills of Landshut.

Again; the principal reason which determined the king to enter Bohemia was that the elector of Saxony feared lest the Austrians should invade his states, and take Dresden, before the Prussians could arrive to his aid. If the emperor had conceived this design, it was requisite he should be prevented from putting it into execution; otherwise the distressed elector of

Saxony would have been in danger of being obliged to change sides, or at least, instead of making Bohemia the theatre of war, it would by this wrong proceeding have been carried into Saxony. It was therefore requisite the king should enter Bohemia with his principal forces, face the emperor, and prevent him from sending reinforcements to the corps under marshal Laudon, who, without aid, was too feeble to oppose the enterprizes of prince Henry. But it was also proper not to leave Upper Silesia without defence, and troops must be sent to oppose general Ellerichshausen, who held the camp of Heydepiltfch, behind the Mora. Stutterheim and Werner were entrusted with this command, and had under them a body of about ten thousand men.

The plan on Bohemia was thus put into execution. The army of Silesia entered the county of Glatz; the van-guard occupied the important post of the Raschberg, whence it inclined toward Nachod, the remainder of the army following the van\*. On the 7th of July, the king reconnoitred, at the head of fifty squadrons of dragoons and hussars.

\* The French reads—"le reste de l'armée suivant l'arrière-garde." "The rest of the army following the rear-guard." This evidently must be a mistake. T.

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That a clear idea may be formed of the position of the enemy, it should be known that the Austrians had sufficiently fortified the town of Königgrätz to enable it to sustain a siege of some weeks, at least; to which fortification the confluence of the Adler and the Elbe principally contributed; for, by the aid of these waters, they had formed inundations that would be difficult to drain. The town formed the support of the right of their camp. Beyond the Elbe, and near Königgrätz, a corps of grenadiers and some horse were encamped, in works which rather resembled a fortified town than field intrenchments. Another corps, of about thirty thousand men, extended from Semonitz to Schurz, and were covered by ditches, eight feet in depth, sixteen wide, well fraized, palisadoed, and, for still greater security, surrounded by chevaux de frise, which connected the separate works. Somewhat further rose the height of Kukus, which, commanding the near shore of the Elbe, extends from hill to hill, by Königssaal, toward Arnau; whence that chain of hills proceeds to Hohenelbe, where it is joined by, and confounded with, the mountains that are called the Riefengeburge. All the passages of the Elbe were defended by triple redoubts. The foe had constructed abatis, with trees, on  
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the summits of these woody hills, behind which forty battalions forming a reserve were encamped, whence quick succour might be sent to any part that the Prussians might have the temerity to attack; supposing it was possible that these numerous redoubts and works, in which fifteen hundred cannon erected into batteries were placed, should successfully be carried. To all these difficulties another, and a most considerable one, must be added, and which absolutely forbade any attempt to be made to pass the Elbe. This was that, from Jaromirs as far as the mountains, the river on each side is confined between rocks, that rise twelve, and more than twelve, feet in height, which prevent bridges being thrown over, or the river to be passed, except in those places where bridges are already built; and the Austrians had paid their principal attention in fortifying all such passes, any approach to which a superabundance of works rendered impracticable.

However awful the aspect of this formidable camp might be, hopes were at first entertained of gaining that by address which could not be carried by force. It was intended to oppose a corps of troops to that of the Austrian army, encamped between Jaromirs and Schurz, which should be capable of inspiring it with respect.

This corps was destined at the same time to make false attacks, from one side, on the village of Hermannitz, and from another, on Königsaal; while the main army should steal a march through the valley of Sylva, pass the Elbe by night, at the village of Werdeck, and file off, on the road for Prausnitz, to gain the heights of Schwitschin, the elevation of which, being the greatest, overlooked the whole country, and even the camp of the foe. Had it been possible for the Prussians to establish themselves here, they would have cut off the right wing of the Imperialists from their left, and either have obliged them to give battle to disadvantage, or still more shamefully to have retreated.

In consequence of this plan, the king encamped at Welsdorf, with no more than twenty five battalions and sixty squadrons. It was this corps that was intended to mask the motions of the grand army, which was to continue in the post of Nachod, whence it might manoeuvre with the greater facility, either to the right or principally to the left of the van-guard. As there was a necessity exactly to reconnoitre the position of the enemy, perfectly to understand whether the plan of which we have spoken was capable of being executed, or whether it ought to be rejected; the reconnoitings were disguised under

under various apparent pretences. At one time the alarm was given to some quarter of the enemy; at another there were skirmishings with the advanced posts; and still more often foraging parties were sent, under the Austrian artillery.

It was on these different occasions, which the inferior operations of war supplied, that, by approaching Königstaal, and the village of Werdeck, a strong camp was discovered, near Praufnitz, consisting of nearly seven battalions; and behind this post, on the top of the hill of Schwitschin, another corps of about four battalions. These precautions of the enemy having thrown insurmountable obstacles in the way of the plan that had been formed, the king saw himself obliged to renounce it, and have recourse to other expedients. The distribution of the troops was good, as far as it related to the execution of the first project; but it might become the reverse, should the king remain satisfied with opposing the whole force of the emperor, by so feeble a corps.

This distribution therefore was changed. Forty battalions formed the camp of Welsdorf. Lieutenant-general Bulow was placed, with some battalions and thirty squadrons, at Smirnitz; general Falkenhayn, at the defile of Kowalkowitz, which was in the rear of the army; general

Wunſch, with twenty battalions, at Nachod, to cover the army convoys; and general Anhalt, with twelve battalions, and twenty squadrons, wholly on the right of the army, at Pilnikau, oppoſite Arnau and Neuſchloß; but his communication was aſcertained with the royal army by the foreſt of Sylva, in which the Pruſſians had poſts.

While theſe motions were made in Bohemia, and while the army of the emperor was ſo occupied by its own ſafety that the momentary fear of attack removed all thoughts of ſending detachments to marſhal Laudon, prince Henry gained Dresden without oppoſition. He thence ſent detachments forward into Bohemia, on the left ſhore of the Elbe; but, by a motion of ſome ſkill and difficulty, he turned off into Luſatia, leaving general Platen, at the head of about twenty thouſand men, to cover Dresden, and, after being joined by eighteen thouſand Saxons, the prince inclined into Bohemia, by different corps, which, turning and attacking the detachments that the enemy had placed at Schlukenau, Rumburg, and Gabel, diſpoſted them, and took fifteen hundred men and fix cannon.

This blow, which the Imperialiſts were not prepared to receive, deranged their whole de-  
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fenfive plan. Marshal Laudon precipitately abandoned the pofts of Aufsig and Dux, and what muft furprife us more, quitted the fortifications of Leutmeritz, with the magazine which was at that place. General Platen profited by the error with celerity, took Leutmeritz, advanced toward Budin, on the Egra, and fent his van-guard forward, as far as Welwarn, which is only three miles from Prague. Alarm and confternation were fpread through that great city. The chief nobility, who were there affembled, fled; and the capital was for fome days like a place deferted.

Marshal Laudon, having, as we have related, abandoned all the left fhore of the Elbe, did not think himfelf in fafety till he came to Munchengrätz, befide Jung Bunzlau; and, as the foe had every thing to fear for the army of the emperor, marshal Laudon garnifhed the whole courfe of the Ifer, which runs either between rocks or among marfhes, with heavy detachments. In Upper Silefia, the Pruffians had furprifed, and almoft ruined, two regiments of Imperial dragoons, in their camp of Heydepiltsch.

Under thefe circumftances it was, after war had been begun, after the Pruffians had gained fome advantages, and while four grand armies



were acting against each other in the kingdom of Bohemia, that a stranger arrived at Welfdorf, who, announcing himself as secretary to prince Gallitzin, the Russian ambassador at Vienna, demanded to speak with the king. This self-said secretary was the sieur Thugut, formerly ambassador from the emperor at Constantinople. He brought a letter to his majesty from the empress queen, the substance of which we shall satisfy ourselves with relating.

The empress testified her chagrin at the quarrels and troubles which had taken birth; the apprehensions she had for the person of the emperor, and her desire of finding expedients by which tranquillity might be restored; she at the same time intreated the king to explain himself on these different subjects. The sieur Thugut, in addition, declared to his majesty, it would be easy to come to a right understanding, if the parties did but proceed with sincerity.

The intention of the Austrians was to gain the king, by offers which should be so advantageous as to induce him to desist from lending his support to the elector palatine. To this effect, Thugut assured him that the court of Vienna, so far from opposing his eventual succession to the margraviats of Bareuth and Anspach, offered its assistance to Prussia for the  
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barter of these margraviats, in lieu of some provinces bordering on Brandenburg ; such as Lusatia or Mecklenburg, should the king think it conformable to his interests.

His majesty replied that this court mingled and confounded things together which in themselves had no connection : that is to say the legal and incontestable succession to these margraviats with the usurpation of Bavaria, and the interest of his kingdom with the interest of the empire, the cause of which he had embraced ; that, if conciliatory measures were wished, it was requisite the court of Vienna should desist from a part of Bavaria ; and for steps to be taken that, in future, no acts of despotism so violent should trouble the security of the Germanic body, by shaking it to its very foundation ; and that, with respect to the succession of Bareuth and Anspach, he was so far from desiring to force any prince to barter his states, in lieu of these margraviats, that, if any such barter was to take place, it must be with the free consent of the parties. The king added, these being only verbal remarks, he was desirous of affording the empress evident proofs of his pacific dispositions, and would make minutes of some of the principal articles, which might serve as the basis of the treaty it was proposed to con-

clude. Thugut offered to act as his majesty's secretary; but the king, who neither confided in his style nor his intentions, wrote the propositions he sent himself. Certainly, by accepting these, the empress queen would have been the gainer. The court of Russia hitherto had not declared itself, and France advised Austria to peace; but her advice had little influence over the ardent mind of the young emperor, and the imperious genius of prince Kaunitz.

The following is an abstract of this project. The empress queen should restore Bavaria to the elector palatine, Burghausen, the Mines, and a part of the Upper Palatinate excepted; the Danube should be free; Ratibon should no longer be blockaded by the possession of Stadt-am-Hof; the succession of this country should be assured to the right heirs of Bavaria; the elector of Saxony should obtain from the palatine a sum of money, in lieu of the allodials; and the Imperial court should cede those claims which she pretended to make on all the fiefs situated in Saxony; the duke of Mecklenburg, by way of remuneration for his pretensions on Bavaria, should have some vacant fief in the empire; the Imperial court should no more dispute the succession of the margraviats with the king of Prussia; and France, Russia, and the  
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Germanic body, were to guaranty the proposed treaty.

Thugut departed for Vienna with this memorial, and returned loaded with a multitude of insidious propositions, with which he had been stored by prince Kaunitz. The king perceived, by the form which the negotiation assumed, that it was not of a complexion to succeed; neither was it for him to continue in treaty with the *sieur* Thugut. He therefore sent him to the convent of Braunau, to display his talents in the company of the king's ministers, count Finck, and the *sieur* Hertzberg; who some days afterward dismissed him to Vienna, without having accomplished his purpose.

All that had passed, in the course of negotiation, was communicated to the French and Russian ministers; that, being convinced of the disinterested procedure of the king, they should not suffer themselves to be prejudiced by the false interpretations which might be sent them from the ministry of Vienna. The empress queen was sincerely desirous of peace. She knew the ambition of the emperor, her son, who was at the head of the troops; and feared lest this should occasion the loss, or the enfeebling, of her own authority. But she was ill seconded by her minister prince Kaunitz,

who, from views common enough to courtiers, rather attached himself to the emperor, whose youth opened a brighter prospect to the family of this minister, than to the advanced age of the empress queen. Such is the fate of human affairs, the greatest of which are determined by petty selfishness.

The emperor, being informed of the negotiation of the *sieur* Thugut, was enraged at the intelligence. He wrote to his mother that, if she were determined to make peace, he would never return to Vienna, but would remain at Aix-la-Chapelle, or in any other place, be it where it might, rather than again approach her person. The empress queen had sent for the grand duke of Tuscany, whom she immediately dispatched to the army, that he might appease the emperor his brother, and inspire him with more pacific sentiments. The effect of this interview was a quarrel between the brothers, who till then had lived on good terms.

After having given an account of this negotiation, and of all that appertained to it, we now must continue our narrative of the military operations of the four armies, which opposed each other in Bohemia.

The position of the Imperial army that opposed the king had been exactly reconnoitred,  
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from Königsgrätz, as far as the town of Arnau. It remained to enquire if there were troops, extending still further, toward Hohenelbe, and the high mountains. General Anhalt, who, as we have said, was detached on the right of the camp, to the villages of Pilnikau and Kottwitz, received orders to send parties toward Langeau, and to incline thitherward himself, that he might make an exact report of what he had discovered. He first perceived a fortified camp, behind Neuschloß ; and further only found two battalions, encamped on the heights that overlook the town of Hohenelbe. This fact, being well proved, served as the basis of the new project, which the king formed, while expeditiously inclining with the army on this side. Here the passage of the Elbe might be forced, which two battalions were incapable of defending ; and, the enterprize being accomplished, success more splendid might be hoped ; especially should prince Henry advance from Nîmes on the Iser. The two Prussian armies, approaching each other, might take the army of the emperor in flank and rear ; who, unable to keep his position, except by a battle, and being obliged to abandon his immense intrenchments, could not gain any secure post, except behind the ponds of Gitschin ; and even there his position might

might be turned, which would have reduced him to take refuge at Pardubitz, where he would be covered by the ponds of Bohdanetz, and the course of the Elbe.

: However grand this project might appear, it met with great impediments in the execution. The first were the hollow ways and defiles, which must be passed to arrive at the Elbe; and the confusion to be dreaded of dragging a numerous artillery through these roads. The second was the difficulty of supplying the army with subsistence. Having passed the Elbe, bread must have been carried five miles beyond the river; and the want of horses would have rendered a more distant transport impossible.

These various obstacles, presenting themselves to the mind of the king, made him determine to proceed with all caution, and carefully to conceal a project which however he did not abandon. For this purpose he would not quit his camp at Welfsdorf till, by foraging, he had first totally cleared the country which extends from the Elbe to the frontiers of Silesia; and the more so because the Austrians had forced the inhabitants to fly with all their cattle beyond the Elbe. By this the king, at least, would gain the advantage of preventing the Austrians from keeping a considerable

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able corps on his frontiers, during the winter, and disturbing his troops in their quarters.

As soon as the forage was consumed, the king marched with his army, and assumed the camp of Burkersdorf, near Sorr; where thirty-three years before he had been victorious over the same opponents. Not a man of the Austrians left the camp to pursue his army. The emperor remained motionless in his position behind the Elbe, without so much as disputing the dreadful defile of Kowalkowitz with the rear-guard, which it was obliged to pass. General Wunsch returned to his post of the Raschberg behind Nachod. The prince of Prussia occupied the post of Sorr, near that of Pilnikau, where the hereditary prince of Brunswick commanded. Some battalions were sent to Trautenau, Schazlar, and Landshtut, for the security of the convoys, which from thence were nearer the army.

All these motions having occasioned no alteration in the position of the foe, the project which the king had formed was supposed possible. For this purpose the hereditary prince marched with his corps and occupied the height of the Dreyhäuser; and the prince of Prussia with his detachment entered the camp the hereditary prince had left at Pilnikau; while the king took post, with forty battalions, near the village of Leopold;



pold : so that the three corps, by thus communicating, might aid each other, should any one of them be attacked. It was time to advance, the nearer to approach Hohenelbe ; and to this effect the hereditary prince marched on the hills which go from Schwarzthal to Lange-nau. The king joined him, by his right, and filled the ground that leads from Lauterwasser to a height on the left, which was in like manner occupied. The prince of Prussia kept his position at Pilnikau, whence he might make a false attack on the corps of the enemy at Neuschloß, while the army should force the passage of the Elbe. The prince, on various occasions, distinguished himself by his vigilance, and the excellent disposition of his troops. The reserve was stationed at Wildschütz, to support the camp of the prince of Prussia ; and the brigade of Luck was destined to garnish the impracticable defiles of Hermannseiffen, Mohren, and the Dreyhæuser. That brigade, which was ordered to conduct the heavy artillery and army howitzers, employed three days in dragging them from Trautenau to Hermannseiffen, which are three miles distant from each other.

The artillery, which was large in the track, never could pass the narrow roads that were dug

in the rock : it was impatiently waited for, but did not arrive. Time so precious, lost in useless efforts, was so favourable to the Austrians that they were enabled to establish their whole army, and their cannon, on the hills which lie beyond Hohenefse; and from that moment it was necessary to renounce the attempt, which, though admissible against a feeble corps, would have been temerity had it been hazarded in presence of a numerous army, that was stationed in a post almost impregnable. To force these troops howitzers were requisite, the sole artillery that can be employed against an enemy seated on hills, and howitzers were not there. The Elbe must likewise have been passed, over bridges, and the men must have filed off in the face of a grand front, by which they must have been destroyed before they could have formed; nay the corps of Ziskowitz must have been dislodged from the hills of the Riesengeburge, whence it would have fallen on the flank of the assailants, if it had not previously been driven from its station, which was on the hill called Wilschura; so that this became a preliminary step. It was further necessary that prince Henry should co-operate in the enterprise.

Had not all these impediments arisen, it was,

as I have said, intended to have driven Ziskowitz from his post; to have afterward erected batteries of forty-five heavy howitzers, behind Hohenelbe, with which to bombard that part of the foe that would have been opposite the right of the Prussians; to have passed the Elbe at a ford that had been discovered near a monastery; and, after having dislodged the enemy from this position, to have encamped, between Branna and Starkenbach, on the flank of the troops that were stationed near Neuschloss, where the Austrians might have assembled with promptitude, to attack the Prussians in a good post (which required time) otherwise they must have been obliged to abandon the whole course of the Elbe, to the victorious Prussians.

The various reasons we have alleged having made it necessary to renounce this bold project, nothing remained to be done except to eat up the forage of this uninhabited country, and to reduce it to a kind of desert, to secure tranquillity for winter quarters, which could only be taken in Silesia. The foraging parties continued as usual to proceed to the banks of the Elbe, and under the cannon of the enemy, without the least indication of vigour being shewn by the emperor or his troops, or without a man among

among them venturing to pass the river, to defend the forage, which in their presence was taken from the wretched husbandman. Although the country was fruitful, the great number of troops that were to be maintained presently eat up the productions of the earth.

Prince Henry informed the king he was in want of forage, and that he had not more than sufficient at the utmost to maintain him till the middle of September. The two armies therefore decamped nearly at the same time. The king quitted the position of Langenau, and Lauterwasser, on the 14th of September, and prince Henry his camp of Nimes, two days afterward. The prince passed the Elbe at Leutmeritz, and the prince of Bernburg, who had the Saxons under his command, retired toward Zittau, and posted his troops on the Eckartberg. There were some skirmishes with the rear-guard of prince Henry, in which the hussars of Usedom found opportunity to acquire applause. The reader will easily pardon our omitting to relate those minute and circumstantial details which have little influence over great events.

The king, in order to facilitate his retreat, had taken the precaution to send forward his artillery, and howitzers, from Hermannseiffen to Wildschutz. His measures were so well adapted

adapted that the enemy ineffectually attempted to injure the hereditary prince, near Schwarzhthal, and peaceably suffered him to reassume his former camp of the Dreyhäuser. About twenty pieces of artillery, appertaining to the column under the king's command, were entangled in the ruts of the defiles of Leopold. The accident was a momentary impediment to the march of the army. The heights were immediately garnished by the troops that were at the head of the column, and some detachments of pandours and hussars, that had been sent from Neuschloß, through Arensdorf, with an intention to harass the royal rear-guard, were easily repulsed. The artillery was dragged by strength of arm to the summit of the heights, and a few cannon shot dispersed the foe, after which the army entered the camp of Wildschütz. The reserve as we have said occupied the heights, and the prince of Prussia was on the left; so that from the Dreyhäuser, as far as Pilnikau and Kottwitz, the troops formed an almost contiguous line.

All the various motions of the Prussians produced no effect on the Imperial army; it remained lifeless behind the Elbe. Therefore, after having exhausted the whole forage of the vicinity, the king retreated for Trautenau. The march

march was made in three columns, neither of which was harassed, except that under the hereditary prince, who facing about attacked the enemy in turn. Fearing a serious engagement, the Austrian troops retreated, after having lost about a hundred dead, and some few prisoners. The Prussians entered their camp; the corps of the hereditary prince was stationed to the right, on the heights of Freyheit, and the corps of the prince of Prussia to the left, on the little hills of the chapel of Trautenau. Wurmser, who had a posse of light troops under him, with which he held Prausnitz, several times attempted to attack the post of the prince of Prussia, and was as often repulsed. This was occasioned by the good military dispositions and activity of the prince, a conduct which would have been honourable to any general, as it was to the prince.

The Prussians could attempt nothing against the Imperialists, but were reduced to the necessity of consuming the subsistence of the countries into which they could gain entrance, and when this subsistence was consumed to decamp. Every precaution and all possible prudence were employed to secure their next manœuvre. The heights which lie on the rear of Uppau were garnished with infantry and artillery, the advanced posts fell back toward the army, and the

retreat was performed with so much order that the enemy could make no assault on the rear-guard. If we except an insignificant skirmish with the pandours, nothing molested the men in their march, which was continued as far as Trautenbach, where they remained a few days.

The army retreated hence toward Schazlar, which post covers all Lower Silesia. Wurmser had made preparations on this day to engage with the rear-guard. His haste was so great that he did not wait till the Prussians were on the march before he made his assault, and attacked one of their posts on the left. The brigade of Keller, which occupied a height on that extremity, valiantly defended itself, and repulsed the foe, who suffered a loss of four hundred men. This affair over, the troops repaired to their place of destination.

The hereditary prince departed from Schazlar with ten battalions, and at Munsterberg was joined by thirty squadrons of the king's army, with which he began his march for Upper Silesia, where he took the command of the various corps that were distributed through that province. He arrived at Troppau toward the end of September. The reinforcement he conducted into Upper Silesia was intended to counterbalance a detachment of nearly the same force,

that had been sent by the emperor to M. von Ellerichshausen, who would thus have acquired a too considerable superiority over general Stutterheim, if such timely precautions had not been taken.

The campaign had been very speedily terminated; it was now the end of September, but the season for military operations was not yet over; there was reason to suspect the enemy would not remain satisfied, but that, after having during the whole campaign been as cautiously observant of the defensive as we have related, he was still projecting some design, and perhaps meditated a winter campaign.

There were two principal objects which might tempt an irruption on the part of the Austrians: the one was to make a powerful attack on the corps of the hereditary prince, and the other to force the passes of Lusatia. A youthful and ambitious emperor, at the head of his troops, who ardently desired to signalize himself by some famous deed, gave an air of probability to the projects it was supposed he might have conceived, and which certainly deserved to be seriously examined. The attempts which the enemy might meditate on Upper Silesia appeared to be the easiest of execution. The Austrians had large magazines at Olmutz, with every thing



which was necessary for the transport of subsistence; and, were the Prussians driven from Troppau, they would be obliged to abandon the Oppa, and to retreat toward Cosel and Neifs.

Greater difficulties attended the penetrating into Lusatia. The prince of Bernburg here commanded a corps of twenty thousand men. The Imperialists had no magazines in the neighbourhood of Lusatia. Subsistence was scarce, toward Schlukenau, Gabel, Rumburg, and Friedland; so that they would find a difficulty in collecting sufficient for any considerable body of troops. Yet, as all the carriages of Bohemia were at their command, it was possible, with time and at a great expence, for them to form magazines in these parts, and to make preparations for such an enterprize, difficult though it was, relative to the post of the Eckartsberg.

The more obscure the intentions of the foe might be, the more was it requisite to be prepared for all accidents. To this intent M. de Boffe was detached, with ten squadrons and five battalions, and ordered to Löwenberg and Greifenberg, there to observe general Alton, who occupied Friedland and Gabel; and, should that general make any attack upon the prince

of Bernburg, to come upon the rear of the enemy; still being careful to concert all operations with the prince. Prince Henry likewise, who encamped at Nollendorf, sent a detachment under general Möllendorf to Bautzen, to join the prince of Bernburg, should the Austrians make any efforts on that side; and did it happen that this expedition should become more serious, and that a part of the enemy's army should attempt to penetrate into Lusatia, Möllendorf was to march to Lauban, with twenty battalions and thirty squadrons, that he might cut the assailants off from their provisions. When general Möllendorf quitted Bohemia, on his march to Bautzen, he was attacked by the Austrians, who were repulsed with considerable loss. Major Anhalt, who served under general Möllendorf, highly distinguished himself in this trifling action.

So long as the determinations of the enemy remained uncertain, the king continued at Schazlar; but as soon as it was perceived new preparations were made, on the frontiers of Lusatia, to amass magazines, and that the corps of the Austrians on that frontier was even inferior to that of the Prussians, it appeared very probable tranquillity would be preserved on that side during the winter. The king therefore

was at liberty to turn his whole attention toward Upper Silesia, especially because the cold began to be sensibly felt on the mountains of Bohemia: there were nightly frosts, and the Austrians had no army in the vicinity.

These different considerations appeared sufficient to induce him to raise his camp, and to send the troops destined to defend the frontiers into cantonments, between Landshut, Grissau, Hirschberg, Schmiedeberg, and Friedland. The troops consisted of twenty battalions and thirty squadrons, of whom general Ramin had the command. The position was the same with that which the king had occupied in the year 1759. Sixteen other battalions and fifteen squadrons departed on their march for Upper Silesia, and were joined by the king at Neiß; and, with his majesty at their head, they continued their march to Neustadt. The following were the reasons of this motion.

It had continually been the intention of the king to make Moravia the seat of war. The hereditary prince occupied Troppau, and the enemy held Jägerndorf, whence they might cut him off from Neiß and Cosel. It was therefore requisite for the Prussians to occupy Jägerndorf, in order by that position to secure the chain of winter quarters behind the Oppa. It

was

was further necessary to take safe posts in Upper Silesia, that they might be ready, at the approach of spring, to make the greatest efforts in Moravia.

The troops of the king drove the Austrians from Jägerndorf without difficulty, and were immediately employed in fortifying the town, the hill, the chapel, and the villages that were most exposed to insult from the enemy. This conduct was imitated by the hereditary prince at Troppau; and the two towns by the fortifications that were added became places of strength, and free from danger, the works being in good condition. Toward the middle of November the king repaired to Breslau; as well to make arrangements for the ensuing campaign as to pay attention to the negotiations, which began to assume rather an interesting aspect.

Desirous of not interrupting the recital of a campaign which was barren of great events, we now think it necessary to return to the progress of politics.

The court of Petersburg was that which most interested the king, because it was thence only that he had any reason to expect effectual succour. The empress of Russia had engaged to aid the king, as soon as her disputes with the Ottoman Porte should be brought to a

conclusion. The king, desirous of enabling the empress to fulfil her promise, had, in consequence of the good harmony which was accomplished between France and Prussia, addressed himself to the ministry of Versailles, that France might act as mediatrix between the Turks and Russians; and this mediation had been so successful that the Porte came to an accommodation with the Russians, by restoring the ships of the latter which had been taken at the Dardanelles, and acknowledging the khan of the Tartars who was under the protection of Catharine.

Scarcely had this intelligence reached Petersburg before the empress, no longer disturbed concerning the tranquillity of her states, and flattered by the ambition of taking a direct part in the affairs of Germany, openly declared in favour of Prussia. Her ambassadors, as well at Vienna as at Ratisbon, gave it to be understood in substance—

That the empress Catharine intreated the empress queen would afford entire satisfaction to the princes of the empire, with respect to their grievances; and especially those just causes of complaint to which the usurpation of Bavaria gave birth; and that, should she refuse, the empress of Russia would be under the necessity of fulfilling

fulfilling the engagements she had entered into with his Prussian majesty, by sending a body of auxiliary troops, according to stipulation, and the tenor of treaties.

The declaration was a thunder-bolt to the court of Vienna. An event so unexpected troubled and endangered her safety. Prince Kaunitz was embarrassed; nothing of this having been foreseen. Joseph II. who ardently desired the continuation of war, took advantage of the anxiety and perplexity of the empress his mother, and induced her to sign an order for the augmentation of the army, by raising eighty thousand recruits. He declared, every effort must be made, and every resource exhausted, to render the house of Austria, at a moment so decisive, more than ever formidable. He imagined that, the expence having been once incurred, nothing could impede the continuance of war. But the sentiments of the empress were much the reverse. She sighed to see an end of these troubles. She placed all her hopes in the mediation of France, which she had requested. Her people, who were loaded with taxes, were unable to supply the immense sums which the expenditure of war exacted; neither were the hopes of the court answered by foreign loans. Money indeed was so much wanted that the  
soldiers

soldiers were often without pay, and in need of daily subsistence; and the best informed people with grief foresaw a general overthrow of the monarchy, if not timely prevented by acceding with a good grace to propositions of a reasonable peace.

The empress, as we have said already, had solicited the mediation of France. She had even implored the good offices of Russia; and, by a very singular accident, the dispatches of Vienna and the declaration from Petersburg, having been sent off about the same time, arrived nearly on the same day at their places of destination. The incident was advantageous to the king; since, had the request of the Austrians arrived at Petersburg before the departure of the declaration, it was to be presumed the empress of Russia would have suppressed the latter.

The king had been informed of all that had passed by his emissaries, and wished for nothing more than an accommodation with the court of Vienna, provided the constitutions of the empire were preserved without infringement, that the interests of the elector of Saxony and those of the duke de Deuxponts were not neglected, and that he himself should have no future disputes relative to the succession of the margraves,  
viats,

viats, his claims on which were incontestable. Far from opposing the mediation of France, the monarch considered the court of Versailles as the guarantee of the peace of Westphalia, and as being equally interested with Prussia herself in not permitting the emperor, by his usurpation of Bavaria, to prepare a road for himself either to fall on the king of Sardinia in Italy, an event which was much feared at Turin, or to penetrate with greater facility into Alsatia and Lorraine. The elector of Saxony was the cousin of Louis XVI. and the duke de Deuxponts was under his protection.

It would nevertheless have been a want of prudence wholly to have confided the interests of Prussia and Germany to a ministry void of energy, and which having no positive will might be shaken by the machinations of the court of Vienna. That M. de Maurepas might be prepossessed against any proposition coming from Austria, which should directly oppose the pacification of Germany, the king sent him a memorial which contained a summary of the motives that rendered such and such conditions of peace acceptable, and others on the contrary inadmissible, with an abstract of the principal and indispensable articles for a general peace. The effect the memorial produced was so advantageous



vantageous that France admitted it, as the basis of that negotiation of which she had taken charge, at Vienna. M. de Breteuil, the French ambassador at that court, met with never-ceasing difficulties, to each proposition he presented, on the part of the emperor; but this did not prevent the empress queen from agreeing to the project of pacification, according to the terms, delivered in by France.

In the interim prince Repnin arrived at Breslau from the empress of Russia, where he rather appeared as a plenipotentiary ambassador, who was sent by his court to dictate law to Germany, than as a general who was to head an auxiliary corps, marching to the aid of the Prussian army. The king had proposed, at the court of Petersburg, that the corps of Russians should act in the following spring against Ludomeria and Gallicia, in which provinces there were but few troops, and should penetrate into Hungary, where the approach of the Russians would occasion a revolt among all the members of the Greek church, who were scattered through Croatia, Hungary, the Bannat of Temeswar, and Transylvania. The king even offered to add a corps of his own troops, and to abandon all the wealth of these provinces to the Russians; but the project was rejected. The corps which  
Russia

Russia was to furnish according to treaty consisted of sixteen thousand men; but a price so enormous was annexed to this aid that the services which might be expected never could be equivalent to the cost. The king could not have expended less than two millions annually, beside a subsidy of five hundred thousand crowns, paid for a war which Russia no longer carried on against the Turks.

The baron de Breteuil, ambassador from France at the Imperial court, flattered himself he should become the pacificator of Germany. He delighted in imagining that, by following the footsteps of Claude d'Avaux, plenipotentiary at the peace of Westphalia, he should prepare himself a path to acquire the highest dignities in his country, and especially to become minister for foreign affairs; consequently, he exerted himself to the utmost, and laboured with so much perseverance that, toward the end of January, he sent the plan of general pacification to prince Repnin, at Breslau, such as it had been conceived by the king, and approved of by the empress queen. The conditions were what we have before described.

The project of peace was communicated to the allies of Prussia, against which the Saxons began to exclaim. They stated their demands on  
the

the allodial domains of Bavaria at the sum of forty millions of florins, and they with great affliction saw that it would be much should they obtain fix. They further demanded the emperor should renounce all feudal rights, which he pretended to possess as king of Bohemia, on Saxony and Lusatia; and they had especially flattered themselves they should gain some compensation in lands, by which their frontiers should be rounded.

The duke de Deuxponts likewise obstinately persisted in maintaining that Bavaria ought not to be dismembered in any manner. He offered to cede a part of the Upper Palatinate, that he might preserve the circle of Burghausen. Add to which, he consented with extreme repugnance to such indemnifications as the elector of Saxony laid claim.

Desirous of satisfying his allies, the king made a new effort, principally relative to Bavaria and the circle of Burghausen, that he might, if possible, obtain conditions more favourable on this head from the court of Vienna. But, far from acquiescence, prince Kaunitz, angered by the new demands of Prussia, proudly replied that the plan of pacification, as communicated by the ambassador of France to prince Repnin, was the *ultimatum* of the court of Vienna,

Vienna, and that the empress queen was resolved to sacrifice the last man of her army, rather than comply with new conditions, so humiliating, and so contrary to her dignity, as those were which had been last presented. Nothing could be more natural than to require the entire restitution of an invaded and usurped province; but France and Russia would hear only of peace; the first that she might free herself from all solicitation on the part of the emperor, who demanded her aid; and the second that she might not be obliged to send her troops to the Prussians. Their actions corresponded with their views, and the Prussian ministers were pressed not to raise any new obstacles to a general peace.

Restrained as he was by mediating powers, whose remonstrances merited the utmost respect, the king was not at liberty to aid his allies with all the zeal he felt in their behalf. He could not at once pertinaciously resist Austria, France, and Russia. He was however desirous of concerting such measures as still remained to be taken with the latter, which postponed the assembling of the congress for a month, because this space of time was necessary to receive an answer from Petersburg.

We shall employ the momentary delay, they  
occasionally,

occasioned, in presenting to the reader an abstract of the military operations, which were performed by the troops during winter. It will be recollected that we left the hereditary prince in Upper Silesia, occupied in maintaining his position from Troppau to Jägerndorf, and in obliging the enemy to retreat, sometimes toward Grätz, sometimes inclining to Mährisch-Osttau, and at others to Lichten. The Austrians, on their part, thought it humiliating to suffer the Prussians peaceably to remain masters of a part of their territories; they were desirous of making attempts to dislodge them, but foresaw that, without ruining and totally burning the towns of Troppau and Jägerndorf, they could not be recovered. The method appeared too rigorous to the empress queen; and the Austrian generals imagined that, by cutting off the army of the hereditary prince from Neiss, whence they falsely supposed he drew his subsistence, they should oblige him to evacuate all Upper Silesia.

With the intent of executing this project, general Ellerichshausen, aided by a reinforcement of ten thousand men that had been sent him from Bohemia, fixed his quarters at Engelsberg, a small town, situated in the defiles of the mountains, one of which led to Branna,  
near

near Jägerndorf, another ended at Hof, and a third, passing by Zuckmantel and Ziegenhals, opened on the plain which extended from Weidenau to Parschkau, Neifs, and Neustadt. His corps, consisting of about fifteen thousand men, thus advantageously stationed, gave various alarms to the Prussian quarters: it sometimes foraged near Neifs, but was continually repulsed; and sometimes it disturbed the environs of Jägerndorf, whence it was driven back by general Stutterheim, who commanded there, after proper chastisement.

Wearied at length by being so often fruitlessly disturbed, and at the fatigue his troops endured, the hereditary prince of Brunswick determined to return the alarm. He called in his men, and with three separate corps fell on the posts of Branna, Lichten, and the Engelsberg. The Imperialists took to flight the moment the Prussians appeared. They lost four field pieces and fifty prisoners; and their terror was so great that they removed to a distance from the Prussian cantonments, and the troops of Troppau and Jägerndorf were allowed to remain in tranquillity.

General Ellerichshausen then turned his whole attention toward Zuckmantel and Ziegenhals, whence he daily made incursions into the open

country. The Prussian troops of Neustadt and Neifs continually opposed the depredations the enemy attempted to commit, which occasioned various skirmishes, where the infantry and cavalry of the king equally distinguished themselves. But this kind of partisan war does not appertain to the plan of the memoirs which it has been our intention to write.

Still it was necessary to check the temerity of such like enterprises. The troops were in want of repose, during winter, and there was sufficient time to fight, in the proper season for military operations. To produce this effect, and effectually to remove the evil, it was determined, if practicable, to dislodge the Austrians from their post at Zuckmantel. Wunsch, who at this time was in the county of Glatz, with ten battalions, where he had hitherto remained inactive, believed he might leave his post for a short time without any great hazard. He left the prince of Phillippsthal with two feeble battalions at Habelschwerdt, and, marching to Ziegenhals, drove away the Austrians, and pursued them into the defiles which are formed by the mountains, as far as Zuckmantel. But this post was not to be maintained by the Prussians, because of the heights which overlooked it, and the precautions which the Austrians had

taken to supply these heights with artillery, and even intrench them with very considerable works, from which it was impossible they should be expelled. It was equally impossible to turn them; for the men were unable to climb the hills, which were too high, too steep, and too rugged to ascend.

Convinced that nothing could be undertaken on this side against the enemy, and that any longer stay would but be loss of time, Wunsch began his march to return to his former post near Glatz. As he passed Landeck, he heard a warm cannonade on the side of Habelschwerdt, toward which place he immediately turned, but had not proceeded far before he met two hundred and fifty soldiers of the regiment of Luck, who had opened themselves a passage, and who informed him that the prince of Phillippsthal, and the remainder of the regiment, had suffered themselves to be surprised by the Austrians. Presently afterward Wunsch heard another cannonade. The enemy had attacked a kind of palanque, or redoubt, in which the Prussian general had left a hundred men for its defence. The Austrian howitzers had set fire to it, and captain Capeller, who signalized himself by his brave resistance, was obliged to surrender before any succour came up, for which reason Wunsch



threw himself with his whole corps into the fortrefs of Glatz.

The Imperial general Wurmser, not having received any information that such a redoubt existed, had intended immediately to march to Glatz, and take the town by surprise; but such a project was by no means capable of being executed. The works of that fortrefs are too strong to be insulted otherwise than by a formal siege. Still however Wurmser had the advantage of seizing on some districts in the county, and he presumed that, in order to dislodge him from the Prussian domains, the king would draw troops out of Upper Silesia to be employed against him, and that thus, the line of the hereditary prince between Troppau and Jägerndorf being enfeebled, Ellerichshausen would have the advantage, and might find means to make some successful assaults on the Prussians, and to clear the banks of the Oppa of troops which gave so much offence to the Imperialists; but the result was very different to what the Austrian generals had imagined and hoped.

The king put himself at the head of some battalions of his reserve, that had wintered at Breslau, to which he added the body-guard, the gendarmes, and the regiment of Anhalt; and with these troops he marched to Reichenbach;

while

while Rantzau sent four battalions to general Anhalt, who already had four under his command. This whole corps occupied Friedland and the intrenchments which had there been thrown up.

To drive the enemy from Wallenburg, general Lestwitz inclined toward Scharfeneck, and general Anhalt to Braunau. The Imperialists took to flight on all sides; it was with difficulty that Anhalt captured about fifty pandours.

While these forces were advancing the king occupied Silberberg, that he might be ready to send succour wherever it should be necessary; and the manœuvre made such an impression on the Austrians that they evacuated the town of Habelschwerdt, and escaped into Bohemia. Every precaution had been taken. Had the Imperialists been left tranquil in Bohemia, on the frontiers of Saxony, their troops would have swarmed on the Silesian borders, and general Wurmsér would have been very considerably reinforced. Therefore, that the attention of the enemy might be divided, and that he might rather be induced to provide for his own security than to disturb Silesia, general Möllendorf assembled some men, departed from Saxony, marched to Brix, and with his cavalry vanquished the corps that opposed him, and took

three field pieces, three hundred and fifty prisoners, and the magazine which the Austrians had in the small town of Brix.

It happened by night that a subaltern of the regiment of Wunsch deserted; and, to revenge himself on his major, he immediately conducted some Austrian hussars to the village he had left, from which he carried off this major, and five pair of colours: so true is it that an officer never can be too much on his guard to avoid being surprised. A similar incident had happened some months before, in Silesia, to the regiment of Thadden, cantoned in the village of Dieterfbach, near Schmiedeberg. The hussars made a false attack on a post of the regiment, while another party, penetrating through a garden and a barn, into the house of the commanding officer, carried off three pair of colours, having been repulsed before they could seize on the others. Such anecdotes are not to the honour of the Prussian service; but, among the great number of officers of whom the army is composed, they cannot all be equally well informed and vigilant.

While war was continued without respect to the rigour of the season, the courier whom the king had sent with his *ultimatum* returned from Petersburg; and, the two courts being agreed concerning

concerning the articles that it contained, prince Repnin sent it to the baron de Breteuil, at Vienna. The answer of the ambassador was that the articles the king had sent had given great satisfaction to the empress queen; and that it was proposed to assemble a congress, that the general pacification might be brought to a conclusion.

Can it be believed by posterity that, under these circumstances, at the very time when the court of Vienna appeared seriously to intend to terminate the war, one general Wallis, with eight or ten thousand men under his command, suddenly appeared before the town of Neustadt, where the regiment of Prussia and the battalion of Preuss were garrisoned, and that, unable to take the town, the enemy threw so many royal grenades, from about twenty howitzers which he had brought with him, that the shingles with which most of the houses were covered were set on fire, and that two hundred and forty of these houses were consumed by the flames? The garrison however remained firm. General Stutterheim, informed of the motion of the Austrians, came on their rear, toward Branitz, while the troops cantoned at Rossvalde advanced on one of their flanks, and some detachments from Neiss on the other. Wallis, unable to remain longer without exposing his whole corps, retreated for

Zuckmantel, and was pursued and sent back to his very hair.

General Wallis had been sent on the expedition by the emperor, who, supposing the king of Prussia to be ardent and warm to excess, imagined that thus to aggravate him, by the ruin of one of his towns, would render him more difficult, more ready to contend in the negotiation which was to be begun, and that perhaps the anger his majesty might feel would induce him to break it off. But the expedition of the Austrians did not turn to their advantage.

Prince Repnin soon after received a dispatch from M. de Breteuil, which indicated how impatiently desirous the empress queen was of a suspension of arms. The king received this information, on the 4th of March, at Silberberg; and issued orders to his generals to take measures with the Austrian commanders, that the truce proposed might be regulated. The 7th was the day appointed for that of Bohemia, the 8th for that of Upper Silesia and Moravia, and the 10th for that between Saxony and Bohemia. These periods having expired, the troops were sent into more extensive quarters, that they might be more at their ease; and especially to avoid epidemic distempers, which then began to be prevalent on the frontiers.

On

On the 6th the king repaired to Breslau, to hold a conference with prince Repnin. The town of Teschen was mutually agreed on as the place of negotiation, and the king appointed M. von Riedesel to be his minister plenipotentiary to this congress. At this time M. von Törring-Seefeld arrived at Breslau, in quality of ambassador from the elector palatine; and, in company with prince Repnin, M. von Riedesel, M. von Zinzendorf, ambassador from Saxony, and M. von Hofenfels, the envoy from Deux-ponts, all negotiators in behalf of the different powers, repaired to Teschen, where they were joined by the baron de Breteuil, ambassador and minister plenipotentiary from the king of France, and M. von Cobenzl, who held the same dignities under the empress queen.

The empress queen was sincerely desirous of peace; but, however eager she herself might be to obtain this purpose, she had not been able to inspire the emperor her son with the same sentiments. This prince, as we have before said, imagined his honour would be injured, should he not firmly support a step which his ardour had induced him to take. No sooner had the ministers begun their conferences at Teschen, than count Cobenzl entirely, and unequivocally, acquiesced in the plan of pacification proposed

posed by France. He started no difficulties, and appeared as well satisfied as could have been wished. It was supposed the labours of negotiation would have been quickly ended, when prince Repnin received a courier from M. von Affeburg, ambassador from the empress of Russia at Ratisbon, which informed him that the elector palatine had declared he could not nor would afford any satisfaction to the elector of Saxony, and that he rather chose to abide by his preceding treaty, made with the court of Vienna, than to submit his interests to the decision of the congress of Teschen. M. de Breteuil and prince Repnin immediately took offence, and assuming all the dignity that became plenipotentiaries of monarchies so great, declared that, all the contracting parties having already adopted the plan of pacification such as it had been proposed to them, they would henceforth consider him as the enemy of their sovereigns, who should wish to abjure the engagements into which he had entered.

Hearing this, count Cobenzl and the Palatine became more flexible, and couriers were sent off with all expedition for Vienna. Various other difficulties however were continually started, by which the progress of the mediators was impeded at every step. To-day the Saxons were persuaded

persuaded proper attention was not paid to their claims; to-morrow the minister of the duke de Deuxponts displayed his whole zeal, by demanding an enormous surcrease of appanage in behalf of his prince; and, to support his favourite system, endeavoured to prove Bavaria was a dutchy that could not be divided. To prevent the excess of such disputes the king was obliged to interfere; and by the aid of the mediators he, with great difficulty, appeased the ill-timed heat of these two ministers. It was demonstrated to Saxony that, if deserted by France, Russia, and Prussia, by whom the elector was aided, the least mite would not have been obtained from the court of Vienna, however just the claims of the former might be; and therefore to act reasonably would be to accept the sum which had been with great difficulty obtained. Similar explanations were entered into with the minister from Deuxponts, by recalling to mind that, having lost three-fourths of Bavaria, the duke ought to think himself happy that two-thirds were to be restored.

Scarcely were these ministers pacified before the elector palatine again entered the lists, and again was productive of disputes. France disliked such proceedings, and the minister of

Louis



Louis XVI. spoke in as high a tone at Munich as Louis XIV. did in his days of triumph;

Still how ever altercations were continued at Teschen, and were carried to such excess that the plenipotentiaries themselves began to fear their negotiation must prove unsuccessful. Six weeks had been fruitlessly wasted when, on the 20th of April, a courier arrived from Constantinople, at Vienna, with the news that peace was concluded between the Ottoman Porte and Russia. An event of no less magnitude could have softened the restless mind of the young emperor. So long as the appearances of war between Russia and the Porte seemed to announce an approaching rupture, between those powers, Joseph II. had considered the declaration of the court of Petersburg in favour of Prussia and the empire but as words; and imagined that Russia would be too much occupied in the Crimea, in supporting the khan of the Tartars against the Ottoman power, which was endeavouring to dethrone him, to possess either the strength or the means of efficaciously aiding Prussia. But the re-establishment of peace was destructive of all those hopes with which the emperor had been flattered. He could not forget that Russia, having her hands at liberty, was enabled to employ her forces

wherever she should think proper; that consequently she might march so powerful a corps, to the assistance of the king, that Prussia must acquire too great a superiority of men for the Imperial troops to be able to support a campaign with dignity; and still less should the war be continued.

We ought therefore to state the peace between Russia and the Porte as the epocha from which to date the commencement of the congress of Teschen. From this moment the engines of the emperor were motionless. The elector palatine and his minister plenipotentiary kept a respectful silence. Count Cobenzl became more complaisant, and, no longer adhering to his vague propositions, explained himself clearly, and precisely, on the subjects concerning which he had to treat with the mediators. All these favourable circumstances so speedily promoted the work that, in less than a fortnight, every party being satisfied, peace was concluded and signed. This event took place on the 13th of May, the birth-day of the empress queen.

We shall satisfy ourselves with stating the principal articles; which were——

The emperor was to restore all Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate to the elector palatine,  
the

the circle of Burghausen excepted; and the succession to these states was to be ascertained to the prince de Deuxponts, and to all the collateral branches of the family, that had equal claims.

The elector of Saxony was to obtain a remuneration of six millions of florins, to be liquidated by the payment of five hundred thousand florins annually. The emperor was to renounce the fief of Schönburg, in favour of Saxony, which was situated in the middle of the electorate.

With respect to the succession of the margraviats of Bareuth and Anspach, which was to revert to Prussia, the emperor acknowledged the legality of the claim, and promised no more to oppose the reunion of those states; and the king, on his part, renounced all right to Juliers and Berg, in favour of the branch of Sulzbach, in consideration of the renewing of the guarantee which France had granted in behalf of Silesia, by the treaty of 1741.

The duke of Mecklenburg was to be allowed the right *de non appellando*, as an indemnification for his claims; and the treaty was finally to be guaranteed by Russia, France, and the whole Germanic body.

Scarcely

Scarcely was the treaty signed before the troops of the king, to testify his good intentions, immediately evacuated all the Austrian districts of which they were in possession.

Such was the end of these troubles in Germany, when all men expected to have seen a succession of campaigns before they should have been terminated. The whole however was a strange mixture of negotiation and military enterprise, which could only be attributed to the two factions that divided the Imperial court; the one of which for a time gained the superiority, and was soon after subdued by the other. The generals were kept in perpetual uncertainty, and no person knew whether it was peace or war; which disagreeable situation continued to the very day that the peace was signed, at Teschen. It appeared that the Prussian troops had the advantage over their enemies, whenever they could bring them to combat according to rule; and that the Imperialists were most successful in art, surprise, and stratagem, which properly belong to a partisan war.

Given at Potsdam, June 20, 1779.

F R E D E R I C.



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**CORRESPONDENCE**

**BETWEEN**

**THE EMPEROR,  
THE EMPRESS QUEEN,  
AND  
THE KING OF PRUSSIA,**

**RELATIVE TO THE**

**BAVARIAN SUCCESSION.**

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B A V A R I A N  
C O R R E S P O N D E N C E.

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*Copy of a Letter written by the Emperor's own  
band, to the King of Prussia, from Olmutz,  
dated April the 13th, 1778.*

SIR AND BROTHER,

**T**HOUGH I have hitherto deferred fulfilling the mutual promise into which we entered, as well at Neifs as at Neustadt, to maintain a personal correspondence, it was only that, being prepared for all accidents, I was desirous of waiting till I myself was at a distance from the metropolis, and consequently from whatever might seem to partake of art and policy, that I might communicate my ideas to your majesty, which I believe to be more analogous to our



true interests than all the disputes into which we could possibly enter. I have reduced these ideas to a project of convention, which is here annexed, and which I have the honour to send your majesty. I shall not add a single reflection, well convinced not one will escape you of which the subject is susceptible. I have at the same time sent full powers to Cobenzl, in order that, should your majesty approve the plan, it may immediately be signed; and should any change or explanation be required, concerning accessory circumstances, I intreat your majesty would inform me of them, by an answer from yourself, with a certitude that, if I have the power, nothing you can desire shall be refused. Should my proposals be in no manner agreeable to you, here the affair will naturally terminate.

I shall be truly delighted to strengthen, by this means, that good intelligence which only ought to be and can be of advantage to our states; which has already so fortunately and so advantageously commenced; which on my part is founded on the high esteem and consideration wherein I hold the genius and superior talents of your majesty; which a personal acquaintance has increased; and which I am sincerely desirous to perpetuate, by assurances and reiterated

rated testimonies of the sincere friendship with which I shall ever remain

Sir, brother and cousin,

Your most affectionate

Brother and cousin,

J O S E P H.

*The Plan of the Convention which was annexed to the above Letter.*

Her apostolic majesty the empress queen, and his majesty the king of Prussia, have with great chagrin perceived the affairs of the Bavarian succession assume so critical and so embarrassing an aspect; insomuch that, not only every thing is at present to be feared for the tranquillity of Germany, but, the most serious consequences are likewise to be apprehended in future, from a similar concurrence of circumstances; and, being mutually animated with the sincere desire of removing, as much as possible, whatever might be injurious to the good intelligence and friendship which personally subsists between them, as well as to the general peace of the German empire, their said majesties have amicably consulted together, according to the information and assurances which, on the one part,

have been given by her majesty the empress queen, and, on the other, according to the declarations afforded by his majesty the king of Prussia. In this conciliating temper they have charged their respective ambassadors, who are provided with full powers, to enter into and conclude a convention of the following tenor.

I. His Prussian majesty acknowledges the validity of the convention concluded, on the 3d of January of the present year, between her apostolic majesty the empress queen and his most serene highness the elector palatine; as well as the legality of the possession of certain districts in Bavaria, which have in consequence been occupied by her apostolic and Imperial majesty.

II. Be it understood that, in this convention, the two contracting parties have expressly reserved the power of entering into a final convention relative to the exchange, which shall be regulated by mutual agreement; whether of the districts which have fallen to her apostolic and Imperial majesty, and, to the house of Austria, or of the whole of the country, or only of some parts; and his Prussian majesty promises to suffer the exchanges in question to be peaceably executed: it being nevertheless precisely stipulated that the acquisitions, to be made, shall not be from any country which is immediately on the  
frontiers

frontiers of the present provinces of the king of Prussia.

III. In return, her Imperial and apostolic majesty previously acknowledges the validity of the incorporation of the countries of Anspach and Bareuth, with the states of the elder branch of the house of Brandenburg, and promises on her part——

IV. Peaceably to suffer any exchange which may be made of these countries, according to agreement with his Prussian majesty; it being nevertheless precisely stipulated that the acquisitions, to be made, shall not be from any country which is immediately on the frontiers of the present provinces of her majesty the queen of Hungary.

*Answer written in the King's own hand to the Emperor, dated at Schanwalde, April the 14th, 1778.*

SIR AND BROTHER,

I RECEIVED with all possible satisfaction the letter which your Imperial majesty had the goodness to write to me. I have neither minister nor secretary here, therefore your Imperial majesty will kindly be pleased to be satisfied with

the answer of an old soldier, who writes, with probity and frankness, on one of the most important subjects which politics long has furnished.

No person is more desirous than I am of maintaining peace and good harmony among the powers of Europe; but all things have their limits, and there are paths so thorny that good inclinations are not alone sufficient to preserve affairs in tranquillity. Permit me clearly to state the question of our present circumstances to your Imperial majesty, which is nothing less than to know, whether an emperor has the right of disposing of the fiefs of the empire according to his will? If this question be answered in the affirmative, all these fiefs will become Timariots\*, which are only granted during the life of the possessor, on whose death they revert to the sultan. But this is contrary to the laws and customs of the Roman empire. No prince will acknowledge the justice of such a proceeding. Each will appeal to the feudal right which ascertains his possessions to his descendants, and no one will personally consent to cement the power of a despot, who soon or late will strip him, or his children, of possessions held time immemorial.

\* A military fief granted to the Spahis in Turkey. T.

These are the reasons that have induced the whole Germanic body to exclaim against the violent manner in which Bavaria has lately been invaded. For my own part, as a member of the empire, and as one having confirmed the peace of Westphalia by the treaty of Hubertsburg, I think myself directly pledged to support the immunities, rights, and liberties of the Germanic body, and the Imperial capitulations by which the power of the chief of the empire is limited, in order to prevent the abuses which might result from his pre-eminence.

Such, sir, is the true state of affairs. My personal interest is not here concerned, but I am persuaded your majesty would regard me as a cowardly man, unworthy of your esteem, should I basely sacrifice the rights, immunities, and privileges which I and the electors have received from our ancestors. I shall continue to speak with the same frankness. I love and honour the person of your majesty. It certainly would be an affliction to me to make war against a prince endowed with such excellent qualities, and whom I personally esteem. Here then I shall add such opinions as the little knowledge of which I am possessed has enabled me to form, which I submit to the superior views of your Imperial majesty.

I confess that Bavaria, according to the right of convenience, may well appertain to the Imperial house; but, as every other right opposes such a possession, should not satisfactory equivalents be made to the duke de Deuxponts? Ought not indemnifications to be found for the elector of Saxony, in lieu of the allodial parts of the succession of Bavaria? The Saxon claims amount to thirty-seven millions of florins, but perhaps these claims might find some abatement in favour of peace. In such propositions, not omitting the duke of Mecklenburg, your Imperial majesty would see me concur with joy, because they are conformable to that which my duties and the station in which I am placed demand.

I assure your majesty, I could not speak with more frankness, to my brother, than I have at present the honour to speak to you. I intreat you would reflect on all I have taken the liberty to lay before you, for this is the real state of the question, to which the succession of Anspach is wholly foreign. Our claims are so indubitable that no person can bring them into dispute. Van Swieten spoke on the subject to me, some time within these six years, and informed me the Imperial court would be glad if I had any exchange to propose, because I should deprive his

court of the plurality of votes in the circle of Franconia, and it was not wished to have me too near a neighbour to Egra in Bohemia. I answered him there was no present cause for apprehension, the margrave of Anspach being in good health, and in all probability likely to survive me. This was all that passed on the subject, and your Imperial majesty may rest persuaded I relate the truth.

With respect to the last memorial I received from prince Kaunitz, this said prince appears not to have been in a good temper when drawing it up. The answer could not arrive here in less than eight days. I oppose my phlegm to his warmth, and I particularly expect your Imperial majesty will have the goodness to decide on the reasonableness of the sincere remonstrances I take the liberty to send you, being with the highest esteem, and all possible respect,

Sir and brother,

The good brother and cousin

Of your Imperial majesty,

F R E D E R I C.

If I should happen to have failed in any of the forms of ceremony, I make my apologies to your Imperial majesty, protesting upon my honour there is not a man, within forty miles of the



the place, capable of giving me proper information.

*Letter under the band of the Emperor addressed  
to the King.*

Littau, April the 16th, 1778.

SIR AND BROTHER,

I HAVE this moment received the letter of your majesty, whom I perceive to be in an error, concerning facts which will entirely change the purport of this long discourse, and the state of the question; I have therefore been induced, from a regard to the good of mankind, to send you further information in this letter.

It is not the emperor who acts, in all that relates to Bavaria; it is the elector of Bohemia, and the archduke of Austria; who, as an equal, has produced his claims, and has entered into an agreement, by a free and friendly convention, with his equal and neighbour the elector palatine, who is become the sole heir of the states of Bavaria. The right of explaining and making agreements with his neighbour, without the intervention of a third, has hitherto ever appeared incontestable, in behalf of any man who is not dependent. Consequently, every prince of the empire has always exercised this right, in claim and deed.

With

With respect to the allodial pretensions of the court of Saxony and the duke of Mecklenburg, which your majesty mentions, these appear to me things in dispute, to be decided by the parties, or ended by agreement with the heir, who is the elector palatine, according to family compacts.

As to her majesty the empress queen, I believe I may affirm she might be induced no longer to exercise the right of regredience, which she has touched upon in the answer that she has given, in favour of the other allodial heirs, and to give them pleasure.

In what relates to the duke de Deuxponts, it is proved he possesses no right till after the decease of the elector palatine. He is free to accede or not to the convention that has been made; and though he previously authorized the elector to make an agreement in his name, and in the name of all his heirs, with her majesty the empress queen, in all that concerned the Bavarian succession, his claims will nevertheless remain in full force; nor does her majesty suppose the convention obligatory, as far as it relates to him; she consequently must make new arrangements, or proceed by legal process, according to the good right she possesses, with the  
duke

duke de Deuxponts, when he shall happen to succeed the elector palatine.

I imagine that, from the reasons here alleged, which are all demonstrated facts, your majesty will be convinced the word despot, which you have employed, and which at the least I abhor as much as yourself, is superfluous; and that, as emperor, I have done nothing in all this affair more than promise to each person who shall complain formally to me that his claims shall be attended to, and justice promptly administered. Neither has her majesty the empress queen done any thing more than assert her rights, which she has confirmed by a free convention; consequently she will employ all the means that are in her power, in the defence of her possessions.

Such is the true state of the question, which is reduced to an enquiry whether or not any law of the empire prevents an elector from making an agreement with his neighbour, and entering into a convention which is to their mutual convenience, without the interference of a third person. I shall tranquilly wait the answer you shall please to write, or cause to be written. I have learnt so many useful lessons already from your majesty that, were I not a citizen of the world,

world, and affected by the cruel sufferings with which some millions of beings might from our contests be afflicted, I should almost add I should not be vexed were you to teach me to become a good general. Your majesty may nevertheless be assured that the maintenance of peace, especially with yourself, whom I honour and truly love, is my sincere desire; and that, in my opinion, four hundred thousand brave men ought not to be employed in mutual murder.— And to what purpose? What good would result? Which of the parties can foresee what might be the consequences? Such are truly my reflections, and as such I venture to communicate them to your majesty, with all possible cordiality and frankness, and remain, with the highest and most perfect consideration,

Sir and brother,

Your majesty's

Good brother and cousin,

J O S E P H.

*Letter written by the King to the Emperor from  
Schænwalde, dated April 18th, 1778.*

SIR AND BROTHER,

THE marks of friendship which your Imperial majesty has deigned to afford me are to me of  
inestimable

ineffimable value; for certainly no man respects, and permit me to say no one personally loves you, more than I do. Though unforeseen causes give birth to a diversity of opinions on political subjects, this in no degree changes those sensations of which my heart is conscious, in your majesty's favour. Since your majesty therefore approves the frankness with which, according to my custom, I speak, on those weighty affairs which at present constitute the principal objects that employ our thoughts, I am desirous of affording you this satisfaction, on condition you will always continue the same indulgence, in behalf of my sincerity, which you have hitherto kindly granted.

Let me previously intreat you not to imagine that, seduced by mad ambition, I have the phrenzy of desiring to erect myself the arbitrator of sovereigns. The ardent passions in me are extinguished, at my time of life they would be unseasonable, and my reason prescribes bounds to the sphere of my activity. I only interest myself in the recent events of Bavaria, because with these are complicated the interests of all the princes of the empire, of the number of whom I am one. And how have I proceeded? I have examined the laws and the Germanic constitutions, as well as the article of the peace  
of

of Westphalia, relative to Bavaria. To the whole of these I have compared the act which has lately taken place; to see whether these laws and these treaties might be reconciled with the seizure of Bavaria; and I confess that, instead of the rights which I desired there to find, I have found the very reverse.

That I may more clearly explain my remarks to your Imperial majesty, suffer me to draw a comparison. I will suppose that the present reigning branch of the landgraves of Hesse was on the point of becoming extinct, and that the elector of Hanover, by a treaty signed with the last of the heirs of these princes, should seize on Hesse, under the pretext of his consent. The princes of Rheinfels, who are of the same family, would no doubt reclaim the inheritance, because the possessor of a fief is no more than the life landlord, and, according to all the feudal laws, neither could transfer nor dispose of his possessions, without the consent of the heirs at law; that is to say of the princes of Rheinfels; consequently, in every legal court, the elector of Hanover would be convicted of having taken possession by force of arms of a disputed inheritance, and would lose his cause with costs of suit. Different is the case of the succession of an extinct family; of such an inheritance the heirs

have a right to take possession, as has been practised in Saxony at the decease of the dukes of Merseburg, Naumburg, and Zeitz. Such have hitherto been the laws and customs of the holy Roman empire.

I now come to the right of regredience, which has been mentioned in the manifesto published by the Imperial court. I remember that, in the year 1740, the king of Poland endeavoured to exert this right, to substantiate the claims which he made on Bohemia, as the husband of the queen his consort; and I recollect that the Austrian ministers at that time warmly refused the arguments which the ministers of Saxony deduced from the right, which the former persevered in affirming to be ineffectual and inadmissible. And can that right which is impotent at one time become valid at another? I own to your Imperial majesty such reasoning to me appears contradictory.

Your majesty adds, in your letter, that whatever relates to the duke de Deuxponts may be accommodated with him at the death of the elector of Bavaria. Permit me to ask, why not accommodated at present? For, in reality, this is but to cherish the seeds of new troubles and new divisions, when there is no impediment to putting an end to them at present.

Do

Do not take it amiss that I add a word on the subject of the elector of Saxony, whom you wish to consign over to the elector palatine. In order to satisfy the former the latter must be entirely stripped. And are there no better expedients to be found? I imagine this to be an affair well worthy of attention; and these expedients, be they what they may, should be named, for they will serve as fixed points on which the negotiators may treat.

In fine, since your Imperial majesty emboldens by permitting me to speak the truth, and since you are so worthy the truth should be spoken to you, while opening my heart, I shall not meet your disapprobation by offering a few ideas which may tend to conciliation. I nevertheless believe a discussion of that nature must necessarily be treated on by ministers appointed for the purpose. You will determine whether you think proper to send orders on the subject to count Cobenzl, or to appoint any other person, the better to accelerate a work so advantageous to humanity. I will allow it is a chaos that will be difficult to restore to order; but the prospect of difficulty ought to encourage and not to repel; if too great to be overcome, compassion at least requires attempts should be



made; and, if peace be sincerely wished, it ought to be cemented in the most durable manner.

Your majesty will rest persuaded I never can confound any disputes with the consideration in which I hold your person. You have been pleased to joke with me. Your majesty has no need of a master. You will act whatever part you shall think proper, for Heaven has endowed you with uncommon talents. You will easily recollect that Lucullus had never commanded an army when he was sent by the Roman senate into Pontus. Here had he scarcely arrived before, as a first attempt, he vanquished Mithridates. May your Imperial majesty be the winner of victories, and I shall be the first to applaud; though I cannot but add may it never be when opposing me.

I am, with every sentiment of the most perfect esteem, and all possible consideration,

Sir and brother,

Your Imperial majesty's

Good brother and cousin,

F R E D E R I C.

*Letter*

*Letter from the Emperor.*

Königsgrätz, April the 19th, 1778.

SIR AND BROTHER,

I AM very sensibly affected by the kind letter which I have just received from your majesty; and, were the high consideration, and I may venture to affirm the true friendship, which I have ever personally entertained for you, capable of increase, it would certainly be effected by your majesty's letter. I shall impart the humane plans with which it abounds, and which are so well worthy of a man so great, to her majesty the empress queen; but I may previously assure you her Imperial majesty has already given, and will again repeat, all necessary instructions to Cobenzl, that he may accept and endeavour to accede to all conciliatory propositions, as far as they are decent and possible, not forgetting what her majesty owes to herself and her monarchy, in order to remove, as well for the present as in future, the scourge of war from our respective states. However difficult the attempt may appear, if the parties are equally willing, it may be accomplished; and we shall thereby mutually acquire some much more last-

ing than all the glory victory bestows; while benedictions from all our subjects, and the preservation of such multitudes of men, will be to us the most splendid of trophies. Nor can any one be sensible of the value of such blessings but those who are conscious how great is the good of rendering men happy.

While speaking to me of the means of preserving peace, your majesty seems willing to make war on my understanding, by the too flattering compliments you are pleased to pay me, and which well might disorder my brain, did I not know how deficient I am in experience and abilities. Distant as I am by character from vanity, and from taking pleasure in being flattered, I will nevertheless confess I am not insensible to the esteem and approbation of so excellent a judge as your majesty. I intreat you to remain indubitably persuaded of the very high sentiments of perfect consideration and sincere friendship with which I am, during life, personally devoted to you. I remain,

Sir and brother,

Your majesty's

Good brother and cousin,

JOSEPH.

*Letter*

*Letter in the King's own hand-writing to the Emperor.*

Schönwalde, April the 20th, 1778.

SIR AND BROTHER,

NOTHING could be more glorious to your Imperial majesty than the resolution you have condescended to take, to endeavour to avert the rising storm, by which so many innocent people are menaced. The success, sir, which the most illustrious warriors have gained over their enemies, is divided among many persons who have concurred to obtain it, by their valour and their conduct. But the benefits which sovereigns confer on humanity are attributed solely to themselves, because they partake of the goodness of their characters, as well as of the elevation of their genius. There is no kind of fame to which your majesty may not assert your claims, whether it relates to deeds of arms or to acts of moderation. I believe you equally capable of both. Your Imperial majesty may rest persuaded I shall act without disguise, and with the utmost sincerity employ every means of conciliation that can be proposed; in order, on the one part, to prevent the effusion of innocent blood, and on the other, sir, to demonstrate the sentiments of admiration in which I hold

U 4

you

you personally, and the profound impressions which will never be effaced from my heart.

I hope your Imperial majesty will rest persuaded that, when I venture to speak of the sentiments I personally entertain for you, I use the pure and simple language of truth. I am rather accused of a too open sincerity than of flattery, and am incapable of saying what I do not think. In the mean time, and while it shall please your Imperial majesty to regulate the important negotiation in question, I intreat you will believe me, with every feeling of the most perfect esteem and the highest consideration,

Sir and brother,

Your Imperial majesty's

Good brother and cousin,

FREDERIC.

*Copy of a Letter from the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, Prince Gallitzin, to the King.*

SIRE,

HER majesty the empress queen has confided to me the resolution she has taken to dispatch her envoy, M. Thugut, to your majesty, who is charged with a letter addressed to you, as well as with overtures that may tend to stop the progress

gress of the misunderstanding which has happened between the two courts. She has required me to provide him with a passport, as in the name of a person who is in the service of my august sovereign, as well as with a letter for your majesty.

I have obeyed her commands, and conformed to her wishes, with the less hesitation because I have supposed the commission M. Thugut has undertaken will be agreeable to your majesty.

Nothing will equal my happiness if, after having acted as an instrument in promoting the most heroic action of the reign of your majesty, that of conferring peace on Germany at the head of your puissant armies, I may venture to flatter myself that your majesty will deign to accept the homage which, on this occasion, I lay at your feet, and those sentiments of the most profound respect with which I am,

Sire,

Your majesty's

Most humble, most obedient, and most

Submissive servant,

DEMETRIUS Prince GALLITZIN.

Vienna, July the 12th, 1778.

*The*

*The Answer of his Majesty to Prince Gallitzin, at  
Vienna.*

From the camp before Jaromirs,  
July the 17th, 1778.

SIR,

Notwithstanding that the last negotiation with the court of Vienna has been interrupted, I am not so averse to peace but that, if this court shall make acceptable proposals, and which may be reconciled to the maintenance of the system of the Germanic body, I shall ever be very much disposed to receive them; and if M. Thugut be charged with any proposition I shall not, for the good of humanity, refuse to hear him, and to make a last effort to put an end to these troubles. I pray God, sir, that he will be pleased to take you into his holy keeping.

*Copy of a Letter from her Majesty the Empress  
Queen, sent by the Sieur Thugut.*

SIR, BROTHER, AND COUSIN,

FROM the recal of baron Riedesel, and the entrance of your majesty's troops into Bohemia, I behold, with extreme sensibility, a new war broken out. My age, and the desire I have to preserve

preserve peace, are known to the whole world, nor can I afford a more evident proof than by the step I now take. My maternal heart is justly alarmed when I recollect that two of my sons, and a beloved son-in-law, are at the army. I act at present without having informed the emperor my son, and I request your majesty will suffer the affair to remain totally secret, be its success what it may. My wishes tend to renew and terminate the negotiation thus far conducted by his majesty the emperor, and broken off, to my very great regret. This letter will be delivered into your own hands by the baron Thugut, who is provided with instructions and full powers. Ardently wishing our hopes may be accomplished, agreeable to our dignity and to our mutual satisfaction, I intreat your majesty to reply with similar sentiments to the strong desire I have that our good intelligence should be for ever re-established, for the good of the human race, and likewise of our families.

I remain your majesty's

Good sister and cousin,

MARIA THERESA.

*Copy*



*Copy of a Postscript to the above Letter from the  
Empress Queen.*

The 12th.

THIS moment intelligence is arrived, of the 8th and 9th, from the camp, which informs me of the arrival of the armies in presence of each other. I am the more eager to expedite the present dispatches lest some accident should change the situation of affairs. After the departure of Thugut, I intend to send a courier off for the emperor, that I may thereby perhaps prevent some precipitate step which, with all my heart, I wish to prevent.

I am your majesty's

Good sister and cousin,

MARIA THERESA.

*Copy of the full Power given under the hand of the  
Empress Queen, the Original of which was re-  
turned to the Sieur Thugut, at Welsdorf, on the  
17th of July, 1778.*

I HEREBY give full powers to the baron von Thugut, that he may conclude a convention with his majesty the king of Prussia, according to such intentions as I have confided to him.

MARIA THERESA.

July the 12th, 1778.

*Copy*

*Copy of the Propositions of her Majesty the Empress  
Queen.*

I. The empress queen, of her present possessions in Bavaria, shall preserve an extent of country equivalent to a million in revenue, and shall restore the remainder to the elector palatine.

II. She will incessantly agree with the elector palatine concerning an exchange to be made, to the satisfaction of both parties, between these possessions and some other part of Bavaria, the revenue of which shall not exceed a million, and which shall neither be in the vicinity of Ratisbon nor have the inconvenience of dividing Bavaria, as the present possessions do.

III. She will unite her good offices to those of his majesty the king of Prussia, to obtain without delay a just and equitable accommodation between the elector palatine and the elector of Saxony, relative to the claims of the latter over the allodial inheritance of Bavaria.

*Copy of the Additions made by the King to the above  
Propositions.*

IV. May not the empress give up her claims over some fiefs in Saxony, to the sovereignty

reignty of which she makes pretence in quality of queen of Bohemia?

V. May not the duke of Mecklenburg be indemnified, by obtaining some small fief of the empire?

VI. Is it yet agreed to regulate the succession of Bareuth and Anspach according to the stipulations in the treaty, further adding that the elector of Saxony shall cause eventual homage to be rendered to himself from the two margraviats, and that the king of Prussia shall, in like manner, receive homage from Lusatia?

VII. Is the blockade of the city of Ratisbon, in which the diet of the empire is assembled, to be raised?

Such are nearly the points which must be agreed to, in order that the preliminaries may be signed.

*Copy of the Answer of the King to the above Letter.*

July 17, 1778.

MADAM AND SISTER,

M. THUGUT has presented the letter with which he was charged by your Imperial and royal majesty. No person here knows him, nor shall any one be informed that he has been here. It was worthy of the character of your

- Imperial

Imperial and royal majesty to give marks of magnanimity and moderation in a litigious affair, after having maintained the succession of your ancestors with heroic fortitude. The tender attachment which your Imperial majesty betokens for the emperor, your son, and for princes of so much merit, must acquire you the applause of all feeling hearts; and this, if possible, increases the high consideration in which I hold your sacred person. Baron Thugut has minuted down some points, to serve as a basis for a suspension of arms. I have been obliged to add some articles, part of which were before agreed on, and others which I imagine will meet with no difficulty.

In the mean time, madam, till the answer arrives, I shall so regulate my proceedings that your Imperial majesty shall have nothing to fear for the blood-royal, or in behalf of an emperor whom I love and whom I respect, although our principles disagree, as far as they relate to the affairs of Germany.

M. Thugut is immediately to depart for Vienna, and I believe that in six or seven days he may return. I shall, in the interim, send for such ministers as are necessary to conclude the negotiation, should your Imperial majesty deign to consent to some necessary articles, which I

have added, in order that the preliminaries may be signed.

I am, with the highest consideration,

Madam and sister,

Your Imperial and royal majesty's

Good brother and cousin,

F R E D E R I C.

*Copy of a second Letter from her Imperial Majesty the Empress Queen, sent under a cover from Prince Gallitzin, without any Letter from that Ambassador.*

July the 22d, 1778.

SIR, BROTHER, AND COUSIN,

THUGUT arrived here yesterday, very late, and delivered me the letter from your majesty, dated on the 17th instant. I there, to my great satisfaction, read sentiments conformable to my own, relative to peace, as well as the various obliging things you are pleased to say. Having informed the emperor of the journey of Thugut, I will immediately communicate to him the answer that has been brought back. I shall hasten, as soon as I am able, to send every explanation

planation which you require. I remain, in the mean time,

Sir, brother, and cousin,

Your good sister and cousin,

M A R I A T H E R E S A.

*Copy of the Answer of the King to the above Letter.*

July the 25th, 1778.

MADAM AND SISTER,

THE letter which your Imperial and royal majesty has had the goodness to write to me is safely arrived. I shall wait, madam, till you and your august son shall think proper to determine concerning the present situation of affairs, having good reason to predict happy consequences from their wisdom and moderation. I reiterate to your Imperial and royal majesty the assurances which I have before given you, that I shall so well regulate my proceedings that you may remain undisturbed, concerning the safety of persons who are to you, by right, so dear and precious. Nothing decisive shall happen before your Imperial and royal majesty shall have thought proper to return your answer. I

am, with all admiration, and the highest consideration,

Madam and sister,

Your Imperial and royal majesty's.

Good brother and cousin,

F R E D E R I C.

*Copy of a Letter from the King to her Majesty the  
Empress Queen.*

July the 28th, 1778.

MADAM AND SISTER,

HOWEVER reluctant I may be to importune your Imperial and royal majesty by letters, I have nevertheless thought it my duty, under the present circumstances, to lay before you some ideas which I have conceived, relative to the general pacification of Germany. I have supposed them such as were most proper speedily to conciliate the present disputes. I submit them to the superior intelligence of your Imperial majesty; and even, should you not think them acceptable, I intreat you will attribute them to nothing but the sincerity with which I enter into your pacific views, and the desire I have to save so many innocent people from the misfortunes and wretchedness which are the inevitable

attendants

attendants upon war. I am, with sentiments of the highest consideration,

Madam and sister,

Your Imperial and royal majesty's

Good brother and cousin,

F R E D E R I C.

*Copy of the Propositions, annexed to the above Letter, for a new general Plan of Reconciliation.*

I. Her majesty the empress queen shall restore the elector palatine whatever she is at present possessed of, in Bohemia and the Upper Palatinate. In return, the elector shall cede to her the district of Burghausen, from Passau, on the banks of the Inn, to the confluence of the Salza; and on the banks of the Salza, to the frontiers of Salzburg, near Wildshut; the remainder of the district of Burghausen, as well as the river of the Inn, being to appertain to the palatine family. By this means the court of Vienna will obtain, without dispute, a great and fertile province, which will add to the uniformity of Austria; a province which is bordered by a fine river, and which contains the fortress of Scharding, with other considerable towns: Bavaria will not be divided in two parts;



and the city of Ratisbon, as well as the diet, will remain free.

II. Should the court of Vienna find any repugnance to afford the Palatine house indemnification by the ceding of any district, this she may in some sort affect, though in no manner proportionate to the cession made, by renouncing her feudalities, or rights of sovereignty, in the Upper Palatinate and Saxony, and by paying a million of crowns to the elector of Saxony. The court of Vienna, if she shall conform to the two last articles, will satisfy the elector of Saxony for his allodial claims, instead of the elector palatine, who thus will be released from the obligations he is under to Saxony, and in some measure indemnified for the loss of the district of Burghausen. For the further gratification of the elector of Saxony, the small principality of Mindelheim may be added as a free allodial, together with the little district of Rothenberg, appertaining to the Upper Palatinate, but included within the territory of Nurnberg. Every consideration of equity, honour and interest, require that the exchange of the districts, occupied in Bavaria, the satisfaction of the house of Palatine and the elector of Saxony, and in general the arrangement of the Bavarian succession, should not be referred to any particular

particular discussion and negotiation; but that all should be regulated at present, with the concurrence of his majesty, the king of Prussia, as the friend and ally of the two families. This plan may be proposed to them, and the two electors invited to accede to it, as soon as their Imperial majesties shall come to terms with his majesty the king of Prussia; and there is every reason to hope they will not refuse, the nature of the plan and all circumstances considered.

III. As soon as the Bavarian succession shall be thus arranged, her Imperial majesty, as well as the elector of Saxony, shall renounce all future claims over Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate; and the express succession of these two countries shall be ascertained, without exception, to the princes palatine of Deuxponts, after the present line of Sulzbach shall become extinct.

IV. The fiefs which have been left vacant in the empire, by the death of the last elector of Bavaria, shall be conferred on the elector palatine, and after him on the line of Deuxponts.

V. His majesty the emperor will please to confer one of these small fiefs on the dukes of Mecklenburg, or otherwise grant them the privilege *de non appellando* throughout their duchy,

to indemnify them for their claims over a part of the landgraviat of Leuchtenberg.

VI. Their majesties, the emperor and the empress queen, will please to renounce their rights of feudality, or others, which the crown of Bohemia might have in the countries of Anspach and Bareuth, and engage never to oppose the incorporation of the countries of Anspach and Bareuth with the primogeniture of the electorate of Brandenburg. Should his majesty the king of Prussia and the elector of Saxony come to any agreement for an exchange of the countries of Anspach and Bareuth, in lieu of the margraviats of Lower and Upper Lusatia, and some other districts, as shall be to them convenient, their Imperial and royal majesties shall in no manner counteract such exchange, but shall rather, in such case, renounce all right of feudality, reversion, purchase, or other claims which they may have over Lusatia entire, or over some parts of the country; so that his majesty, the king of Prussia, and his heirs and successors, may possess that country free from all claims, on the part of the house of Austria.

This plan appears conformable to equity, and to circumstances, and to be to the utmost advantage to the house of Austria. If these articles should be agreed on, it will not be difficult to  
form

form them into preliminaries, or into a definitive treaty.

*Copy of a third Letter from her Majesty the  
Empress Queen.*

August the 1st.

SIR, BROTHER, AND COUSIN,

BARON Thugut was about to depart, on his return to your majesty, when your letter, of the 28th of July, came to hand, accompanied with a new plan of general reconciliation. I had charged him to give every explanation which you could have wished, and to make reciprocal propositions, on my part, which I imagined might lead to our mutual agreement. But those which your majesty has just remitted me, very much to my regret, so highly alter the situation of affairs that it is not possible I should immediately determine on an answer. This I will endeavour to give as soon as may be, to inform you of which I send the present, begging you to remain persuaded of the consideration with which I am,

Sir, brother, and cousin,

Your majesty's

Good sister and cousin,

MARIA THERESA.

X 4

*Copy of the King's Answer to the above Letter.*

August the 5th, 1778,

MADAM, SISTER, AND COUSIN,

I HAVE just received the letter which your royal and Imperial majesty has had the goodness to write to me ; I am sensible, madam, that affairs of such importance well demand serious deliberation. I therefore shall patiently wait the resolutions which your royal and Imperial majesty shall take, and which you will deign to communicate to me by the baron Thugut, with an assurance of the sentiments of the highest consideration with which I shall ever remain,

Madam, sister, and cousin,

Your Imperial and royal majesty's

Good brother and cousin,

F R E D E R I C,

*Copy of a fourth Letter from her Majesty the Empress Queen.*

August the 6th.

SIR, BROTHER, AND COUSIN,

IN my letter of the first instant, I informed your majesty that I would remit my thoughts on the proposition of a new plan of general reconciliation,

ciliation. Thugut is in consequence charged to lay before you a counter-propofal on my part, at once to terminate the miferies of a cruel and destructive war. I refer you to what Thugut fhall communicate, and am, with all confideration,

Sir, brother, and coufin,

Your majesty's

Good fifter and coufin,

MARIA THERESA.

*Copy of the Counter-propofal which is mentioned in the above Letter.*

THE empress queen, not being actuated by views of aggrandifement, and principally defiring only the fupport of her own dignity, her political refpect, and the balance of power in Germany, her faid majesty declares that she is difpofed and determined to reftore whatever she has caufed her troops to occupy in Bavaria, and the Upper Palatinate, and to releafe the elector palatine from the engagements into which he entered with her, by the convention of the third of January, on condition *fine qua non* that it fhall please his Pruffian majesty to bind himfelf and his fucceffors in due form, not to reunite the

two margraviats of Bareuth and Anspach to the elder branch of his family, so long as any secondary branch shall remain, according to the stipulations in the Pragmatic sanction of the house of Brandenburg; which, having been confirmed by the emperors and the empire, has obtained the force of a public law. As by the means of such regulation the whole Bavarian succession will be restored to its primitive state, the discussion and judgment of the claims of the other interested parties to the said succession will be remitted to the common courts of justice, as prescribed by the laws and constitution of the empire, conformable to what his Prussian majesty did himself from the beginning propose.

*Copy of the Answer of the King to the above Letter.*

August the 19th, 1778,

MADAM, SISTER, AND COUSIN,

M. THUGUT delivered the letter to me which your Imperial and royal majesty had the goodness to write. He delivered in the propositions with which he was charged, and, as they were not conciliatory, he remarked the dislike I testified to their acceptance. He told me that there perhaps were still other means for the pacification of the troubles of Germany, and  
that

that he had been ordered, by your Imperial and royal majesty, to make overtures accordingly. Hearing this, I proposed that he should confer with my ministers, in order that it might be known whether this last expedient would be more successful than the preceding had been. Your Imperial and royal majesty will at least be my witness that, should not this salutary work be brought to a happy conclusion, it will be no fault of mine. I am, with the highest consideration,


Madam, sister, and cousin,

Your Imperial and royal majesty's

Good brother and cousin,

F R E D E R I C.





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## STATE PAPERS,


That relate to the Negotiation of Braunau, which, after that of Welsdorf, between the King and the Sieur von Thugut, was carried on at the Convent of Braunau, between the Sieur von Thugut and the two Prussian Ministers, Count Finckenstein and the Sieur von Hertzberg, but which only continued from the 13th to the 15th of August, when it was interrupted\*.

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\* These papers have already been printed at the end of a memorial which is explanatory of their purport, and is entitled, *Déclaration ultérieure de S. M. le Roi de Prusse aux Etats de l'Empire au mois d'Octobre 1778*; or, "The final Declaration of his Majesty the King of Prussia to the States of the Empire, in the month of October 1778." But, as this memorial is become scarce, it is supposed proper to reprint the papers here, because they throw so much light on the whole affair of the Bavarian succession.

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## STATE PAPERS.

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*No. I. Proposition of her Majesty the Empress Queen, which was remitted to the King by M. von Thugut, at the camp of Welsdorf, in Bohemia, the 11th of August 1778, and afterward to the Prussian Ministers of Braunau. As the Sieur von Thugut confessed himself that it had been declined by the King at Welsdorf, it was only produced, but was thrown aside, and he immediately made the Proposition which is contained under No. II.*

THE proposition No. I. is the same which has already been cited page 313; it is therefore omitted here, and only noticed as a part of the negotiation.

*No. II. Propositions of her Majesty the Empress Queen, which M. von Thugut remitted to the Ministers of the King, during the first Conference held at the Convent of Braunau, in Bohemia, August the 13th, 1778.*

I. The

I. The empress queen will restrict the advantages which ought to result to her from her claims over the Bavarian succession, and her convention made with the elector palatine, to the acquisition of a revenue of no more than one million of florins.

II. The elector palatine and the palatine house, in return, shall cede to the empress queen, and shall respectively exchange with her, that part of Bavaria and of the Upper Palatinate included within the limits which are here immediately indicated.

The line of demarcation shall begin beside Kuffstein, in the county of Tyrole; it shall follow the course of the Inn, as far as Wasserburg; from thence it shall be continued toward Landshut, to Lanckwat, afterward to Perbing, Donaustauf, Nittenau, Neuburg, and Retz, as far as Waldmünchen, along the high road which leads to Toms, in Bohemia.

This cession shall be made in the following manner. An exact estimate shall be obtained of the whole revenues of that extent of country. The estimate shall be made on the spot, *according to the original accounts of the general receipts, as they exist in the revenue accounts of Munich.* It shall be regulated and verified by a commission, composed of a commissioner on the part of the

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the

the empress queen, another on the part of the elector palatine, and a third appointed by the duke de Deuxponts.

The estimate being made, there shall be a *pre-levy* \* of a million of florins for the preciput, † which the empress queen shall reserve to herself; and her said majesty shall make an exact and faithful compensation, for any surplus contained in this cession, to the elector palatine of other possessions equal in revenue, and in such a manner as the three commissioners, above mentioned, shall freely and fully agree on, among themselves.

The empress queen shall, in particular, cede to the elector palatine whatever she possesses in the circle of Suabia, provided that the revenues of the new acquisition, which she shall make in Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate, after a deduction of her preciput of a revenue of a million of florins, be found equal in revenues to her aforesaid possessions in Suabia; the estimate of which shall in like manner be proved, by an examination of the original statement of the re-

\* A part deducted previous to the division of the remainder. T.

† The previous deduction from the whole; nearly synonymous to pre-levy. T.

ceipts. Should the revenues of the new acquisition in Bavaria prove to be inferior, the cessions which the empress queen shall make in Suabia shall be proportionate; and, if the revenues of the acquisitions in Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate should exceed the preciput of the empress queen, together with the revenues of the Austrian possessions in the circle of Suabia, her said majesty shall, in like manner, equitably and faithfully indemnify the elector palatine, either by other cessions, of an equal revenue, in the Netherlands, *or in taking upon herself a proportionate part of the debts of Bavaria*, or in any other manner, as shall be freely and fully agreed on, by the three commissioners before mentioned.

III. Her majesty the empress queen engages, in behalf of herself and her successors, to make no opposition to the reunion of the two margraviats of Bareuth and Anspach, to the elder branch of the electoral family of Brandenburg; and, should his majesty the king of Prussia find it convenient to make any exchange, between the countries of Bareuth and Anspach and the Upper and Lower Lusatia, the empress queen, will not only desist from impeding such an exchange, but, will afford it all the aid in her power; and particularly by renouncing all her claims

claims of feudality, of reversion, or others, on the Upper and Lower Lusatia.

IV. During the present negotiation, the satisfaction which is to be given to the elector of Saxony, on the part of the elector palatine, relative to his allodial claims, shall be treated on, by the intervention of the united good offices of her majesty the empress queen and his majesty the king of Prussia.

V. To facilitate the arrangement of the allodial claims of the elector of Saxony, the empress queen will renounce all her rights of feudality, and others which she possesses over some fiefs in Saxony.

VI. Her majesty the empress queen will give her vote, in conjunction with his majesty the king of Prussia, that the emperor and the empire may confer one of the small vacant fiefs on the duke of Mecklenburg.

*No. III. The Answer of the Prussian Ministers, to the Propositions which M. von Thugut brought to the King, on the Part of her Majesty the Empress Queen.*

THESE propositions consist in an alternative, the first part of which indicates that her majesty the empress queen will restore whatever she occupies in Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate,



and release the elector palatine from the engagements into which he entered with her, by the convention of the third of January, on condition *sine qua non* that it shall please his Prussian majesty to bind himself and his successors, in due form, not to reunite the two margraviats of Bareuth and Anspach to the elder branch of his family, so long as any secondary branch shall remain, according to the stipulations in the Pragmatic sanction of the house of Brandenburg, which, having been confirmed by the emperors and the empire, has obtained the force of a public law. This proposition is inadmissible, for the reasons which have already so often been alleged and explained in the conferences held at Berlin. The succession to the margraviats of Anspach and Bareuth incontestably appertain to the house of Brandenburg only. It alone appertains to that house to regulate the order of its succession; and that order has been regulated by the unanimous consent of all the members of the said house. The pretended Pragmatic sanction is nothing more than the will of the elector Albert I. which was made by that elector, and was confirmed, at his request, by the emperor Frederic III. It therefore was capable of being altered, and has been altered by his successors, with the unanimous consent of the members of the house of Brandenburg.

denbourg. The Imperial confirmation, which is only a customary formality, can have no force, except in favour of the parties interested, which are the princes of Brandenburg only, and by whom it has been renounced; it is incapable of being appealed to by any other state of the empire, not interested in that order of succession; and, for the same reason, no such state has any right to interfere in, or to dispose of, that succession. The same may be affirmed of the empire, the concurrence of which to the aforesaid confirmation of Frederic III. consists in the simply announcing that confirmation, and avowing that it had been made with the consent of the empire.

From all these considerations, his majesty the king of Prussia never can admit of any parity, or compensation, between the regulated order of the incontestable succession of his house, to the margraviats of Bareuth and Anspach, and the unfounded claims, made by the house of Austria, to the Bavarian succession, which appertains only to the Palatine house, as has been proved, in both cases, in the most evident manner. Equity will not admit the refusal of the aforesaid proposition to be attributed to any unjust desire of aggrandisement, which may be dangerous to neighbouring princes. The king

has given proofs that are sufficiently convincing of his disinterestedness, through the whole course of the preceding negotiation, by insisting only on the interest of his allies, without seeking any personal advantage. His majesty is, beside, too well persuaded of the great knowledge, and dignified sentiments, of her majesty the empress queen, to imagine that this august sovereign can either envy or previously contest a legitimate succession to the house of Brandenburg, which is itself uncertain and distant; or that she can attach to this the support of her dignity, her political respect, or the balance of power in Germany.

The observation with which the first proposition concludes would be good, and conformable to the justice and the intentions of the king, if the proposed arrangements could be reconciled to the incontestable claims of the house of Brandenburg. *This arrangement is also mentioned in such a manner that, if the thing could be called in question, it would still remain doubtful whether, under the name of the parties interested, the court of Vienna did not mean to resume her claims, and to render them effectual by some other mode, equally prejudicial.*

The second part of the alternative proposed by M. von Thugut contains a new arrangement,

ment, according to which the empress queen wishes to acquire those districts, of Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate, which are expressed in the second article of the aforesaid propositions. We have only to compare the line of demarcation, as described in that article, with the map of Bavaria, to see, at a glance, how immense and how dangerous such an acquisition would be to the whole empire; and how prejudicial the proposed arrangement would be to the Palatine house, and annihilate its political existence.

The court of Vienna would intersect Bavaria by a line extending from the county of Tyrole to Bohemia. She would thereby obtain, not only all the Lower Bavaria, over which she forms claims, but also a great part of Upper Bavaria, to which she had hitherto made no pretensions. She would acquire, though not the greatest part of Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate, at least the most fertile, rich, and populous; containing the rivers of the Danube, the Iser, the Inn, and the Saltza, with the rich salt works of Reichenhall; and she would leave the Palatine house only the worst part of these two duchies, which would consist of wood and sand, and which could not be supported without the aid of the other part, on which it must always be dependent; and this worst part must nevertheless

less remain encumbered with an immense burthen of debts.

That part of Bavaria the cession of which is demanded, and the principal worth of which consists in its contiguity and intrinsic qualities, never could be paid for by distant and scattered equivalents, the properties of which are in every respect inferior. In general, the whole method proposed for the acquisition of that part of Bavaria which is required, and especially for the surplus of the Austrian claims, by an estimate in revenues, and equivalent compensations, is as novel as it is prejudicial in its consequences.

First, the court of Vienna has no well founded claims on any part of Bavaria; had she any such, they would relate to some determinate district of the country, and not to a million of revenues. If, during the conferences of the preceding negotiation, any mention has been made of a certain revenue, the granting the court of Vienna a preciput was never thought of; but determinate territory has been always offered, and other equivalent determinate territories have in return been demanded; admitting, for the love of peace, equivalents inferior to the countries ceded, and thus supposing that the court of Vienna would gain, by this mode, the preciput of revenue which she keeps in view. To convince

vince ourselves of what dangerous consequence it would be to the Palatine house to make an estimate, in present revenues, of the countries to be ceded, we have only to remember that Bavaria has notoriously hitherto been the country worst governed of any all Germany contains; so that a district which, at present, yields no more than a million of revenue, would soon yield double, and triple, to the court of Vienna; and the Palatine house would thus lose that which the house of Austria would gain,

If likewise the estimate and the exchange in question were to be referred to a commission, that should be formed by the commissioners of the empress queen, the elector palatine, and the duke de Deuxponts, the Palatine house, and especially the house of the duke de Deuxponts, would be exposed to remote and uncertain accidents, the consequences of which will easily be perceived, without being here dwelt upon, and the king this way would lose the very end of his interference.

A like reference of the general arrangement of the Bavarian succession would not permit of any agreement, in the present negotiation, that could be satisfactory to the elector of Saxony, according to the proposition of M. von Thugut, in the fourth article; and, in general, the regulations

lations that he has proposed would entirely disable the Palatine house from contributing to the satisfaction of the house of Saxony.

If we wish to weigh with equity, and without prejudice, all the considerations which have been alleged in this abstract, it cannot be thought strange that his majesty is unable to agree to these propositions; and to an arrangement which would, after an enormous manner, dismember the important dutchy of Bavaria, which would almost be destructive to the Palatine house, and which would deprive it of the greatest and the most inestimable part of what is indubitably its patrimony; an arrangement to which, for these reasons, the duke de Deuxponts would never consent, as he has positively declared; which would take away all means of procuring the house of Saxony any reasonable satisfaction, for its allodial claims; an arrangement which would obtain the house of Austria an exorbitant aggrandisement, without any valid pretensions; which would overthrow the whole balance of power in Germany; and by its consequences affect the freedom and safety of all the empire, and its system, as it also would those of the king, and thus would be, in every respect, directly opposite to the dignity and most essential interests of his majesty, as well as to the engagements into  
which

which he has entered, and the end that he has proposed to obtain, by his interference in the affairs of Bavaria.

The king does justice to the sentiments of her majesty the empress queen, and is persuaded that her inclination for the preservation of peace is as pure and sincere as his own; but his majesty regrets that the propositions which have been made, in her name, do not correspond to so salutary a desire.

During the preceding negotiation, the king, for the love of peace, offered his endeavours to procure her majesty, the empress queen, by a general regulation of the Bavarian succession, a cession of two considerable districts of Bavaria, which are advantageously situated to render the countries of Bohemia and Austria uniform, in lieu of equivalents in other countries of inferior quality. In the present negotiation, his majesty has offered one of these districts in lieu of a very inconsiderable equivalent in money, and a cession of rights that are of no value, without requiring any equivalent of country; and he imagines he has given very evident proofs of his great moderation, and his sincere desire to yield to their Imperial majesties, and contribute to their satisfaction. But, as none of these propositions have been accepted, his majesty now cannot refrain from



from retracting; and he waits till a change of principles shall conduce to a more fortunate, and a more efficacious negotiation.

*No. IV. A Note remitted by the Baron Thugut to the Ministers of the King, on the 15th of August, 1778, after they had sent him the Answer of the King to the Propositions of the Empress Queen.*

BARON Thugut is very sincerely afflicted by the rupture with which the present negotiation, which scarcely has been begun, is threatened; and which apparently will retard the very desirable end of the misfortunes that have been occasioned, by the misunderstandings between the two courts. That his zeal may leave nothing unattempted, and that he may prove the upright intentions of the empress queen, he thinks proper to declare, according to the instructions given him by her Imperial majesty, that the principal end of her said majesty, in the limits which have been proposed for the cession and respective exchange in Bavaria; was not any purpose of aggrandisement, but rather that of communication, and a convenient rounding (or connection) between her different states; and which apparently might have been obtained, without

without prejudice to the Palatine house, by means of the exact and faithful compensation, which has been offered, of all which shall exceed a revenue of a million of florins; that consequently if, in order to effect the cession of the mutual exchange which relates to Bavaria, a plan of limits similar to that which is indicated on the annexed map\* shall be judged acceptable, he will pursue the negotiation with pleasure, on the supposition of the proposed estimate; and, if such an estimate, notwithstanding the ease and exactness which apparently must result from it, in what relates to compensation, should be absolutely judged inadmissible, he will write to Vienna to request new orders, that he may be authorised to propose such equivalents as shall accord with the principle which has hitherto been acknowledged by the court of Berlin; namely, that it is just that a reasonable advantage should accrue to her majesty, the empress queen, from her claims on the Bavarian

\* The new line of demarcation which was proposed by M. von Thugut, when he sent the above note, was traced from Kufstein, along the Inn, by Wasserburg, Muldorff, Marckt, Pfarrkirchen, Osterhoven, Deckendorff, Vichtach, and Wahlmunchen, as far as the frontiers of Bohemia. It was marked with red ink, like the first, on a map, by Homann, and a copy was taken.

succession,

succession, and the convention into which she had entered with the elector palatine.

Braunau, August the 15th, 1778.

*No. V. Answer of the Prussian Ministry, to the Note of the Baron von Thugut.*

THE king's ministers have examined, with the most ardent zeal for the re-establishment of a good intelligence between the two courts, the note which was sent them from the baron von Thugut, after having received the answer of his majesty to the new propositions of her majesty the empress queen. They regret that they cannot find any thing in the note which may lead to any change in the above answer. Although the extent of territory that is there demanded be less than that contained in the preceding propositions, still it includes a part of the Danube, the whole course of the rivers Inn and Saltza, the half of the district of Straubing, and the whole fertile and considerable district of Burghausen, with the salt works of Reichenhall, which are absolutely necessary to Bavaria, and of too much importance to find any equivalent whatever.

Any estimate of the territories of Bavaria, according to their present revenues, never can  
take

take place, without exorbitantly turning to the advantage of the house of Austria, and too heavily to the loss of the Palatine house, for the reasons that have already been alleged; which are, that the administration of these countries has hitherto been so defective; and that, under a better administration, they would, in a short time, produce a surplus too great to be able to estimate the value of the country itself, or to proportion it to the value of another country, the taxation of which has been extended as far as possible.

The supposed principle that her majesty the empress queen ought, in consequence of her claims on the Bavarian succession, and her convention with the elector palatine, to pre-levy a million of revenues for the exchange in question, is a supposition which has never been acknowledged by the court of Berlin, and which never can be admitted. Neither has any acknowledgment been made of the claims of the house of Austria on Bavaria. It has been shewn, in the preceding answer, that the advantage of her majesty, the empress queen, must be placed to the account of the intrinsic qualities of the countries which she shall obtain by the exchange; not including the benefit, which likewise is sufficiently great, that will result from contiguity and

and uniformity of frontier. Were the millions of florins to be pre-levied from the diminished portion of Bavaria, as demanded in the last note, and especially were it estimated according to its present revenues, the equivalent of the Palatine house would be so highly diminished that it would be reduced to something of small consequence. In fine, any reference to exchanges that are yet to make, and in general to the conclusive arrangement of the succession of Bavaria, without the concurrence of the king, is contrary to the end which his majesty proposed by his interference, and to that of a stable and well-founded accommodation, such as must be supposed agreeable to both courts.

When all these considerations are united, it will be found that the same impediments, which have rendered the preceding propositions of the court of Vienna inadmissible, are equally obstructive of the new plan, delivered by the baron von Thugut. Her majesty the empress queen would equally obtain, by that arrangement, not a mere line of communication between her states, which already sufficiently subsists independent of that acquisition, but rather a too considerable aggrandisement, given gratis, and destitute of claim. Nothing further therefore

can be done but to refer to the first answer, which was this morning presented to the baron von Thugut, and to wait for a change of principles, which shall lead to more favourable circumstances, in behalf of a future negotiation.

Braunau, August the 15th, 1778.



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CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

PRESENT STATE


OF THE

BODY-POLITIC IN EUROPE.

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# CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

PRESENT STATE

OF THE

BODY-POLITIC IN EUROPE\*.

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**N**EVER did the public affairs of Europe merit greater attention than they do at present. At the conclusion of obstinate wars the state of empires is changed, and their poli-

\* Frederic II. composed this essay when prince royal, in the year 1736; and it remains a proof of the vast knowledge he had then acquired. There still exists a correspondence between him and the marshal, and minister of state, von Grumbkow, continued from the year 1732 to the death of the general, in 1739, on the transactions of the times, in which the minister imparted whatever was done by government to the prince, and his royal highness replied by the most subtle and just reflections.

tical views are changed at the same time. New projects take birth, new alliances are treated of, and each individually takes such measures as are supposed the most proper, for the execution of ambitious designs.

Like as it is worthy the curiosity of the reasonable man to penetrate the secret recesses of the heart, to search its windings, and to discover effects in their causes, so is it necessary that a prince, if he be in any degree desirous of acquiring fame in Europe, should watch the conduct of courts, should inform himself of the true interests of kingdoms, and take precautions to wrest, as it were, from the policy of ministers and of courts, those plans they in their prudence are preparing, and which they, by dissimulation, conceal from the public inspection.

As an able mechanic is not satisfied with looking at the outside of a watch, but opens it, and examines its springs and wheels, so an able politician applies himself to understand the permanent principles of courts, the engines of the politics of each prince, and the sources of future events. He leaves nothing to chance; his transcendent mind foresees the future, and from the chain of causes penetrates even to the most distant ages. In a word, it is the part of prudence

dence to know all things, in order that all things may be judged, and every precaution taken.

Considering the lethargy in which several of the princes of Europe exist, I have imagined it would not be unseasonable to draw a sketch of the present state of the Body-politic. Not that I have the presumption to suppose I am more enlightened than numerous ministers, whose vast knowledge and long experience, in political affairs, will always appear respectable in my eyes, and infinitely superior to the little I have acquired. I mean no more than to communicate my opinion to the public.

Should my reasoning be found to be just it may then be of advantage, and this is all I ask. If on the contrary it should be incongruous and false, it need only be rejected; I shall at least have afforded myself some amusement.

To obtain a just idea of what is at present passing in Europe, it is necessary to go back, and begin at the fountain-head.

At the close of the campaign of the year 1735, the negotiations between the courts of Vienna and Versailles date their commencement. The operations of war were suspended, and the interests of the two courts, instead of being decided by the sword, were accommodated by the pen. Neither Spain nor the king of Sardinia at first

acceded to that negotiation, and it is to be remarked that Spain did not subscribe to it, till after the fall of the *seur Chauvelin*.

The war was much less hot on the Rhine than in Italy. The emperor may be said to have extorted the declaration of war made by the states of the empire, in the year 1733, at *Ratibon*. The election of Poland, being disturbed by troops encamped on the confines of *Silesia* and ready to enter this kingdom, had occasioned a division among the bishops and palatines, the greatest number of whom took part with *Stanislaus*. The provinces of Germany were in no manner interested in these disorders. The emperor had rashly enough entered into an obligation, by a secret treaty with Russia and Saxony, to place the elector, *Augustus III.\** on the throne of Poland. The Imperial ministers, not perhaps foreseeing the consequences of the step he had taken, and, contrary to the advice of prince Eugene, relying on the pacific character of the cardinal de Fleuri, had too inconsiderately engaged their master in an affair of so much consequence. The emperor had singly,

\* The French text reads *Augustus II.* which, as his title of elector and not that of king of Poland immediately precedes his name, is certainly erroneous. See Advertisement, by the Translator, to the History of my own Times. T.

in conjunction with Russia, and without the participation of the empire, interfered in the troubles of Poland; he ought therefore singly to have extricated himself.

France who, on the other side, had with all possible prudence laboured, after the death of the duke regent, to establish the disorder of her affairs, had been so far successful that the finances were in an excellent state, the store-houses were provided with all necessaries, and the troops were in the very condition that might have been desired. The situation of the kingdom was so fortunate, in consequence of these advantages, that it was able to profit by any new occurrence.

The death of Augustus II. furnished a specious pretext to interfere in the affairs of Poland; and, if not to execute, to display those vast projects which had been conceived, ripened, and digested by policy. France neglected nothing; she aided opportunity; she put herself in a state to act with success; she entered into an alliance both with Spain and Sardinia. By her secret practices she disposed some princes of Germany toward a kind of neutrality. She lulled the maritime powers; after which she published a manifesto of her conduct, and attacked the emperor, who was in some sort the aggressor, considering

sidering the troubles that he had fomented in Poland, and which his armies were ready to support, if he had not been himself assaulted.

The emperor perceiving himself on the eve of danger, from all sides, set every engine in motion, that he might induce the empire to participate his fortune. All the most able negotiators were employed, by the ministry of Vienna, to invite the empire to declare war against France. The intention of the emperor was, first, to draw succour from the empire, and next, to have divided the forces of France. He had already been attacked by the French in Italy, where he could not but have been overwhelmed. It will not be amiss just to remark that, had not the empire taken any part in the war, it would have been sooner ended. The emperor would have lost whatever the allies had conquered in Italy, but Lorrain could not have been dismembered from the empire, without giving birth to other broils, and exciting conflagration anew.

The war was carried on with great languor in Germany, on the one part because the policy of the court of Versailles would not give umbrage to the maritime powers, which would undoubtedly have declared in favour of the emperor, if his affairs had become desperate, and  
on

on the other from a complication of different causes, the particulars of which each campaign furnished, and which disabled the emperor from acting with vigour on the Rhine.

In Italy, the Spaniards had seized on the kingdom of Naples, and on Sicily; and the French, aided by the Piedmontese troops, had over-run the Milanese, and almost the whole of Lombardy; and, as it was a clause in the treaty between the three allied crowns to divide the spoils of the emperor in Italy, these powers were each, with all imaginable activity, endeavouring to put their vast designs in execution. Yet I dare affirm that it was the ill state in which the provinces of the emperor at that time were, which most contributed to the good fortune of the allies. The reason of the fall of the greatest empires has ever been the same. It is ever to be found in the constitutional debility of such empires. The date of the decline of the Roman empire was at the time when there was no longer any order among the troops, when discipline was abolished, and when the precautions which prudence dictates for the safety of kingdoms were neglected. The losses which the emperor had lately suffered in Italy originated in the same principles. There was no army to stop the progress of the enemy; there were no magazines;



zines; no troops, sufficient to maintain the fortresses; no able commanders for the defence of places; in fine the emperor had lost, in three campaigns, what he had only acquired by eight successive years of war.

It might have been supposed that, after so many defeats, the emperor would have been the first to have solicited for peace; but let not the world deceive itself; let it learn better to understand the pacific and disinterested spirit of the cardinal minister; and let this be spoken to the honour of France, and as a testimony of her moderation; the victors, loaded with laurels, and apparently fatigued by conquest, made offers of peace to their vanquished foe, the emperor.

It is to be presumed that marshal Villars communicated his system to the cardinal, according to the plan inserted in his memoirs; and that the cardinal, having adopted the opinions of this great man, assumed them as principles on which to establish a perfect and permanent union, between the emperor and France; in imitation of the triumvirate formed by Augustus, Anthony, and Lepidus. The whole world knows this triumvirate was strengthened by proscriptions; thus the first article of the preliminaries of peace bestowed the possession of the dutchy of Lorrain,

Lorrain, which was dismembered from the empire, on France.

The emperor, that he might obtain peace, stripped his son-in-law of his hereditary states. The sacrifice seemed sufficiently great to excite, by a species of reciprocity, proportionate gratitude; but, to continue the comparison, it is to be presumed that France will in time play the part of Augustus,

To consider this event simply in itself, and unaccompanied by some reflections which the subject will supply, would be of little use. And first, with respect to the French, we perceive a uniform well-connected system of politics, which never varies. When they concluded the peace of Utrecht, their purpose only was to recommence the war; though not immediately, because they had lost their fame, their finances were exhausted, and they had not yet brought affairs to that degree of maturity which they wished; but it was not the less their intention to watch the moment at which they might attack the emperor, with advantage.

At this time, there was a general prejudice which was infinitely injurious to the designs of France. This hurtful prejudice was founded on an old error, which by being perpetuated acquired increasing force. It was rumoured  
that

that France aspired to universal monarchy; by which assertion however France was greatly wronged, That single opinion had impeded all the magnificent projects of Louis XIV. and did not a little contribute to lower his power. It was absolutely necessary to destroy a prejudice so pernicious, and to efface its very remembrance.

That fortune which presides over the happiness of the French, or, to speak in the style of the priesthood, that guardian angel who watches for their aggrandisement, contributed to destroy an opinion so prejudicial to the interests of France.

Louis XIV. whose ambition had so often made Europe tremble, after having felt a reverse of fortune toward the close of his reign, ended his glorious career. The empire was committed to guardianship, and the government was sensible of the feebleness of its monarch, and of all the misfortunes inseparably annexed to a minority. The duke regent, an enlightened prince, who was in possession of all the qualities which are the delight of society, and make the fortune of private persons, had not enough of that fortitude which is absolutely requisite to those to whom the government of empires is confided. He embroiled the domestic affairs of the nation,

by those famous stock-jobbing schemes which ruined almost the kingdom and the people, individually, whose money found its way into the royal treasury, and into the hands of some of the clerks of law.

The duke de Bourbon became regent after the death of the duke d'Orleans; but this was only a temporary regency. Cardinal de Fleuri soon was his substitute; who, taking the helm, not only repaired the state of the finances, and the internal losses of the nation, but by his abilities, the ductility of his mind, and his apparent moderation, acquired the reputation of being a just and pacific minister. In order to understand the profundity and wisdom of his conduct, it is necessary to remark that nothing more effectually attracts the confidence of men than a generous and disinterested character. This character the cardinal so well supported that Europe, or rather the whole world, was persuaded it was justly his due.

Nations that were in the vicinity of so good a neighbour were lulled in peace; and those ministers who had acquired the most fame for their political abilities had made it one of their invariable principles that, while the cardinal should live, in consequence of his great age and his pacific character, no ambitious enterprises were

were to be feared, on the part of France. This was the chef d'œuvre of the cardinal; and in this perhaps his politics were preferable to those of Richelieu, and Mazarin. When all his projects were ripe for execution, the able minister suddenly displayed his intentions. The manifesto of the most Christian king continued to support the deep impressions which the character of the cardinal, for its justice, had made. It contained in substance—That it was neither from interested nor ambitious views that the king took up arms; that his majesty was satisfied with possessing 'a flourishing kingdom, and reigning over a faithful people, and that it was not his intention to extend the boundaries of his dominions.

Consequences have since demonstrated that the love of peace, alone, obliged his majesty to accept of Lorraine, and to disencumber Germany of a province which, in reality, had appertained to it from time immemorial, but by which it was burthened because of its inconvenient and insulated situation. Beside, to establish peace on a solid basis, it was necessary that Lorraine should be ceded to France; for it might otherwise have furnished frequent subjects of dispute; and it was still farther necessary to indemnify France, for the expences incurred by the war. These circumstances, well considered, evidently shew

shew that the most Christian king entirely fulfilled the positive engagements into which he entered, by the publication of his manifesto.

If we are attentive to the conduct of Spain, we shall perceive that the treaty of Vienna \* (or otherwise the treaty of Succession) was not a stable act; and that the king of Spain, by re-

\* Corps Diplom. par Dumont. Tome VIII. 1731. Part II. page 107.

Article V. In virtue of the renunciation made by his Imperial majesty, in the two preceding articles, the Catholic king, in return, cedes in his own name, and in that of his heirs and descendants, male and female, all claims, general and particular, without any exception whatever, over and to the kingdoms, provinces, and dominions which his Imperial majesty has effectually possessed in Italy, or in Flanders, and which formerly appertained to the Spanish monarchy; among which is the marquisate of Final, ceded to the republic of Genoa by his Imperial majesty in 1713, and at present duly occupied: on the subject of which solemn acts of renunciation have been made out in all form; which care will be taken to publish, and the act will be passed in proper places, which shall be remitted to his Imperial majesty, and to the parties that are interested. His Catholic majesty in like manner renounces that right of reversion, to the crown of Spain, which he had reserved over the kingdom of Sicily; and to all other contracts and pretensions, under pretext of which his Imperial majesty might be disturbed, or his heirs or successors, directly or indirectly; not only in the aforesaid kingdoms or provinces, but likewise in all other dominions, which he at present possesses in Flanders, Italy, or elsewhere.

nouncing the succession of the provinces, situated in Italy, only renounced them till he should acquire strength for their recovery.

I affirm nothing which I am not able to prove. The famous treaty of Seville\*, between Spain and England, sufficiently discovers the intentions

\* Extract from the Treaty of Seville, concluded between the most Christian king and their Britannic and Catholic majesties, Nov. 9, 1729.

This treaty, which the English call the fountain of their tears, and which consists of twelve articles, with two secret articles—

1. Confirms the preceding treaties, and contains an amnesty for both parties.
2. Regulates the contingencies of the reciprocal succour, in men, ships, and money.
3. Infringes the treaty of Vienna, concluded in 1725, between the emperor and Spain.
4. Preserves the trade of France and England, as well in Europe as in the Indies, on its former footing.
5. Promises reparation for damages, sustained by the contracting parties.
6. Ordains a commission, and the nomination of commissaries, to examine the losses and damages which the parties had suffered.
7. Speaks of the commissaries of France, that were to make similar researches.
8. Prescribes the duration of that commission; that is, confines it to three years.

The article to be noted as the most remarkable, is in the following terms:

“ The

intentions of Spain, and evidently proves that all the conquests from Italy are but the consequence of those invariable principles which that

“ The introducing of garrisons into the places of Leghorn, Porto Ferraio, Parma, and Placenza, to the number of six thousand men of his Catholic majesty’s troops and in his pay, shall be effectuated without loss of time; which troops shall serve for the better securing and preserving of the immediate succession of the said states, in favour of the most serene infante don Carlos, and to be ready to withstand any enterprize and opposition which might be formed, to the prejudice of what has been regulated, touching the said succession.”

10. The conduct which the said troops are to observe in these fortresses is prescribed.

11. Makes the king of Spain promise to withdraw his troops as soon as all things shall be reduced to order and tranquillity.

12. Contains the guarantee of the said states to the infante don Carlos, with which the English have been so much reproached.

13. Refers to the private agreement which was to be made between the contracting parties, relative to the maintenance of the said garrisons.

14. Invites their High Mightinesses, the States General, to accede to the treaty.

The two secret articles explaining the advantages of the trade of the English in the West Indies, and particularly the famous Asiento treaty. Signed

W. Stanhope, Brancas. Marq. de la Paz.  
at present Lord Harrington. Don Joseph Patinho.

B. Keene.



crown regards as the basis of its politics. Let it not be supposed that the treaty of Seville is here wrested, to serve a purpose : a few considerations will clearly shew, as through a transparent veil, the intentions of Spain.

The policy of invasion assumes it as a principle that the first step toward the conquest of a country is to obtain footing in it ; and this is the greatest difficulty. What follows is decided by the fate of war, and the laws of force.

Under what pretence could Spain have introduced troops into Italy, had not an opportunity been afforded by the treaty of Seville ? How might she, without troops, have thought on the conquest of the Milanese, the province of Mantua, and the kingdom of Naples and of Sicily ? It was therefore requisite to obtain this footing in the country, to have troops there, and to augment them as occasion should serve. Places were in like manner necessary to form magazines ; which necessity the treaty of Seville supposes to be indispensable. Spain therefore deeply reflected on its own interests, when making this treaty, and it may be perceived her designs were not so bounded as they may perhaps have been imagined. For this reason, when speaking of the conduct of Spain, it would not  
have

have been right for me to pass over the treaty of Seville in silence.

At present, I have to develop the conduct of the Imperial court. It cannot but be remarked that this court placed great confidence in its own strength, relative to the affairs of Poland; though she indeed wished to assume the semblance of not interfering\*. In like manner, the insupportable haughtiness with which she affected to treat, not only her inferiors, but, her equals must have been remarked. It must easily have been discovered that the end of her policy was the establishment of despotism, and the sovereignty of the house of Austria throughout the empire; a thing not very easy in itself, considering the power of several of the electors, who will not readily be subjected. Imbued however with superstitious prejudices, and encouraged by rash pride, the house of Austria

\* It is notorious that the ministers of the emperor continually acted in concert with those of Russia; that he kept a body of seventeen thousand men encamped on the frontiers of Poland; that he had corrupted prince Lubomirsky, who is called the booted prince, and who was the author of the scission of those who passed from Warsaw to a village named Prague; and it was at the instigation of the emperor that the Russian troops entered Poland.

has always endeavoured to accustom the sovereign princes of Germany to support its yoke. The ministry labour according to this plan, which is transmitted to the successors of the empire; who, as ignorant as they are superstitious, vainly flatter their hopes by ambitious chimeras, the injustice of which ought to render them detested.

We have no need to go back to the times of the emperors Ferdinand I. and Ferdinand II. to discover testimonies of the immeasurable ambition of that court. Four events, which have happened in the present age, afford an excellent commentary on this subject.

First, it is to be remarked that the emperor, unknown to the empire, entered into an alliance with the empress of Russia, to place Augustus III. on the throne of Poland. It was therefore just that the war to which that alliance gave place should be terminated by the emperor, and not by the empire, which in no manner participated in the proceedings of the emperor. It has nevertheless been seen that the court of Vienna, by its intrigues, found means to make the empire take a part in the war, which directly concerned none but the emperor and Russia; by which proceeding the emperor manifestly infringed

infringed the fourth article of his capitulation.\*

The emperor has, in the second place, violated the sixth article of his capitulation†, by having called foreign aid into Germany, contrary to the

\* Art. IV. pag. 32. Conformable to our duty, it is our will, in all deliberations which concern the affairs of the empire, especially those which are described in the *Instrumentum Pacis*, that the electors and princes enjoy the right of suffrage, and that no act may be undertaken or concluded without their free consent, it is our duty and wish, during our reign, to live in peace with the neighbouring Christian powers, and not to give them occasion of dispute with the empire. We will avoid involving the empire in foreign wars; we will wholly abstain from all aid, the result of which might be disadvantageous to the empire; from all disputes and wars, both within and without the empire, under every pretext whatever, unless such should be begun with the consent of the electors, princes, and states, given in general diet, or with the acquiescence of the electors.

† Art. VI. pag. 41. And, in quality of emperor, elected king of the Romans, in whatever relates to the affairs of the empire, previous to our having obtained the consent of the electors, princes, or states, in full diet, as the interest of the state sometimes requires celerity and haste, it shall be our duty and our will to obtain such consent, at a time to be specified, and in the collegial assembly, and not by individual declarations, till a general diet can be assembled, according as is the practice in other affairs which relate to the safety of the empire. Should we happen to make any alliance that shall relate to our own provinces, such alliance shall not be of any prejudice to the empire; nor shall it be in contradiction to the contents of the *Instrumentum Pacis*,

fundamental laws of the empire; the empress of Russia having sent a body of ten thousand men on the Rhine.

We shall, in the third place, perceive that the treaty begun with France, and the preliminaries of which were signed, without the confirmation of the empire, is an infraction of and prejudicial to the sixth article of the Imperial capitulation\*.

The emperor has, in the fourth place, transgressed against the tenth article of his capitulation†, for he alienated the dutchy of Lorrain, which being a fief of the empire could not, according to the fundamental constitutions of the empire, be separated, or cut off, from the Germanic body, without the formal consent of the diet and the states.

\* See the conclusion of the preceding note.

† Art. X. pag. 59. It shall farther be our duty and our will, neither to bestow, barter, alienate, nor molest by taxes, any lands that appertain to the empire, without the will and consent of the electors, princes, and states. It shall be our duty and our will to desist from whatever might give occasion to an exemption, or retrenchment, of any part or parts of the empire; particularly, we will abstain from all exorbitant privileges, or immunities; and on the contrary carefully apply ourselves again to acquire, and afterward to preserve, the principalities pledged, or alienated; and the lands which are either confiscated, or illegally fallen under foreign subjection.

The

The emperor may farther be reproached with having declared war against the Turks, and with having demanded subsidies from the empire, for the support of that war. But this would lead me to be too circumstantial, and I have reflections of greater importance to make.

We have thus far judged of causes by their effects; it remains for us to judge of effects, such as are to be expected, from the causes which may be foreseen.

It will not be necessary to measure the depths of political secrecy, and with profane eyes to penetrate the sanctuaries of ministers; but it will be requisite to observe the different paths those ministers pursue, to arrive at the goal. Nothing can better teach us the characters of courts than remarks, made on the various modes with which their policy acts on the same subjects; their passions, their subtleties, their arts, their vices, and their good qualities will thus be all discovered.

Properly to judge of the ministers of the emperor and of France, let us compare their conduct, and observe the different routes each have taken, in what relates to the affairs of Poland; we there shall perceive the tokens of manners (or system) which will not be of small utility, to those great men who know how to employ them effectually.

According

According to the alliance which he had concluded with Russia, the emperor was to place the crown of Poland on the head of Augustus, elector of Saxony, nor could he imagine any better means to accomplish his purpose than those which force affords. He kept his armies on the confines of Poland, while the Russian troops invaded the territories of the republic, and approached within a small distance of Warsaw. Thus violence was supposed, at Vienna, to be the only means by which Augustus might be seated on the throne of the Sarmatians.

The French ministry, more humane and more artful, thought differently, and employed only the seductive power of gold to raise Stanislaus to the sovereignty. The emperor's ambassador at Warsaw vented threats; the ambassador of France employed only flattery and caresses. The one endeavoured to intimidate the mind; the other attempted to win the heart. Like an enraged lion, the one fell upon his prey; the other, Siren like, charmed all who approached by the sweetness of his voice. In fine, France by artifice and intrigue subdued the affections; while the cowards all were terrified by the Imperialists. But as, in Poland, the number of the timid is infinitely greater than that of those  
who

who are superior to fear, it is not astonishing that Stanislaus was not supported on the throne.

Let us not however stand too much in dread of those who only execute their projects by such means as haughtiness, and the spirit of pride dictate. They injure their own cause by rendering themselves odious. Their violence is an antidote that expels the poison which their ambitious purposes labour to infuse. Rather let us beware of those who, by their secret practices, their winning manners, and their affected gentleness, endeavour to enslave us. They do but cast a hook the barb of which is concealed by the seductive bait, and which by captivating deceives, whenever our prudence suffers itself to be caught.

As it is certain there are reasons for the existence of all things, and that the cause of events is discovered in other events by which they were preceded, it therefore follows that each political fact is but the consequence of a former political fact, and by which it may be said its birth was prepared. According to this system, let us endeavour to foretel, from recent events, and the vast projects of the courts of Vienna and Versailles, what shall be the consequences of the strict union of the most powerful monarchs of Europe.

It



It is evident that the views of the Imperial court tend to render the empire hereditary, and to entail it on the house of Austria. For this purpose she founded the Pragmatic sanction, solicited all the princes of Germany, inserted an article in the pacification, and has concluded an infinity of particular treaties. So true it is that the house of Austria wishes, in time, to deprive the empire of the right of election, to confirm its descendants in arbitrary power, and to change the democratical government of Germany, which has been such from time immemorial, into a monarchy. The system of the Imperial ministry being thus simple, it is not difficult to exhibit it in its true colours. But that of the court of Versailles is more intricate, and will require to be considered more at length, more circumstantially.

It is an unshaken principle among kings to aggrandise themselves as much as their power will permit; and, though such aggrandisement must be subject to different modifications, and infinitely varied according to the situation of provinces, the power of neighbouring states, or fortunate opportunities, the principle is not the less unchangeable, and is never abandoned by monarchs. Their pretended fame is a part  
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of this system. In a word, it is necessary they should increase in greatness.

France is bounded\* on the west by the Pyrenees, which separate it from Spain, and which form a kind of barrier, raised by the hand of nature. She is limited by the ocean on the north; and by the Alps and the Mediterranean on the south; but toward the east she has no other boundaries but those which moderation and justice may prescribe. Alsatia and Lorrain, dismembered from the empire, have extended her domain as far as the Rhine. It were to be wished that the French monarchy might never extend beyond this river; to attain the shores of which she has only the small dutchy of Luxemburg to invade, the little electorate of Treves to acquire by some treaty, the dutchy of Liege, by right of convenience, with the barrier towns, Flanders, and some few similar trifles which must necessarily be included in such a re-union; nor is there any thing wanting to this purpose except the administration of a mild and moderate man, who, if I may be allowed the expression, modelling his character after the practices of his court, and throwing the whole blame of his arts

\* The youth of the author must atone for the unaccuracy of his geography. T.

and insidious subtleties on subaltern ministers, shall, sheltered under a respectable appearance, bring his purposes to a happy issue.

France does not act with precipitation. Constantly attached to her plan, she waits its completion from circumstances. It may be said that conquest must come unbidden, and present itself to her. Whatever is studied in her project she conceals; and were we to judge by appearances we should imagine that fortune has taken this nation under her particular protection. Let us not deceive ourselves; fortune and chance are words without signification; the actual good fortune of France is her penetration, the foresight of her ministers, and the excellence of her measures.

Let us remark with what assiduity the cardinal undertakes to mediate between the emperor and the Turk. The emperor, in return for the service rendered him, cannot do less than cede his claims over the province of Luxemburg to Louis XV. According to all appearances, this dutchy must be one of the first acquisitions which shall follow the cession of Lorrain; for, as France has been respectful in all things that related to the arrangements the emperor thought proper to make, justice will seem to require a similar respect, on the part of the emperor, for the arrangements

rangements of France. This is no more than the traffic of gratitude, which the politics of these sovereigns render subservient to their grandeur.

With respect to other countries which France may conquer, it will be a prudent part not to be in too much haste, that she may the better confirm herself in former conquests, and not alarm her neighbours. The din of too much success might awaken the maritime powers, that are at present slumbering in the arms of security, and the bosom of indolence.

I can perceive projects more grand, more comprehensive, than those of which I have spoken, which may constitute a farther part of the system of France; and the moment which Providence has indicated for the execution of those vast designs seems to be that of the decease of his Imperial majesty. What time can be more proper to give law to Europe? What circumstances more favourable under which every thing may be risked?

The electors are all at present disunited by their divided interests; some seeking for personal advantages will throw themselves into the arms of France, and sacrifice the general good; others will dispute among themselves for the empire; a third party will ruin themselves to

obtain the succession of his provinces, and others again, inflated by hopes to which grand alliances will give birth, will spread the flames of war, incite troubles and confusion, while those who might oppose the chief force of the common enemy will venture nothing, but will abandon their destiny to chance.

By the last treaty of peace, France has pledged herself to the guarantee of the Pragmatic sanction. She is thus indispensably obliged to interfere in the affairs of Germany, after the death of the emperor, and the proceedings of France will, on that occasion, be rendered much more dangerous than on any other, because they will assume the plausible appearance of justice, and even the violence she shall commit will wear the garb of equity.

Let us farther remark how carefully France keeps the maritime powers from participating in the guarantee. Can this be supposed to be done without a meaning? Can it be imagined that some frivolous caprice of pride was the cause of such a proceeding? Or is it possible to persuade ourselves that a minister, who hitherto has afforded marks of consummate prudence, in the most trifling affairs, has views so bounded? Let us do justice to the policy of the French; it is never so limited as it may be supposed.

It

It is possible the French were glad not to disturb the English ministry, who found sufficient employment in the intestine quarrels of the kingdom. They were equally well pleased that the maritime powers should have no part in the secret treaties of the two contracting courts, in order that, should the Austrian succession hereafter excite disputes, these powers may have no pretence whatever to interfere in the troubles of Germany.

Precautions are carried still farther; subsidies are paid to the courts of Sweden and Denmark; either to keep them inactive, or to put them in a condition of opposing such as should desire to take measures inimical to the designs, and regulations, of the court of France.

Excellent as the policy of this court is, it must be confessed that it is equally favoured by the concurrence of certain circumstances. All those princes whose power and grandeur might give umbrage are in a state of disunion. France has only to blow up, and not to suffer the embers of discord to be extinguished. She has at present still infinitely greater advantage, for she meets with no opponent whose depth of mind, boldness, and abilities, can be dangerous to her. For this reason she will acquire less glory than

is assigned to the names of Henry IV. and Louis XIV.

What would Richelieu, what would Mazarin say, were they at present to rise from the dead? They would be highly astonished no longer to find a Philip III. and IV. in Spain; no Cromwel, no William of Nassau in England; no prince of Orange in Holland; no emperor Ferdinand in Germany; and very few true Germans in the holy Roman empire; no Innocent II. at Rome; no Tilly, no Montecuculi, no Marlborough, no Eugene, at the head of the armies of the enemy; in fine, to see so general a debility among all those to whom the destiny of man is confided, in peace and war: nor would they wonder were any one to vanquish, and deceive, the successors of these great men.

The French were formerly obliged to combat all Europe, leagued and conspiring against them, and to their valour alone were they indebted for their conquests. At present they owe their greatest success to negotiation, and must attribute the triumphant career of their prosperity less to their own strength than to the weakness of their foes. There is no better way of obtaining a just and exact idea, of such events as happen among men, than that of judging by comparison;

parison; of selecting examples from history; of drawing a parallel between them and facts of the present day, so as to remark their connection and similarity. Nothing is more worthy of human reason, more instructive, or more capable of increasing our knowledge.

The mind of man is the same in all countries and in all ages. They have nearly the same passions; their inclinations scarcely differ in any thing. They are sometimes more or less furious, according as the wretched demon of ambition and injustice infuses into them his infectious and contagious breath. Certain epochs stand distinguished because, during them, the passions of men have been more agitated, and often rewarded. Such is that of the conquests of Cyrus at the head of the Persians; the battles of Salamis and Plataea among the Greeks; the reigns of Philip and of Alexander the Great over the Macedonians; the civil wars of Sylla; the triumvirate; the reigns of Augustus and of the first Cæsars, among the Romans.

In a word, the love of the arts and the rage of war have passed from country to country, and have always produced the same effects, wherever they have taken up their abode. The reason of this is evident. The mind of man, and the passions by which he is governed, are ever



the same. Hence necessarily the same effects must be produced. All I have said of arts and of war is still more true with respect to the politics of great monarchs, which have continually been the same. It has been their constant fundamental principle to invade, in order to aggrandise; and their wisdom has ever consisted in anticipating the arts of their enemies, and in contending who among themselves shall be the most subtle.

Let us at present examine the proceedings of Philip of Macedon, toward the Greeks; and try whether we cannot discover, in them, some traits of French politics. Let us afterward take a retrospect of some of the events of the Roman history; and the reader will then be able to say whether he cannot perceive, I will not say a resemblance, but a perfect conformity, between the transactions that have lately happened in Europe and those at which we have glanced. The republic of the Greeks was only supported by the strict union in which the various little republics were connected. The cities of Lacedemon and Athens were however distinguished above all the others. It was they who gave life to the deliberations, and the great things which were put in execution; and on them the little republics were no more than dependent. Had Philip at-  
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tacked the entire league, he would have met with formidable enemies, by whom he would not only have been resisted but who might have rendered even his own states the theatre of war. How did the politics of this prince act to vanquish the whole republic? He sowed disunion and jealousy among the inferior allied cities; he strengthened discord, corrupted their orators, took part with the feeble that he might support them against the strong, and, having humbled the latter, the former were soon at his mercy,

How do the politics of France proceed, to obtain universal monarchy? Do we not see with what art she scatters division among the princes of the empire; with what address she gains the friendship of the monarchs of whom she stands most in need; and with what subtle cunning she supports the interests of petty princes against the more puissant? Who can but admire the manner in which she has acted to sap the force of the maritime powers; the seasonable art with which she intimidates them; and with what complaisant cunning she amuses them about trifles, while she herself is striking great strokes? Let us also, at the same time, observe how most of the princes of Europe, equally insensible with the Greeks, plunged in lethargic security, neg-

left to reunite and join their neighbours, to prevent certain misfortune, and infallible ruin.

Let us again take a momentary view of the artful manner in which the French attract the attention of the northern powers by subsidies, thus as it were to leave those who have not obtained any to their own peril, and then judge whether such politics do not assimilate with and form a part of the system of Philip of Macedon. Permit me to carry the comparison still further; we shall perceive that the history of Philip will furnish more than one event conformable to those of the present times, and worthy of the politics of Versailles.

The king of Macedon had previously gained the Thebans, Olynthians, and Messenians. He afterward induced the Athenians, who were enfeebled, and little capable of resisting him, to cede the cities of Amphipolis and Potidea, which served him as barriers. Being in possession of Phocis and the straits of Thermopylæ, he held as it were the key of Greece, and it was easy for him to attack whenever he should find attack convenient to his interests.

The history of France supplies an example which it is impossible to read, without recollecting the trait of ancient history which I have just cited. I scarcely need say I allude to the acquisition

acquisition of Alsatia and Strasburg. Those places, cut off from Germany, were formerly the straits of Thermopylæ, or a kind of bulwark, and Lorraine, which has so lately been invaded, in situation corresponds to the country of Phocis.

A manner of invading which so much resembles that of king Philip, to me seems with sufficient evidence to discover a perfect conformity of plan. Philip did not fix his boundaries at the straits of Thermopylæ, he soon passed beyond them. I recollect what a sage said, on such an occasion, to a king of Epirus, at seeing the immense preparations which were made for war. "Wherefore," he asked the prince, "are you collecting all these arms, and this baggage?" "For the conquest of Italy," replied Pyrrhus.—"And, having conquered Italy, where are we to go next?"—"My good Cyneas, we will then make ourselves masters of Sicily; after which nothing but a fair wind will be wanting and Carthage shall be ours; we will next cross the Libyan deserts, Arabia and Egypt will be unable to resist us, and Persia and Greece shall in like manner be subjected." The project of this prince was no less than that of establishing his dominion over the whole earth. His language was the language of ambition, and am-

bition continually acts and thinks alike.—I shall add nothing more.

With respect to the Greeks, they considered the progress of Philip in a superficial manner, and very foolishly imagined that the death of the king would rid them of a dangerous enemy, from whom they had every thing to fear. This is precisely the language which is at present held in Europe. Men flatter themselves that the death of an able French politician will put an end to French policy, and that the minister who shall succeed him will neither have the same views nor the same plans: in fine they amuse themselves with trifling hopes, which usually are the consolation of feeble minds, and men of inferior genius.

Permit me here to cite the manner in which Demosthenes reproached the Athenians, in his first Philippic.—“ Philip is dead, says one. No, answers another, but he is sick. And what is it to you whether he live or whether he die? Though he should be no more, Athenians, you would soon raise up another Philip, if you do not change your conduct; for Philip is become what he is, not so much from his own force as, from your negligence.”

I have

I have still some reflections to make, on points in which the conduct of the Romans was perfectly correspondent to that of our modern Romans; I mean the French. Let us consider the extreme attention with which the Romans interfered, in the affairs of the whole earth; they even affected to decide on all the disputes of princes; Rome was the tribunal of the world; and monarchs acknowledged, I know not how, the sovereignty of that tribunal; they laid their causes before the Roman people, who of all people were the most powerful and the most proud. The senate, accustomed finally to determine on the fortunes of princes, erected itself the arbitrator of their various disputes. By these means it was that they made themselves masters of Greece, and acquired the inheritance of Eumenes, king of Pergamus; and this was the method by which Egypt was reduced to a Roman province.

We soon shall see that France has done the same. Nay Louis XIV. dared to effect what the Romans never could accomplish; he instituted a tribunal of reunion; which, pretending to search into ancient dependence, reduced whole provinces under his yoke.

It is now time to speak of the succession of Charles II. last king of Spain; and of the will which was substituted, or mutilated, by which

the French blood royal has encroached upon the rights of that of Spain; of the intrigues by which France has endeavoured to reanimate the party of the pretender in England, and make this prince king of Great Britain: and, that we may allege more recent examples, let us recollect the sending of don Carlos into Italy, and the proceedings of France in the troubles of Poland.

I might further cite the right of arbitrating, which France has arrogated to herself, in the disputes, relative to Juliers and Berg, that have arisen between the king of Prussia and the palatine of Sulzbach, which affair would properly have affected the empire only, had not the most Christian king found a pretence for interference, in the peace of Westphalia. In the note below, all which is mentioned on the subject, in this treaty of peace, may be seen\*.

Even in the disputes of the city of Geneva France has made herself a party; and, whether from corrupt or other motives, the citizens of Geneva have thrown themselves into her arms.

\* Art. IV. of the peace of Westphalia, § 7.

And, as the succession of Juliers may in process of time excite great troubles in the empire, between the persons interested, if they are not prevented, it is agreed that, after the peace, an accommodation of the cause shall be effected, by the usual means, before his Imperial majesty, or by friendly agreement, or by some other legal way, as soon as possible.

Neither will the war which the emperor is now making in Hungary be concluded without hearing mention made of France; and the Corsicans will very soon learn what their fate is to be from these same French. In fine, if differences arise, they are terminated by France. Is war to be made; France becomes a party in it. Are articles of peace to be drawn up; France imposes laws, and erects herself the sovereign arbitress of the earth.

Such are the facts which I have imagined are parallel to those I have selected from the Roman history. I cite them impartially, and without being actuated by any other motive than that of the love of truth.

I shall only add a single remark, which will relate to the conformity of genius to be found between the Roman and French negotiators. When France has attained a certain purpose, and has no more need to observe a respectful conduct, we cannot but remark, in her negotiators, an extreme haughtiness and arrogance. Suppose when they seek the assistance of kings, and insupportable in their pride, when the assistance of these kings is no more conducive to their interest. It is requisite we should here recollect the embassy which the Romans sent to Antiochus king of Syria, to prevent him from  
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attacking Ptolemy and Cleopatra, who, as sovereigns of Egypt, were the allies of the Romans. Popilius, who was no more than a Roman citizen, was charged with this embassy, and proudly demanded a categorical answer, from Antiochus, to the question that had been proposed. The king, then at the head of an army, and ready to fall on Egypt, being astonished by such a proposition, hesitated concerning a reply. Popilius, with the wand which he held in his hand, traced a circle round the king, and commanded him to answer before he passed its limits.

Let us remark the haughty and absolute manner, in which the ambassador of France behaved, in the affairs of Geneva. Let us cast a glance over the memorial\* that M. de Fenelon presented to the States-General at the Hague, relative to the succession of Juliers; let us recollect the puerile dispute † between him and the

\* At the end of the treaty.

† Of which what follows was the origin. At a festival given by the States-General, the ambassadors of France and England were present. The English ambassador drank to the health of the emperor, or to the prosperity of the States-General. M. de Fenelon affirmed it appertained to him to drink that health. The quarrel proceeded to great lengths, and it was called the war of the side-board. The story is generally known.

English

English ambassador, as singular as it was novel, concerning a point of precedency; and, from so many similar traits, we shall be able to discover designs equally ambitious in the moderns as in the ancients; and views equally extensive. In fine, we shall perceive an exact correspondence between the conduct of France and that of Philip of Macedon; as well as between that of France and of the Roman republic.

From what has been said, it will be easy to perceive that the political body of Europe is in a perilous situation. It is deprived of its due equilibrium, and is in a state in which it cannot long remain, without great risk. The political resembles the human body, which can only subsist by a mixture of equal quantities of the acid and the alkali. Whenever one of these two substances predominates, the body is made sensible of it, and the health is considerably injured: should that substance continue to increase, it may finally cause the destruction of the machine. Thus, whenever the policy and prudence of the princes of Europe lose sight of the maintenance of a just balance, between the principal powers, it is felt by the constitution of the whole body-politic. Violence on the one side, weakness on the other; the desire of invading on the one, and on the other the inability to prevent invasion.

sion. The most puissant gives law, and the feeble are under the necessity of adding their signature. All finally concur in augmenting disorder and confusion. Force acts like an impetuous torrent, passes its bounds, carries every thing with it, and exposes this unfortunate body-politic to the most fatal revolutions.

Such are the considerations which briefly have been furnished me by the present state of Europe. Should any power imagine I have explained myself with too much freedom, it ought to know that the fruit will always partake of the flavour of the tree; and that, born in a free country, I may be permitted to speak with a noble daringness, and a sincerity incapable of feigning, a sincerity of which most men are ignorant, and which perhaps will appear criminal to those who, drawing their first breath in servitude, have been educated in slavery.

After having given a sketch of the conduct of the politics of Europe, after having developed the system of its courts, according to the degree of information I possess, and shewn the dangerous consequences of the ambition of some princes, I will venture to probe the wound of this body-politic still deeper; I will examine the root of the evil, and exert myself to discover its most secret causes. Should my reflections  
fortunately

Fortunately come to the ears of some princes, they will there find truths which they never would have learned from the mouth of their courtiers, and their parasites. Perhaps they will even be astonished to perceive these truths arranging themselves round the throne. Let them be taught, therefore, that their own false principles are the most poisonous source of the misfortunes of Europe.

The error of the most of these princes is they imagine God has expressly created, out of particular attention to their grandeur their felicity and their pride, that multitude of men, the prosperity of whom is committed to their charge; and that their subjects are destined only to be their instruments, and the ministers of their ungoverned passions. Whenever first principles are founded in error, the consequences deduced must continually be vicious. Hence their disorderly love of false glory; hence their ardent desire of invasion; hence the rigor of the taxes with which the people are loaded; hence the slothfulness of kings; hence their pride, their injustice, their inhumanity, their tyranny, and all the vices by which human nature is degraded.

Were princes to reject these erroneous ideas, were they desirous of inquiring into the end of their  
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their institution, they would then perceive that the rank of which they are so vain, and their elevation, is the work of the people; that the millions of men over whom they are to watch did not all yield themselves up the slaves of an individual, in order to render him more formidable and more puissant, and that they did not subject themselves to a fellow citizen to fall the martyrs of his caprices, and to be made the sport of his whims, but that they chose the person among them whom they supposed the most just as their governor, that he might be to them a father; the most humane, that he might compassionate and alleviate their misfortunes; the most valiant, that he might defend them against their enemies; the most wise, that he might not insensibly plunge them into ruinous and destructive wars; and, in fine, the man who most effectually could represent the embodied states, and in whom sovereign power might be the support of justice and the laws, and not the instrument of committing crimes with impunity, and of exercising tyranny.

This principle being established, princes would consistently avoid the two rocks which in all ages have occasioned the ruin of empires, and the world's confusion; that is to say, immeasurable ambition, and cowardly indolence. Instead of incessantly

incessantly projecting conquests, these gods of the earth would labour only to secure happiness to their people; would wholly employ themselves to relieve the miserable, and to render their government mild and salutary. It is necessary that the benefits they should bestow should inspire men with a wish to have been born their subjects; that a general rivalry should reign among them, each endeavouring to surpass the other in bounty and clemency; that they should be convinced the true glory of monarchs does not consist in oppressing their neighbours, nor in augmenting the number of their slaves, but in fulfilling the duties of their offices, and in perfectly corresponding to the intention of those by whom they have been clothed with power, and from whom they hold supreme grandeur.

Yes, sovereigns ought to remember that ambition and vain glory are vices which are severely punished in private persons, and held in abhorrence when discovered in a prince.

Neither would those kings who should unceasingly reflect on their duties neglect to perform those duties, or hold them to be occupations unworthy of their splendor. They would not blindly commit the welfare of their people to a minister who might be corrupted, who might

be deficient in talents, and who is generally less interested in the public welfare than the sovereign.

Princes should personally watch the proceedings of their neighbours. They should apply themselves with extreme attention to penetrate their plans, and anticipate their enterprises. They should take the precautions which good alliances afford against the politics of those turbulent spirits that never cease to invade, and that, like the canker, eat into and consume whatever they touch. Prudence then would strengthen the ties of friendship, and the alliances which such princes should form. Wisdom would be their counsellor, and would render the designs of their enemies abortive; they would prefer assiduous application, which would ever have the public good for its end, to the slothful and the voluptuous lives of courts.

In a word, to lose provinces is opprobrious and ignominious; and to conquer those over which we have no legal claim is unjust and criminal rapacity.





